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This dissertation examines post-World War II debates within U.S. unions over the 
role and character of the labor press. I use archival sources and interviews to construct a 
history of the International Labor Communications Association (ILCA). The AFL-CIO 
created the ILCA (originally, the International Labor Press Association) in 1956 to 
strengthen communications with union members and the public. Representing hundreds 
of publications, the ILCA remains the only national organization of journalists working 
on behalf of U.S. unions. The debates over the role and character of union media are put 
in the context of social movement and organization theory.  
Like most modern social movements, organized labor exists as both a set of 
bureaucratic institutions and as diffuse agglomerations of individuals struggling against 
dominant social actors. Policies and practices that prioritize the needs of union 
organizations and leaders (i.e. tendencies towards “business unionism”) frequently 
conflict with the needs and impulses of rank-and-file workers (“social movement 
unionism”). The debates I examine—a campaign in the 1960s to win AFL-CIO support 
for community-based labor newspapers; divisions among union editors and leaders in the 
1980s and 1990s over the use of electronic technologies for national public relations 
instead of local campaigns; a dispute in the late 1990s over editorial freedom for union 





unionism. Movements use internal media to create member identities, define opponents, 
frame issues, and set goals. Debates over the content of movement media and who those 
media should mobilize are debates over the nature of the movement itself. 
U.S. unions are shrinking in size and influence. I conclude that union media will 
be indispensable in any successful effort to spark a new workers' movement. Given the 
constraints imposed by union leaders on the labor press, however, I conclude that the 
chances of igniting a new movement will be greatly enhanced if union journalists 
collaborate outside the current union structures. Digital media and networks of 
progressive media activists offer unprecedented opportunities for union journalists to 
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  Social Movement Theory and the Labor Press 
 
Introduction and Disclosure 
I have spent most of the past thirty years writing and editing for the U.S. labor 
movement. As a rank-and-file activist, I produced local union newsletters in my free 
time, before and after my shifts in the factories where I worked. As a paid, full-time 
editor, I produced a statewide newspaper for the Connecticut AFL-CIO. I also produced 
national publications during my fifteen years in the communications department of the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and during my three 
years as an officer in one of the AFL-CIO’s nine “constitutional departments.” (See page 
8.) I have handled membership communications and press relations during strikes, 
organizing drives, and contract talks involving tens of thousands of workers at Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin, United Technologies Corp., and other 
companies. 
Time and again, I have seen the power of the labor press to mobilize people for 
collective action. I have seen how effective union media can stimulate debate, build 
bonds of solidarity, and turn generalized discontent into steely resolve. I have also seen 
how ineffective union communications can sow division, confusion, and demoralization.  
I was drawn to communications by the social movements of the 1960s. 






and other injustices. And on each front of what was loosely called “the Movement,” 
activists were busy creating their own media—including colorful “underground” 
newspapers—to advance their cause. I turned to the alternative press for information 
about rallies, meetings, issues, and ideas—information that I and millions of others 
needed in order to organize effectively; information that the mainstream press typically 
distorted or refused to report. The alternative press was the public face of that diverse, 
sprawling movement, and its organizing center, too. It helped to educate and mobilize the 
already-committed. And it inspired others to get off the sidelines and into the fight.  
When I first became involved in the unions, I found that the labor press served the 
labor movement in many of the same ways that the “underground” press served the 
radical movements of the 1960s. It provided news and information that workers needed 
but could not obtain through mainstream media outlets. It mobilized activists and helped 
draw new, or less active, members into the union’s orbit. But I quickly found some major 
differences, too. For many workers, the labor press was their only point of contact with 
the union. The civil rights and anti-war movements were characterized by mass 
mobilizations and participatory democracy. Most union members, however, never 
attended union meetings, rallies, or other events where they could interact with union 
leaders and activists, and take part in the life of the organization.1 Consequently, much of 
what the average members knew about a union—and the wider labor movement— came 
                                            
1 George Strauss, Union Democracy, Working Paper Series, Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment (Berkeley: University of California, May 1, 1991), 9. According to Strauss, between 2 percent 







from the pages of the union newspaper. I found the labor press was more than the public 
face of the union. In important ways, for many workers, it was the union. 
Labor newspapers were not the “center of the action” of the trade union 
movement: Certainly not in the way that the alternative press was central to the 
movements of the 1960s. Most union officers—including imaginative, forward-looking 
leaders—seemed preoccupied with processing grievances, legislative lobbying, and 
contract negotiations. The labor publications were a secondary concern, at best. As a 
union editor, I often felt isolated and frustrated, and most of the union editors I have 
known felt the same. Often, they performed their journalistic duties after work and on 
weekends for little or no pay. Many of them burned out after a year or two, and quit.2  
Much of the understanding and support I received came from other union 
journalists who were active in the International Labor Communications Association 
(ILCA). The ILCA sponsored conferences where we could commiserate, share ideas, and 
sharpen our skills. The ILCA allowed us to form networks and friendships with editors 
from the biggest union magazines to the tiniest mimeographed newsletters. We received 
mailings full of news about the labor press from all across the country. We met union 
leaders and mainstream reporters who seemed to grasp the importance of what we were 
trying to do.  
This dissertation is a history of the International Labor Communications 
Association, the only national organization of union journalists in the post-World War II 
                                            
2 1979 Membership Survey, International Labor Communications Association files, Washington, 
DC.  (Hereafter cited as ILCA.)  In 1979, 54 percent of ILPA members responding to a survey described 
themselves as part-time editors with other union duties and/or shop work occupying most of their time. 
Twenty-five percent of local union respondents said they received no compensation for their editorial work. 






period. In the interests of full disclosure, I have been active in the ILCA since the early 
1980s, including one term on the executive council from 2004 to 2006. Whatever biases I 
bring to this study (conscious or not) will, I hope, be offset by the value of my first-hand 
knowledge of labor media and the ILCA.  
Terminology 
Editors employed by the newly-founded AFL-CIO and its affiliates created the 
International Labor Communications Association in 1956. Its original name was the 
International Labor Press Association (ILPA).  I will use the acronym ILCA as my 
“default” reference, but when writing about a particular period I will use the 
organizational name or acronym appropriate to that time. Occasionally a quote or 
reference may use the name or acronym from a different period, but it should be 
understood that the ILPA and ILCA are one and the same organization.  
I will make frequent references to four levels of union organization:  
1. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations  
(AFL-CIO or the “federation”) is a voluntary, national association of trade 
unions. It was created in 1955 through a merger of the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The 
AFL-CIO performs a number of functions for its member unions, which I 
refer to as “affiliates” or “affiliated unions.” The functions include political 






the regulation of inter-union relations.3 An organizational chart of the AFL-
CIO appears on page 8. 
2. National and international unions are, respectively, unions that operate 
solely within the U.S., and unions that operate within the U.S. as well as 
countries or territories outside the U.S. (e.g. Canada).  For convenience’s 
sake I follow a widely-accepted convention within organized labor and refer 
to both categories as “internationals,” or “international unions.” A chart 
showing the structure of a typical international union appears on page 9. 
3. “Central Labor Councils” (“CLCs, or “central labor bodies”) are 
subdivisions of the national AFL-CIO that represent unions at the state or 
municipal level.  I will refer to all such organizations as CLCs, central labor 
bodies, or labor councils. When greater specificity is required, I will insert 
the words state or local (e.g. “state labor council,” “local labor council,” or 
“local CLC”). 4  
4. Local unions, or locals, are the smallest subdivision within organized labor.  
They are the organizational units located closest to the union rank and file, 
and in which rank-and-file members are most active. Locals typically 
represent members of one union under contract to one employer or (in the 
                                            
3 In the fall of 2005, six unions quit the AFL-CIO to found a new labor federation, Change to Win 
(CTW).  Overwhelmingly, my research involves events that occurred prior to the split.  
4 Pavy, Gordon, director of the AFL-CIO Department of Collective Bargaining, Nov. 4, 2009, 
telephone interview by author. Currently, there 51 state and 484 local central bodies in the U.S., many of 







case of amalgamated locals) members of one union working for and having 
contracts with several employers.5 
I use the terms “labor press” and “union press” interchangeably to describe the 
publications affiliated with the ILCA. I do so to underscore the reality that in the post-
World War II era, no press speaks broadly for all workers, organized and unorganized 
alike.6 As Chapter 3 explains, from the 1800s through the early 1940s, a rich variety of 
union and independent publications served large swathes of the U.S. working class. The 
destruction of the labor left and the consolidation of a federalized industrial relations 
system during the 1940s and early 1950s killed off most of the independent workers’ 
publications and effectively turned the U.S. labor press into a union press. Historically, 
the overwhelming majority of ILCA publications have circulated solely among union 
members and (to the extent that they read them) members of union households. As the 
following section shows, many union editors are also responsible for communicating with 
people outside the ranks of organized labor (e.g. with mainstream reporters and public 
officials), and I use the term “public relations” to describe those activities. I use the terms 
“publications” and “media” as catch-alls for all manner of communications (e.g. print, 
video, Internet, and radio).    
As explained later in this chapter, the U.S. labor movement has a dual character. It 
exists simultaneously as a set of large, formal organizations and as diffuse groups of 
workers scattered all across the country. I use the term “institutional labor” to refer to the 
                                            
5 Ibid. There are more than 30,000 union locals in the U.S., virtually all which are affiliated with a 
national or international union. 
 
6 The fact that the words “labor press” form part of the name of the ILPA (the International Labor 






organizations themselves—the AFL-CIO and its affiliated unions—and their leaders. As I 
explain in Chapter 3, union leaders who focus on internal administration and economic 
bargaining have historically been said to practice “business unionism.” Union leaders 
who prioritize the needs and interests of rank-and-file workers in the unions and 
communities are said to practice “social movement unionism.” In Chapter 3, I also 
describe two tendencies within union journalism that reflect the dual character of 
organized labor. I use the term “institutional union journalism” to describe labor press 
practices (e.g. media content, the role of the audience, production, and distribution) that 
focus attention on union leaders, internal union policies, and officially-sanctioned 
activities. I use the term “social movement union journalism” to describe labor press 
practices that focus attention on union members, questions of social justice, and the lives 
of working people inside and outside the unions.7 
The ILCA and a Profile of Union Journalists 
The ILCA is an organization of publications (e.g. newsletters, web sites, and 
videos) produced by U.S. trade unions and other organizations deemed by ILCA’s leaders 
to share their goals and interests. Publications of any size, from any level of an eligible 
                                            
7 Steven Brill, The Teamsters, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978);  Matthew Bates, “The 
Alliance for Labor Action,” Labor Center Review 6, (May, 1984): 54-56 [excerpted from a longer paper, 
which is available from the author]; Ralph Nader, “The Sorry State of the Labor Press,” The Progressive 41 
no. 10 (Oct., 1977): 29-31; Michael Hoyt, “Is the Labor Press Doing Its Job?” Columbia Journalism 
Review 22, no. 2 (Aug., 1983): 34-39. Business unionism and social movement unionism are tendencies, or 
ideal types. Unions and union publications are pulled in conflicting directions depending on circumstances 
and the issues at hand. For example, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters has a well-earned 
reputation for anti-democratic internal practices. Yet, the IBT quit the AFL-CIO in 1969 to help launch a 
new progressive social movement. The IBT official directing that effort was the socialist leader of a large 
union local which ran non-profit grocery stores, medical centers, and recreational facilities for members 
and their families in and around St. Louis, Missouri. Union publications also reflect the conflict between 
labor’s “institutional” interests and the broad interests of grassroots labor. For decades, many mainstream 
and union journalists have praised the Machinist newspaper its in-depth coverage of controversial social 






















organization, may join the ILCA. Consequently, multiple publications produced by the 
same organization often belong to the ILCA at the same time. Currently, nearly 1,000 
publications belong to the ILCA. Structurally, the ILCA is an Executive Council with 
fifteen voting members: a president, secretary-treasurer, and thirteen vice presidents. In 
addition, there are two “ex-officio” (non-voting) seats on the council. One is reserved for 
the immediate past president of the ILCA, and the other for a representative of the AFL-
CIO. The executive council meets quarterly, and its members serve on a voluntary basis. 
In 1999, the ILCA began to employ a full-time executive director.  
Every two years, the ILCA holds a convention where delegates nominate and 
elect members of the executive council. Should a seat become vacant between 
conventions, other council members may appoint an eligible member of the ILCA to fill 
the position until the next convention. 
ILCA members have created “regional” associations in various parts of the 
country and “industrial” associations within particular unions (e.g. The Midwest Labor 
Press Association, and the UAW’s Local Union Press Association). Currently, eight 
regional associations and some half-dozen industrial associations are affiliated with the 
ILCA. These groups are chartered by the ILCA and must adhere to the ILCA’s 
constitution and code of ethics. However, they are “free-standing” associations. They are 
affiliated with—but not run by nor a formal part of—the ILCA.8 
                                            
8 This dissertation focuses mainly on activities involving the ILCA executive council, and the top 
staff and officers of the AFL-CIO and its affiliates. A study that additionally included the ILCA’s regional 
and industrial associations would tell a richer story—one that captured the experiences of union journalists 
in the shops and local communities, and within specific unions. At the time of this writing, I have not 
determined whether the various associations maintained records of their activities over the years. I expect 






Similarly, the ILCA is an “allied organization” of the AFL-CIO. The ILCA 
represents publications produced by unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Like those 
unions, the ILCA must adhere to federation policy. However the ILCA is not formally 
part of the AFL-CIO, and it is not under direct federation control. 
 Once or twice a decade since 1956, the ILCA has surveyed its members to 
determine their interests and needs. The quality and focus of the surveys, as well as the 
questions they asked, varied widely. So did the response rates, which were sometimes too 
low to produce useful results. Still, there was enough commonality in the surveys 
conducted in 1974, 1994, and 1996 to construct a general picture of the journalists active 
in the ILCA.  
 The majority of respondents (between 63 percent and 73 percent) represented 
local unions. Between 11 percent and 12 percent represented international unions, and the 
remaining publications were affiliated with CLCs and other state or regional union 
organizations.  
The majority of union editors (between 54 and 56 percent) said they performed 
their journalistic duties on a part-time and/or voluntary basis. No fewer than 60 percent 
(and as many as 78 percent) of the respondents indicated they performed other union 
tasks in addition to writing and editing their union publications. In 1996, only 22.3 
percent of the respondents listed their job title simply as “editor” or “assistant editor.” 
The remainder indicated they were also responsible for such duties as grievance handling, 
community service programs, labor education, and holding elected union office. 






almost certainly from local union or CLC publications. I am not aware of any 
international union officers who were active in the ILCA.) 
 Sixty-one percent of the respondents said they produced their union publications 
alone, without any assistance from other union members or staff. Of the few who did 
report receiving assistance, the vast majority (78 percent) said their helpers worked on a 
part-time basis, or as volunteers. Between 53 percent and 66 percent of the respondents 
said they had no journalistic experience outside the labor press.  
Communications, Social Movements, and the Labor Press 
Leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) created the ILCA in 1956 to represent publications 
produced by members of the new federations and its allied organizations.9  Though 
technically the ILCA represents publications, in practice it has always been an 
organization of labor movement journalists—a discursive space where editors and 
reporters working inside organized labor could “network,” share information, 
commiserate, collaborate on projects, and debate ways to strengthen the labor press.  
 Curiously, most social movement scholars have ignored the role of internal 
movement media, a puzzling omission given the nature of social movements and the 
large body of research devoted to their study. Social movements mobilize people to 
undertake sustained collective action against more powerful groups. They are “meaning-
making” processes through which people forge new identities, and craft internal 
                                            
9 In 1983, the International Labor Press Association (ILPA) changed its name to the International 







movement cultures that define behaviors, ideas, institutions, and social relations as just or 
unjust; acceptable or unacceptable.10 
It is impossible to fully understand how movements recruit members, shape 
norms and identities, frame debates, and reach out to the press and public without 
considering the role of movement media. As media scholar John Downing observed, “It 
is on the edge of being weird that there is so little systematic analysis of communication 
or media in the social movement literature.”11   
On the other hand, journalism and media scholars have written extensively on 
radical and alternative media. But a significant gap exists in this literature, as well. As 
journalism historian Jon Bekken wrote, the labor press is “virtually unstudied in its 
structure, circulation and impact.”12 The omission, too, is puzzling given the long history 
of labor struggles with employers, vigilantes, the National Guard, and even the U.S. 
Army.13 Historically, a colorful mix of independent radical publications, foreign 
language newspapers and union publications have sustained and popularized the struggles 
of U.S. workers. However, as Bekken pointed out, historians have treated these 
publications not as examples of journalism, but as sources of information about various 
social and political events. The study of the labor “press as a subject in itself has barely 
                                            
10 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, (Aug. 2000): 611-39. 
 
11 John Downing et al. Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 26. 
 
12 Jon E. Bekken. “No Weapon So Powerful: Working Class Newspapers in the United States,” 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 12, no. 2 (July 1988):111. 
 
13 Jeremy Brecher, Strike, (Boston: South End Press, 1972); Oscar Ameringer, If You Don’t 
Weaken, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983); Mary Harris Jones, The Autobiography of 







begun,” he wrote.14 Scholarly neglect of the post-World War II labor press is particularly 
pronounced, as I show in Chapter 2. 
Thesis and Research Questions 
I address these gaps in the literature by examining the role played by the ILCA 
and its member publications in the post-World War II labor movement. Drawing upon a 
fusion of social movement and organization theory, and upon studies of alternative 
media, I examine several crucial debates involving the ILCA for insights into the role of 
social movement media—in particular, the role of the modern labor press.  
I consider the ILCA and its member publications as discursive arenas within the 
labor movement: as spaces where ideas circulate and are contested, and where meanings 
are formed.15 As shown later in this chapter, the debates inside a movement over which 
issues to address, or who to mobilize and how, can reflect wholly different conceptions of 
the movement itself. Using studies of how social movements grow and transform 
themselves, I consider what the debates involving the ILCA reveal about the deeper 
conflicts between organized labor’s institutional interests and the needs of its grassroots 
social base. Specifically, I attempt to answer two questions: 
1. Given the historical constraints placed on the ILCA and its member 
publications, can the labor press serve as an instrument to transform      
organized labor into a vigorous, expanding workers’ movement?   
                                            
14 Bekken, “No Weapon So Powerful,”114.  
15 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT 






2. If the labor press can play that role, what might a “transformative” labor 
press look like?  How would it be organized, and what would it do? 
 
Preview of Chapters 
 In the following sections, I examine labor as a social movement. I also explore 
social movement and organization theories relevant to modern grassroots movements that 
are led by large bureaucratic institutions. I then review research by alternative media 
scholars for insights into the post-World War II labor press.  
In Chapter 2, I review the work of historians who have studied the origins of 
“business unionism” and its conflicts with “social movement” labor. I examine crucial 
choices made by the top leaders of institutional labor—the AFL, the CIO, and major 
internationals—to narrow the movement’s goals and its range of discourse.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the limited, but important, research on the labor press by 
historians and media scholars. Using the theoretical framework described later in this 
chapter and the insights into “business” unionism in Chapter 2, I describe journalistic 
practices that differentiate “institutional union journalism” from “social movement union 
journalism”—differences that help to explain the dynamics underlying key debates 
involving the ILCA, AFL-CIO, and other actors over the role of the labor press.  
Chapter 4, “The Campaign for Community Labor Newspapers,” explores the 
ILPA’s efforts to convince the AFL-CIO leaders to create weekly newspapers in cities 
and states with large union populations. In the mid-1960s, leaders of the federation and 






organized labor. Many influential union editors and high-ranking AFL-CIO staff backed 
the call for community papers, believing it offered a timely, practical plan for restoring 
communications with the federation’s grassroots membership. But top AFL-CIO leaders 
refused to even consider the ILPA’s proposal. In Chapter 5, I examine the reasons behind 
that startling disconnect between union leaders and union editors. I examine forces in the 
post-war political economy—including federal labor laws, postal regulations, and anti-
communist/anti-corruption campaigns by government and business—that powerfully 
shaped the character of institutional labor and the labor press.  
In Chapter 6, “In Whose Voice?” I look at two closely related debates concerning 
the labor press: (1) Should union newspapers serve as ‘house organs” that focus on the 
actions and ideas of union leaders, or as “grassroots tribunes” that mobilize and speak for 
the union rank and file? (2) Should union communications take the form of public 
relations, and target politicians, the press, and the general public? Or should unions use 
mass media and other channels to organize working-class communities? Both debates 
exploded in a very public way as the political and economic clout of organized labor 
visibly declined in the late 1990s. Some ILCA leaders began advocating editorial 
independence for union journalists and blasting the AFL-CIO communications program 
as a top-down, corporatist operation. Federation officials responded by threatening to 
dismantle the ILCA. 
 In the final chapter, I consider what the campaign for community papers and the 
debates that erupted in the 1990s suggest about the potential for the labor press to 
transform the labor movement. I conclude that the labor press must be one of the primary 






However, I also argue that union journalists do not need to—and should not— wait for 
labor leaders to ignite that transformation. Union journalists can create the cultural 
conditions for a new movement by experimenting with innovative collective action 
frames: with new conceptions of what it means to be a worker, and new modes of 
organizing. But to do that, union editors must create spaces outside the union structure 
where they will be free to develop new ideas and practices that can successfully challenge 
the dominant logics of organized labor.  
Labor as a Social Movement  
Sociologist and political scientist Sidney Tarrow defined social movements as 
groups of ordinary people, possessing limited resources, who engage in “sequences of 
contentious politics based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action 
frames…which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful 
opponents.”16 According to Tarrow, collective action becomes contentious “when it is 
used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or 
authorities. Contentious collective action… is the main and often the only recourse that 
ordinary people possess against better-equipped opponents or powerful states.”17 Social 
movements frequently employ non-disruptive tactics (e.g. petitioning) but, for Tarrow, 
contentious activities remained their “most characteristic” feature.18   
                                            
16 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2. 
 
17 Ibid., 3. 
 






Rather than concentrating on contention, sociologists Doug McAdam and          
W. Richard Scott described four characteristic processes of social movements: “the 
mobilization of people and resources, the construction and reconstruction of identities, 
the building of alliances, and the crafting of ideologies and cultural frames to support and 
sustain collective action.”19 The processes they described closely parallel three core 
activities that Tarrow said characterize social movements: (1) mounting collective 
challenges, (2) drawing upon social networks, common purposes, and cultural 
frameworks, and (3) building solidarity through connective structures and collective 
identities.20 
The dominant social movement theories of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, discussed 
below, took as their unit of analysis a movement or group of movements. 21 They offered 
useful insights into the past struggles that created today’s unions of today and into current 
upheavals involving unorganized or loosely organized groups of workers (e.g. the 
immigrant rights movements). But they failed to capture some of the fundamental 
dynamics of the labor unions themselves. As sociologist Paul Johnson explained, 
“Today’s labor organization is partly a product of labor movements of the past, partly a 
product of employer and governmental responses to those movements and…partly an 
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arena within (and sometimes against) which new labor movements may emerge.”22 In 
other words, organized labor is multi-layered and complex. Unions operate within a 
matrix of laws, regulations, and political obligations governing their interactions with 
employers, branches of the state, and other formal institutions. At the same time, 
organized labor exists as a decentralized agglomeration of groups that mobilize workers 
for contentious action. Moreover, rank-and-file workers sometimes self-organize for 
contentious actions directed against their own labor leaders.23  
Sociologists Gerald Davis and Mayar Zald might have been thinking about 
organized labor when they wrote, “Social movements are often represented by formal 
organizations, and organizations respond to social movements and have movement-like 
processes within themselves.”24 It was this realization in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
that convinced scholars of the need to synthesize social movement and organization 
theory. 
The Evolution of Social Movement Theory 
Social movement theories of the 1950s (dubbed “collective behavior” and 
“grievance” theory) focused on shared beliefs and identities. They linked contentious 
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politics to feelings of mass alienation produced by social shocks and dislocations.25 In 
one respect, this analysis echoed a commonplace of trade union doctrine: the notion that 
unions are the workers’ natural response to exploitation. It also resonated with more 
radical ideologies that viewed unions as manifestations of an underlying class struggle—
“uninterrupted, now hidden, now open”— inherent in capitalist society.26 On the other 
hand, the dominant theories of the 1950s reflected the efforts of liberal-pluralist scholars 
to explain the mass appeal of fascism and Stalinism. Consequently, they tended to view 
social movements as “dysfunctional, irrational and inherently undesirable” phenomena.27  
With the rise of the U.S. civil rights movement, scholars began to consider social 
movements in a more positive light, as rational attempts to advance legitimate collective 
interests. They developed new theories of “resource mobilization” and “rational choice,” 
which emphasized the ability of entrepreneurial leaders to leverage limited movement 
resources to acquire additional resources from outside the movement. They also focused 
on rational actors weighing costs and benefits to decide whether to support a particular 
movement.28 In so doing, resource-mobilization and rational-choice theorists 
concentrated on a number of questions relevant to the labor press, including building 
solidarity between resource-poor members, and alliances with influential external actors.  
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However, these theories had a significant shortcoming: They could neither 
explain why one movement succeeded while another (with similar resources) failed, nor 
why movements would appear at some times and places but not at others. To answer 
those questions, scholars in the 1960s and 1970s shifted their attention to changes in the 
movements’ environment.29 As sociologist David Meyer, an architect of “political 
opportunity theory,” wrote, “Activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, 
mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent.” Political, 
economic, and social conditions affect “the grievances around which activists mobilize,” 
and make certain actions more or less attractive to the actors; more or less likely to 
succeed. “The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices—–their agency —
can only be understood…by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in 
which their choices are made.”30 Historian Robert Korstad used political opportunity 
theory to study the unionization of North Carolina tobacco workers during the 1940s.31 
He identified a confluence of forces that created opportunities for union supporters, 
including a large community of African-Americans (which included middle-class 
professionals) surrounding the R. J. Reynolds factories, the presence of seasoned 
communist cadre, and employees with military and union experience. Efforts to form 
unions commonly failed throughout the south during this period, but the R. J. Reynolds 
workers exploited a particular set of opportunities and built an industrial union.  
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Social Movements as Meaning-making Processes 
 “Resource mobilization” and “political opportunity” theorists were correct to 
argue that political-economic change constrains (or facilitates) the growth of social 
movements in significant ways. However, they were wrong to privilege changes in the 
political-economic structure over the “cultural and ideational dimensions of collective 
action,” according to Doug McAdam.32 “The causal importance of expanding political 
opportunities…is inseparable from the collective definitional processes by which the 
meaning of these shifts is assigned and disseminated,” McAdam wrote.33 People decide 
to engage in collective action based on how they perceive their individual and collective 
interests, the “rightness” of their cause, their own strength, and the strength of their 
opponents.34 In a point with great relevance for the labor press, McAdam argued that 
successful leaders must learn to “join the cognitive orientations of individuals” with the 
goals and objectives of the social movement organization.35  
Social movements “become worlds unto themselves,” with their own cultural 
practices, identities, and beliefs.36 A strong, internal culture creates the cohesion and 
willingness to sacrifice that resource-poor movements need to confront wealthier, more 
powerful opponents. Organized labor has its canonic songs and slogans (e.g. “Solidarity 
Forever;” “An Injury to One is an Injury to All”), movement heroes (e.g. Eugene Debs 
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and Mother Jones), and such terms as “sister,” “brother,” “free-rider,” and “scab” to 
differentiate insiders from outsiders, and friends from foes. Because the very act of 
defining grievances generates an “us” and a “them,” identity construction is inherent in 
all social movements.37   
However, the task of creating collective identities is particularly critical and 
challenging for organized labor. Unlike most movement organizations, unions primarily 
represent people the organization did not organize, and who did not join of their own 
volition. Federal laws banning the “closed shop” granted employers the exclusive right to 
screen potential employees and decide whom to hire.38 The union must then endeavor to 
win the loyalty of those employees. A union’s power rests largely on its ability to 
mobilize people handpicked by the boss.    
Social movements are reflexive processes of discourse and collective action. 
Movements define problems, and cast people as protagonists, antagonists, or neutrals 
through the use of “diagnostic collective action frames.” They set goals, assign tasks, and 
select tactics by using “prognostic collective action frames.” They employ “motivational 
collective action frames” to energize supporters and to demoralize opponents.39 William 
Gamson and Andre Modigliani’s model of “collective action frames” captures the 
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dynamic between discourse and collective struggle. The contending social actors advance 
competing “interpretative packages” comprised of “framing devices” (i.e. metaphors, 
examples, descriptive words and images) and “reasoning devices” (i.e. identifications of 
root causes, predictions of consequences, and appeals to principle). 40 Victory hinges on 
the cultural resonance of the competing frames, and on the practices, resources, and 
perceived credibility of the actors, including the media.41 Movement discourse, in other 
words, both shapes and is shaped by collective action. Debates about the content and 
deployment of movement media are debates over the identity and direction of the 
movement itself. 
The ILCA as an Organizational Field 
Because my purposes in writing a history of the ILCA are descriptive and 
explanatory, I do not employ theory to predict outcomes or to test competing models of 
social movement media. Nonetheless, I found the synthesis of social movement and 
organization theory developed by Davis, McAdam and others provided a useful 
framework for studying the ILCA and the post-World War II labor press. Specifically, in 
Chapter 7, I apply the following “analytic conventions” to key debates involving the 
ILCA in order to assess the potential of union media to transform the labor movement:  
1.     The “organizational” field is the fundamental unit of analysis.  
2.     To understand episodes of change in the organizational field, we must  
                                            
40 William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach,” The American Journal of Sociology 95, no. 1 (July 1989): 1-4. 
 







    define the composition of the field by identifying the following “actors:”  
a) “Dominants” are individuals, groups, and organizations that enjoy a 
privileged position within the organizational field. The structure and 
operation of the organizational field provides dominant actors with 
superior access to resources, and the ability to influence the access of less-
powerful actors to resources. The norms, values, and beliefs of dominant 
actors are the dominant “institutional logics” of the field.   
b) “Challengers” are actors who seek to contest the advantaged position of 
the dominants, or the ways in which the field is structured and governed. 
c) “Governance units” are organizations that wield power and authority 
within the field. They may operate within the field or within the field’s 
wider social environment. Governance units facilitate and constrain field-
level interactions.  
3.    The organizational field exists within a “wider social environment”    
   comprised of: 
a)  “External actors.” These actors may not appear or directly participate in 
field-level interactions, yet they influence the course of events. 
b) “External governance units” are authority and power structures wielding 
society-wide influence. They provide opportunities and constraints for 
field-level actors. 
4.     “Social actors” are constituted by—and their behaviors are guided by—  
“institutional logics” (i.e. norms, values and beliefs). “Primary, or 






“Secondary logics” guide and legitimate the actions of subordinate actors 
or challengers. Social actors interpret and frame field-level events 
according to their institutional logics.  
5.    “Destabilizing events or processes”—typically, fundamental changes in the  
    wider social environment—introduce the potential for field-level change.  
    However, they do not, by themselves, trigger cycles of contention. 
6.     Episodes of field-level change are likely if and only if the actors respond   
to destabilizing events or processes through a process of “reactive 
mobilization,” which involves the following three mechanisms: 
a) “Attribution of threat or opportunity”: The field-level actors interpret 
destabilizing events or processes as either threats or opportunities 
affecting their group interests. 
b) “Social appropriation”: The field-level actors establish their interpretation 
of the destabilizing event or process as the dominant institutional logic for 
their groups. 
c) “The appearance of new actors and innovative actions”: The new 
dominant institutional logics—the new perceptions of threats or 
opportunities—cause new actors to emerge and/or cause actors to adopt 
new innovative behaviors. The presence of new actors and forms of 
interaction can generate more conflict and destabilization.  
7. If all three reactive mobilization mechanisms occur, field dominants and  
challengers are likely to interact in increasingly innovative and 






alignment”: a new balance of power between field-level actors that leads 
to a new “institutional settlement” regarding how the field is structured 
and stabilized. Social change takes place in stages. Each stage is triggered 
by particular destabilizing events; each involves different alignments of 
social actors with distinct institutional logics, or new actors and new forms 
of interaction.42 
Alternative Media and the Labor Press 
 As Chapter 2 will show, U.S. unions were largely isolated from, even hostile to, 
the mass movements of the 1960s that sparked so much scholarly interest in alternative 
media. On the other hand, the U.S. labor movement was often in the forefront of the mass 
struggles for social change from the 1880s through World War II when the Knights of 
Labor, Eugene Debs’ Socialist Party, the IWW, the Communist Party, and the early CIO 
roiled the country. And during those periods, much of the labor press reflected the 
rebellious spirit of the movement it served. With the crushing of the left-led unions in the 
late 1940s and the creation of a federalized industrial relations system, organized labor 
became more predictable and bland. And in important ways, the labor press became less 
interesting and, well, less fun. This may explain why so many scholars of social 
movements and alternative media have ignored the post-World War II labor press. Even 
so, their research is vital for a proper understanding of the ILCA.43 
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In his book People’s Movements, People’s Press, historian Bob Ostertag argued 
that social movement media “can be understood only in the context of the particular 
movements” they serve and that this requires a “detailed historical analysis.”44 For 
Ostertag, the important question was not “whether words are shared, but how they are 
shared... [and] the social relations that develop” from a movement’s use of media.45 
Indeed, as I show in Chapter 5, the post-World War II labor press has mirrored—and 
helped to reinforce—the structure and distribution of resources within the U.S. labor 
movement. Since the 1940s, a small number of well-resourced publications with 
nationwide circulations produced by the large, wealthy international unions have 
dominated the U.S. labor press, while thousands of poorly-resourced publications 
produced by local unions and CLCs have addressed smaller audiences in specific 
worksites and localities.  
Media scholar John Downing also emphasized the importance of the social 
relations created by movement media. “Communications within and by social 
movements is…a vital necessity,” Downing wrote. But Downing wasn’t interested 
primarily in how media contribute to specific rallies or campaigns. Far more important 
to Downing, were the interlocking “webs of interpersonal communication that do not 
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operate through media yet are fed by media and feed into media.” 46 Movements rely 
upon activist networks to survive periods of inactivity, construct alliances, amass 
knowledge, and give birth to new movements.  
Downing’s Radical Media is the single most comprehensive study of social 
movement media. He opened the book by faulting his earlier writings for defining 
“radical alternative media” too narrowly, as “pure opposition to mainstream media.”47 
He then offered a more expansive definition that included media operating “relatively 
free” of dominant group influence and only “sometimes in opposition” to dominant 
agendas.48 His broader definition of radical alternative media certainly applies to the 
post-World War II labor press. Nonetheless, in Radical Media, Downing still focused 
overwhelmingly on media produced by small, intensely oppositional groups. His focus 
was the result, I believe, of the way Downing counterposed social movements 
(“dynamic expressions of resistance”) to “institutions such as unions or [political] 
parties,” which he described as “stable and enduring.”49 That formulation prevented 
Downing from recognizing a hallmark of modern social movements: their simultaneous 
existence as grassroots struggles and formal institutions.  
 Chris Atton’s book, Alternative Media, also concentrated on media produced by 
small, highly oppositional organizations. However, Atton defined alternative media 
primarily by the degree to which they erased traditional distinctions between audience 
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and producer.50 Even so, Atton’s book identified important tendencies within the modern 
labor press. He distinguished “advocacy media” (which speak on behalf of subordinate 
groups) from “grassroots media” which speak for and are produced by subordinate group 
members. In subsequent chapters, I repeatedly describe tensions between local union 
editors (who have intimate ties to the union rank and file) and international union editors 
who interact mainly with high-ranking officers and staff.51 Atton employed another 
useful term, “native journalism,” to describe reporting produced by participant/activists 
about conditions they face and campaigns they are waging.52  
Atton  pointed to Nancy Fraser’s notion of multiple public spheres and “parallel 
discursive arenas” to argue that isolation actually benefits subordinate groups by 
providing spaces to engage in “prefigurative politics” and develop distinctive 
identities.53 He explicitly rejected arguments that inadequate resources and ultra-
democratic operating methods have trapped alternative media in “alternative ghettos” 
where they cannot affect the mainstream discourse. 54 (In a particularly descriptive turn 
of phrase, I. A. Boal wrote that modern media monopolies force subordinate groups into 
“communicative enclosures,” in much the same way that the buying up of the commons 
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forced peasants off the land and into the mills of 18th and 19th century England.) 55  
However, Atton has mischaracterized Fraser’s arguments, and treated the corrosive 
effects of isolation far too lightly. Atton seemed fascinated by the purity of small, 
isolated sects, while Fraser emphasized the “emancipatory mission” of the alternative 
press. She viewed discursive spaces as liberated zones where subaltern groups could 
withdraw, regroup, and gain the strength necessary to fight their way into the 
mainstream discourse and make social change.56     
According to Fraser, social discourse is conducted by multiple “publics” who 
possess unequal power and occupy “parallel discursive arenas.” Marginalized groups use 
debate and discussion to define themselves and to gain a sense of strength and common 
purpose. “Preferences, interests and identities are not given exogenously,” Fraser wrote. 
“They are as much outcomes as antecedents of public deliberation.”57 Alternative media 
allow oppressed people to launch agitational campaigns directed outwards towards other 
groups and broader “publics.”58  
In her study of the U.S. suffragist press, journalism scholar Linda Steiner 
explored the emancipatory potential of alternative media. Suffragist “periodicals 
provided the arenas in which women could come together to experiment with alternative 
definitions of and for women,” Steiner wrote. Here, “they could try on various identities 
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and then advocate those conceptions that offered a sense of significance and value.” 
Activist writers and editors helped craft to cultures and networks that were vital in 
“sustaining both individuals and the [women’s] movement as a whole.”59   
Discursive spaces; Arenas of Struggle 
However, journalism scholar Lauren Kessler pointed out, alternative discursive 
spaces rarely encourage freewheeling debate. Historically, marginalized people have 
tended to divide, again and again, into like-minded groups, and debate has mainly taken 
place between those groups, not within them. Even so, Kessler argued, studying the 
alternative press is a crucial way to recover “a complex marketplace of ideas in the 
passionate rhetoric of the dispossessed”—ideas that were rarely recorded by the 
dominant media.60 As Chapter 5 will show, from the 1940s on union leaders 
increasingly sought to muzzle the voices of rank-and-file workers. But muzzling is not 
the same as erasing. Studying the labor press is a way to recover dissident voices and 
perspectives that might otherwise be lost.   
Labor scholar Ruth Needleman described how leaders and “non-leaders” create 
different types of discursive spaces in a struggle for political power. Union members (as 
well as low-level officers and staff) create “independent spaces” where they can come 
together outside “the dominant culture and controlled structures of the union.”61 Such 
spaces might include informal peer networks, ad hoc committees, or publications 
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produced by the union rank and file. Union leaders create “structured opportunities” that 
provide members and subordinates with controlled experiences and limited 
responsibilities. Structured opportunities might include committee assignments, or the 
chance to work on official union publications, or to participate in the ILCA. Structured 
opportunities and independent spaces, alike, can be arenas of struggle. However, 
structured opportunities almost invariably reproduce and reinforce the existing union 
culture. Independent spaces, on the other hand, have the potential to produce new 
identities and ideologies that can displace those of the incumbent leaders.62 As I show in 
Chapter 7, the autonomy of the ILCA (and of union journalists) has a great deal to do 
with the potential of the labor press to transform the labor movement. 
According to media scholars Nick Couldry and James Curran, political struggles 
always involve battles over “representational resources” (i.e. the resources required to 
define social reality by framing and disseminating ideas).63 As subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, debates over the “appropriate” role of the labor press have invariably 
involved the distribution of money, staff, and other “symbolic resources” within the labor 
movement. On the most obvious level, the AFL-CIO and the international unions have 
always had the ability to influence the ILCA because they control much of the ILCA’s 
income and employ many of its leaders. But debates over symbolic resources and the 
labor press have hinged on more interesting questions than that: What matters should the 
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union members know about? What information should be closely held by the union 
leadership? Whose voices should be heard in news stories and on the editorial pages? 








 “Business” and “Social-Movement” Unionism 
My Scope of Study 
 My study of the International Labor Communications Association (ILCA) is an 
“institutional” labor history. I focus on a set of labor organizations, officers, and 
journalists active in the post-World War II labor press. A “new labor” history, focused 
from the “bottom up” on the ways that everyday workers used the labor press, would 
make a fascinating study.64 However, as explained in Chapter 1—and as subsequent 
chapters demonstrate—very little research exists on the U.S. labor press, particularly for 
the years after World War II. How could we make sense of the workers’ use of labor 
media without knowing how the labor press was structured, who controlled it, or the 
resources it possessed? I hope to fill some of those gaps in the literature by tracing the 
history of the ILCA, the only national organization of union journalists in the post-war 
period, and by examining key conflicts within that organization, and between it, the AFL-
CIO, and the international unions. 
 Of course, the ILCA cannot be understood in isolation. The decisions of its 
leaders and the debates about the labor press occurred within a matrix of power 
relations—an organizational field—involving social actors driven by different norms, 
values, beliefs, and organizational needs. Political-economic forces do not determine 
human decisions in a mechanical, predictable fashion. Still, the social environment does 
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create limits and exert pressures that shape human behavior in powerful ways by making 
certain courses of action more feasible, “thinkable,” or attractive.65 To paraphrase Karl 
Marx, people do make their own history—but not as they please, or in circumstances of 
their own choosing.66 The history of the ILCA, then, must be understood in the context of 
the labor movement that created the organization, and which that organization served.67  
In this chapter, I examine two conflicting tendencies which, most historians agree, 
have characterized the U.S. labor movement. “Business unionism” is a set of labor union 
policies and practices that emphasize centralized, hierarchical administrative controls, the 
pursuit of short-term economic and political objectives, and the suppression of 
independent rank-and-file activity. “Social movement unionism” is characterized by 
policies and practices that encourage internal union democracy, the pursuit of broad 
political and economic reform, and rank-and-file initiative.  
Environment, Agency, and the Rise of Business Unionism 
According to labor scholars Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss, the anti-communist 
purges and the creation of a federalized system of industrial relations in the 1940s and 
1950s “produced a distinctive variety of unionism, which in turn and over time, also 
generated a distinctive type of labor leader.” This distinctive type of leader was more 
concerned with collective bargaining than with mobilizing the rank and file; more 
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concerned with administrative duties than with social reforms.68 Fantasia and Voss made 
an important point. As I show in this chapter, under the U.S. industrial relations system, 
labor leaders became responsible for administering complicated plans involving pensions, 
seniority, health and welfare, and other vital benefits. They also became legally obligated 
to enforce contracts which typically required the union to maintain production by 
quashing independent rank-and-file activity (e.g. slowdowns and wildcat strikes). But 
Fantasia and Voss overstated matters by asserting that the post-war system produced a 
distinctively parochial, conservative brand of union leadership. As I will show, it would 
be far more accurate to say that U.S. employers, judges, and politicians expressed a 
militant preference for a conservative brand of union leadership that was well-established 
decades before World War II. The federal industrial relations system legitimated 
“business unionism” and simultaneously attacked more radical “social movement” 
alternatives.  
Historians broadly agree that since the late 1800s, U.S. unions have displayed a 
marked tendency—largely absent from European labor—towards the pursuit of 
incremental political reforms, and towards collective bargaining with employers over 
wages, benefits, and other so-called “bread and butter” concerns. This more cautious, 
conservative style of unionism has competed with currents inside organized labor that 
favored more militant mass action, and sweeping social change.   
 Labor historian Julie Greene identified an early “model of business unionism” in 
Cigar Markers International Union Local 144, led by Adolf Strasser and Samuel 
Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Starting in 1877, Strasser 
                                            






and Gompers introduced centralized administrative and fiscal controls, and adopted a 
political agenda that spurned “broad solidarities” in favor of practices aimed at protecting 
their “skilled, white, male” members. They did this partly in reaction to a failed strike 
involving less-skilled cigar makers, including women and recent immigrants. They also 
took these steps to combat socialist elements inside the unions that sought to organize all 
workers, regardless of skill, gender, or nationality, and favored large-scale social change 
over piecemeal, “practical” reforms.69 During the Progressive Era, Gompers and the AFL 
perfected the practices pioneered by Local 144. Business unionism soon became the 
dominant ideology of organized labor, and it remains so today.70 
Historians differ, however, in their explanations of how and why business 
unionism came to dominate the U.S. labor movement. Some have argued that external 
political-economic forces (e.g. profoundly anti-union employers; an inherently 
conservative work force) compelled labor leaders to create centralized, narrowly focused 
labor organizations. Other historians have emphasized the choices labor leaders made at 
critical junctures about what U.S. unions should do, and fight for.  
 According to William Forbath, choices “were imposed upon the American labor 
movement” by “judge-made law and legal violence” that separated unions into small, 
autonomous units devoted to firm-specific bargaining.71 Forbath rejected many widely-
held explanations for the dominance of business unionism. He pointed, for example, to 
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the broad support for the Knights of Labor following the Civil War as evidence that U.S. 
workers were not inherently individualistic or hostile to radical doctrines. Indeed, he 
wrote, members of the working class, “not meddling middle-class intellectuals,” were the 
core of the socialist movements of the Gilded Age. U.S. workers united in longer, more 
frequent strikes than their European counterparts during the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
and expressed their solidarity through a rich variety of community-based mutual aid 
societies, cultural and political associations.72 
 Historians can no longer plausibly argue that the AFL arose “from a timeless bias 
among American trade unionists against broad reforms and radical visions,” Forbath 
wrote.73 Labor’s preoccupation with firm-specific bargaining was better explained by the 
failure of federal and state government to regulate labor relations at the turn of the 
century. Conservative jurists happily filled the void by making “the common law…the 
premiere source of state policy” regarding worker and union rights.74 The courts 
promoted business unionism by crushing sympathy strikes, boycotts, and other collective 
expressions of class solidarity. The “mass imprisonments and glint of bayonets behind 
the court decrees”75 confirmed “Gompers and his cohorts in the view that broad, class-
based strategies and industrial ambitions were too costly and self-defeating,” Forbath 
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concluded.76 Interestingly, from the point of view of the labor press, Forbath observed 
that labor’s discourse changed with the rise of business unionism: Union “leaders at all 
levels began to speak and think more and more in the language of the law.…[They] 
abandoned more radical ways of describing and criticizing the nation’s political 
economy. They entered a discourse in which the legitimacy of corporations’ power over 
economic life” was never seriously questioned.77  
 Historian Christopher Tomlins also argued that U.S. labor leaders had “little 
choice but to conform” to the economically focused, bureaucratic roles favored by the 
“state-managers”: the courts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the U.S. 
Congress.78 After World War I, social and economic policies were increasingly 
engineered by powerful interest groups, including political parties, corporations, and 
agencies of the state. Organized labor demanded an equal, “legitimate” role in setting 
national policy and quickly found itself ensnared in a pluralistic industrial relations 
system that subordinated collective action rights to the goals of industrial stability, 
increased productivity, and capital accumulation.79 Labor leaders and members sought 
legitimacy, political power, and security. What they received was “a counterfeit liberty… 
[an] opportunity to participate in the construction of their own subordination.”80 
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Only a few years after the Wagner Act granted federal protection to unions, the 
NLRB, Congress, and the courts began simultaneously to expand the laws requiring 
union organizations to administer contracts and to restrict the rights of workers to engage 
in collective action.81 The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act (which mainly codified post-Wagner 
bans against secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, and closed shops) also barred front 
line supervisors from joining unions, granted the NLRB (not labor) control over the crafts 
or jobs a union could represent, and required union leaders to sign affidavits swearing 
they were not members of or affiliated with a communist organization.82 The affidavits 
“signified an intent to cripple by administrative process any union whose interpretation of 
its role was likely to be incompatible with pluralist values and assumptions,” Tomlins 
wrote.83 By 1953, most U.S. unions had become regulated, “quasi-public ‘service 
organizations,’” that provided “expert wage-bargaining” to state-approved groups of 
workers and promoted production by mitigating industrial unrest.84 Business unionism, in 
Tomlins’ view, resulted from legal coercion. Federal laws and regulations prohibited 
effective expressions of class solidarity (e.g. sympathetic strikes and boycotts) and barred 
unions from challenging corporate decisions to automate, reorganize, or relocate 
production.85 Unions that dared to overstep the narrow role prescribed by federal labor 
law were vulnerable to raids by rival unions and to employer decertification campaigns: 
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Having lost their protected status, they could no longer go to the NLRB and plead their 
case.86 
Labor historian Warren Van Tine described U.S. union leaders in the Gilded Age 
and Progressive Era as “prisoners of historical forces, unknowingly confined by the 
perimeters of their situation.”87 Political-economic pressures during these periods 
produced a new set of social actors, according to Van Time: professional union 
bureaucrats. As early as 1920, key characteristics of this new group were well-
established: conservative men on “the fringe of the power elite,” using authoritarian 
tactics to stamp out radicalism and “rank and file spontaneity.”88 Van Tine’s analysis left 
little room for human agency. Unrelenting attacks by employers and courts at the turn of 
the century denied U.S. unions the “sense of security” necessary “for the developing and 
flowering of democracy.”89 Large bureaucratic unions developed because U.S. workers 
needed strong, disciplined organizations capable of confronting wealthy corporations 
across regional and national markets. Moreover, he wrote, union officials had to adopt a 
cautious, authoritarian style of leadership because the workers were prone to apathy and, 
occasionally, to abrupt, explosive outbursts.90 
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Van Tine, like Forbath, pointed to changes in labor’s discourse that accompanied 
the rise of business unionism. He identified four principal metaphors used by labor 
leaders dating back to the Gilded Age: The union-as-fraternity (which stressed solidarity 
and mutualism); the union-as-democracy (which emphasized membership rights and 
allowed leaders to pin failures on the ‘sovereign’ rank and file); the union-as-army 
(which encouraged members to be loyal and obedient), and the union-as-business (which 
framed workers as customers exchanging dues for union services).91 According to Van 
Tine, by the end of World War I fraternal and democratic metaphors appeared less and 
less frequently in union newspapers and speeches, and images of the union as an army or 
business led by experts became “far more prominent and influential.”92  
Historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, writing mainly about the CIO, argued 
that a new class of union leaders arose from a “proto-Keynesian elite” that developed 
during the 1920s and formed the core of the New Deal coalition. John L. Lewis and 
Sidney Hillman, founders of the CIO, were “entrepreneurs of the newer consumption-
oriented industries.” They—along with Senators Robert Wagner and Robert La Follette, 
Supreme Court Justices Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, and other progressive 
reformers—believed that a mass-production economy required government intervention 
in capital and labor markets, alike.93  
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Fraser and Gerstle did not ignore human agency. Leaders of the CIO, they wrote, 
were determined to become part of a “new political elite.” In the 1930s, they saw their 
“opportunity and seized a portion of state power.”94 Nevertheless, a strong sense of 
historical determinism pervaded Fraser’s account of a labor movement swept up in, and 
then marginalized by, the currents of the political economy. “Somehow, the political 
chemistry of the New Deal worked a double transformation: the ascendency of labor and 
the eclipse of the ‘labor question,’” he wrote.95 Unions that were once “the core of 
oppositional politics” became one more interest group within a vast coalition promoting 
production and economic growth. Fraser also observed that the labor movement’s 
discourse—its articulated sense of self—was transformed in that process, as “metaphors 
of pariahdom” morphed into “metaphors of social integration.”96  
A similar sense of determinism is evident in the work of labor historian Nelson 
Lichtenstein. “The stolid quality of postwar U.S. unions reflected the institutional 
constraints and legal structures under which the unions were forced to function,” he 
wrote. Chief among the structural constraints was the “baroque” system of collective 
bargaining.97 In Western Europe, terms and conditions of work are typically determined 
in nationwide bargaining involving entire industries and labor federations.  In the U.S., 
on the other hand, unions must negotiate contracts with thousands of employers, 
workplace by workplace: contracts that include complex benefit plans which workers in 
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most industrialized countries receive through government social welfare programs.98 
According to Lichtenstein, the burdens of collective bargaining fostered the growth of 
unions that were “administratively top-heavy” with experts and administrative staff.99  
 “The very legitimacy achieved by American unionism in the postwar era 
contained a self-destructive contradiction,” Lichtenstein observed.100 Walter Reuther—
the very embodiment of CIO liberalism—“became a prisoner of the institutions he did so 
much to build.”101 
Emphasizing Agency 
Other historians reject the view of U.S. labor leaders as captives of circumstances 
imposed upon them and outside their control. Reuther, like many labor leaders, eagerly 
exploited the anti-communist crusades which eliminated thousands of labor’s best 
organizers and its strongest links to the civil rights struggle and other progressive 
movements.102 “The repression of the American left in late 1940s and 1950s was a 
project of liberals as well as conservatives,” historian Kim Phillips-Fein pointed out.103 
Many union leaders “hoped that by acknowledging their fundamental allegiance to the 
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social order, they could maintain the stable bargaining relationships with employers that 
they had won at last.”104 If that was, in fact, their hope, they had badly underestimated the 
opposition. To conservatives, even de-radicalized unions “embodied the most social-
democratic tendencies within liberalism,” Phillips-Fein wrote. The political right used the 
anti-communist crusades that Reuther and others in labor helped to inflame to weaken 
organized labor and accomplish their primary objectives: rolling back the New Deal and 
“dismantling the welfare state.”105  
 In her history of the early AFL, labor historian Julie Greene focused on the 
choices made by union leaders. Taking careful account of the political-economic forces at 
work in the late 1800s and early 1900s, she concentrated on “the political possibilities” 
open to various elements within the AFL and “the political choices they made.”106 As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Greene traced the dominance of business unionism to 
practices developed by Gompers and Strasser to combat socialists and to consolidate 
control of their union in the hands of skilled, white, native-born men.107 She also traced 
the decentralized, fragmented character of today’s labor movement to decisions by 
Gompers and other AFL leaders to guarantee the autonomy of their member unions. 
Federation leaders set overall policies for organized labor (with the input and consent of 
the affiliates), but they pointedly stayed out of the internal affairs of the member unions. 
Leaders of the affiliates had tremendous latitude to speak and act as they pleased. The 
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AFL’s founders “intended their Federation to be weak and subordinate to the trade 
unions,” Greene wrote, and it remains so today.108  
  At the same time, Greene noted, AFL leaders “possessed a great deal of power” 
over their local and state central bodies and “frequently employed it aggressively” against 
grassroots movements that jeopardized federation control. Anti-socialism “became a 
central tactic in Gompers’ campaign to consolidate his power,” she wrote.109 He 
conflated socialism and anti-unionism as a way of “disciplining AFL members” and 
“enforcing the AFL program.”110 But Gompers also recognized that socialism was a 
potent force within the AFL—one that threatened his strategy of protecting fragile unions 
from employers and the courts through a “close but contingent partnership with the 
Democratic Party.”111  
Historian Paul Buhle offered a far harsher assessment of the motives behind 
business unionism. Leaders of the AFL and, later, the CIO, repeatedly “cast their fate 
with what they perceived to be society’s winners”—the ruling elites of an ascendant U.S. 
empire. According to Buhle, U.S. labor leaders embraced an industrial relations system 
that denied workers any meaningful autonomy in exchange for a small measure of 
influence in the operations of that system. They allowed U.S. workers to become 
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politically and economically “degraded by the narrowing of the (labor) movement’s 
purpose from human emancipation to special favors for the connected.”112  
Buhle conceded that labor leaders faced enormous external pressures. In the U.S., 
he wrote, a “few, immensely powerful firms” have historically had the power to ally with 
judges and politicians to “crush idealistic labor movements. … [No] other modern 
empire, not even the British, showed the same capacity to shape its society or its labor 
leaders to such uniform purpose.”113 Even so, Buhle insisted, union leaders could have 
chosen a different path. They could have rejected the moral logic of the rising imperial 
order and organized mass resistance, as the Knights of Labor and the Industrial Workers 
of the World sought to do. They could have made common cause with poor and 
oppressed people in developing countries rather than aiding their oppressors.114 Instead, 
U.S. union leaders allowed themselves to be coerced and co-opted by the very elites that 
moved during the past several decades to destroy the labor movement. 
Labor historian Robert Zieger, writing about the CIO, also focused on the choices 
of union leaders to explain the fragmented, economically-focused character of organized 
labor. His conclusions, however, are almost wholly opposed to Buhle’s. Writing about 
the CIO, Zieger argued that union leaders took “appropriate and necessary” steps to 
ensure the survival of organized labor by agreeing to suppress leftists and rank-and-file 
militants, and to collaborate with the business and political elites.  “The CIO rightly acted 
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in this period as if the state and the political system were open to the influence of 
industrial workers, that they had a right to contest for influence within its structures, and 
that to attempt to operate in sustained fashion outside these structures was to invite 
futility and marginalization,” he wrote.115 It was risky for labor to rely on the 
government, he conceded: The “shotgun was always behind the door.”116 Yet, he 
continued, the pro-labor policies of the federal government during the 1930s and 1940s 
were “crucial for the achievement of permanent industrial unions.” The need to ally with 
the Democratic Party was obvious “to all but the most doctrinaire activists.”117 
It is simply wrong to argue that organized labor became weaker by choosing a 
less militant path during the 1940s and 1950s, according to Zieger. There was no broad 
“leftward-tending working-class militancy” to support a more confrontational strategy, he 
wrote.118 And the continued presence of pro-Soviet elements in the CIO would “surely 
have crippled” labor’s political prospects and “invited increasing repression.”119 
Furthermore, Zieger argued, the CIO’s strength after World War II was more apparent 
than real: the federation was internally divided, and—with the exception of the UAW and 
the Steel Workers—in a state of “utter weakness.”120 Zieger conceded that purging the 
left and clamping down on rank-and-file activity undercut labor’s ability to organize and 
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take effective collective action.121 He conceded, too, that when the AFL and CIO merged 
in 1955, all that remained was “a largely instrumentalist conception of unionism” as way 
for members to extract economic gains.122 But Zieger concluded that, given the options, 
U.S. labor leaders acted wisely, even if the results proved disappointing. 
Kevin Boyle’s book The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism made a 
similar claim: The feeble state of today’s labor movement cannot credibly be attributed to 
a “failure of will” or “lack of vision” among union leaders in the 1940s and 1950s.123 
Indeed, according to Boyle, the UAW—one of the two most powerful CIO unions—
strove to carry its social-democratic agenda into the post-World War II era. That effort 
failed because the union’s social-democratic ideology was fraught with contradictions 
and its agenda was poorly suited to the post-war political realities.124 Reuther hoped to 
construct a new progressive coalition between trade unionists and middle-class liberals, 
Boyle wrote, but organized labor was too divided and the liberals Reuther courted were 
too estranged from his social-democratic vision. After World War II “most liberal policy 
makers had rejected the notion of a powerful federal state” micromanaging the U.S. 
economy, according to Boyle. The Democratic Party was bitterly divided over the New 
Deal and segregation, and the ranks of labor, including the UAW, were split along racial 
lines, as well.125 In retrospect, Reuther’s quest for a new progressive movement based on 
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labor and the Democratic Party seems hopelessly naive. But, according to Boyle, the fact 
that Reuther miscalculated does not negate the significance of his effort.  
Conclusion 
 The constraints imposed on U.S. labor have been—and continue to be— 
substantial and, at times, overwhelming. If anything, the historians discussed in this 
chapter understated the extent of legal and extralegal repression directed against U.S. 
workers and their unions. To understand the dynamics of any movement we must 
examine the rules and power relations within the organizational field. To understand the 
dynamics of organized labor, we must understand the options open to union leaders and 
members, the advantages they enjoyed, and the obstacles they faced.  
However, as important as environmental factors may be, people do not respond to 
the world in predictable, uniform ways. Ultimately, what matters—what is truly 
interesting—is what people do with the circumstances they are given. We do make our 
own history. When we consider the record of mass arrests, deportations, and vigilante 
“justice” visited upon U.S. workers, it is easy to understand why labor leaders would leap 
at the chance to win protection and security for their unions.  On the other hand, we can 
look at that same ugly record and question whether people as canny as Walter Reuther or 
George Meany seriously believed that U.S. employers and political leaders could be 








Whatever their motives—or mix of motives—might have been, U.S. labor leaders 
bought “a seat at the table” by suppressing the rank and file and attacking the political 
left. Their decisions were at least as important as the actions of the government and the 
corporations in defining the post-war labor movement. In the next chapter, I consider 
how the historical tensions between business unionism and social-movement unionism 








“Social-Movement Journalism” and 
An Explanation of Research Methods 
 
The U.S. labor movement, like most modern social movements, is led by large, 
formal organizations.126 These organizations developed out of the mass struggles of 
workers and they perform a variety of services on behalf of the workers’ movement, 
including political lobbying, strategic leadership, financial management, and policy 
development. The union organizations and the grassroots labor movement are 
interdependent, but they coexist uneasily because the needs of institutions and popular 
movements do not always coincide. The point is not that one set of needs is more real or 
legitimate than the other. Rather, the point is that labor, like other modern movements, 
exists in tension with itself.127 The needs of institutional labor and grassroots labor 
conflict from time to time, sometimes quite sharply. 
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As I discussed in Chapter 2, the term “business unionism” describes policies and 
practices that prioritize labor’s organizational needs and interests (e.g. a focus on 
centralized internal controls, labor agreements, and union policies). “Social movement 
unionism” describes policies and practices that prioritize the struggles of grassroots 
workers (e.g. a focus on building solidarity between wage earners, or educating the rank 
and file).  
In this chapter, I examine the historical role of the U.S. labor press. I will identify 
journalistic practices—specifically, questions regarding content, the nature and 
involvement of the audience, and media production and distribution—that manifest 
tendencies towards business unionism and social-movement unionism. The major debates 
involving the ILCA, which I explore in Chapters 4-6, revolved around those journalistic 
practices, and expressed deeper debates over the character of the U.S. labor movement.   
My review of the historical literature shows that four principal forms of labor 
media have existed in the United States: 
1. Independent labor publications: Prior to the widespread organization of unions in 
the 1870s and 1880s, editors and printers founded labor publications to support 
guilds and early working-class political parties. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
mutual aid societies also published independent labor newspapers. 
2. Left Wing political publications: Numerous anarchist, socialist, and communist 
organizations have produced radical and revolutionary publications targeted to 






3. Foreign language publications: Particularly in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
ethnic organizations and independent publishers produced foreign-language 
periodicals that served immigrant working-class communities.  
4. Trade union publications: Since their beginning, U.S. unions have produced 
periodicals targeted to their members. Some union publications also aimed to 
influence unorganized workers, elected officials, and members of the press. 
Although typically produced by unions, these publications are sometimes 
produced by third parties and endorsed by the unions, giving organized labor 
effective, but less direct, editorial control.  
Historians and media scholars have mainly focused on the first two categories 
(independent and political left publications), paying some attention to foreign-language 
periodicals, and little to the trade union press. I have found no research (e.g. dissertations, 
theses, books, or articles) focused on the ILCA.128  
In his article “Origins of the American Labor Press,” and his book Voices of 
Revolution: The Dissident Press in America, Rodger Streitmatter129 attributed the birth of 
some fifty working-class newspapers between 1828 and 1835 to early industrialization 
and the appearance of “class distinctions” that offended democratic sensibilities in the 
newly formed republic.130 Since the existing ‘party newspapers’ ignored the emerging 
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proletariat, workers created their own media, including the Mechanics Free Press, the 
Free Enquirer, and the Working Man’s Advocate. The “common purpose of the 
publications was to ensure that American workers did not exist merely to enhance the 
power and abundance of the merchant capitalists,” Streitmatter wrote.131  
The early labor press was highly effective, according to Streitmatter. Its editors 
helped draft and win support for legislation creating public schools and the 10-hour 
workday and banning debtors’ prisons and child labor. Between 1828 and 1830, the 
Working Men’s Party—with the Free Enquirer as its official newspaper—elected scores 
of labor reformers to city councils and state legislatures in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, 
New Jersey, and New Hampshire. In New York, the “entire labor ticket won in Syracuse, 
and all but one worker candidate was victorious in both Troy and Albany.”132 
 Streitmatter detailed how Federalist and Democratic Party leaders reacted to these 
gains by using their own party newspapers to attack the labor press and undermine the 
Working Man’s Party. They mounted a “savage editorial onslaught” against Frances 
“Fanny” Wright, editor of the Free Enquirer and an outspoken advocate of atheism, 
interracial marriage, and women’s rights.133 They simultaneously co-opted many popular 




131 Ibid., 99-100. 
 
132 Ibid., 103. 
 







votes. “By the 1831 election, not a single labor candidate nominated for office was 
elected,” according to Streitmatter.134   
“The viscous attacks in the nation’s newspapers followed by the voters’ rejection 
of labor candidates” left the labor press demoralized and weak. William Heighton, editor 
of the Mechanics’ Free Press and a founder of the Working Man’s Party, fell into a deep 
depression and resigned in 1831.135 His paper folded that year, and the Free Enquirer 
ceased publishing in 1835. The Working Man’s Advocate continued to publish (under a 
half dozen different names) until 1849. Nonetheless, the first generation of U.S. labor 
newspapers “demonstrated—and unequivocally so—that labor journalism” could 
empower workers in significant ways by helping to define their interests, construct new 
political forms, and attract national support for their demands.136 
  The handful of historical studies on the early labor press which predate 
Streitmatter’s 1999 journal article offered shorter, more cursory treatments of the 
subject.137 However, they also raised important points that Streitmatter did not address. 
For example, historians C. K. McFarland and Robert Thistlethwaite138 emphasized that 
the Working Man’s Advocate was the cornerstone of a strategic “effort to unite the 
working people”— the product of seven months’ deliberation by a “Committee of Fifty” 
                                            
134 Streitmatter, “Origins of the American Labor Press”: 104-105. 
 
135 Streitmatter, Voices of Revolution, 18. 
 
136 Streitmatter, “Origins of the American Labor Press”: 104-105. 
 
137 Streitmatter’s article “Origins of the American Labor Press” formed the core of the first chapter 
of his 2001 book, Voices of Revolution. 
 
138 C. K. McFarland and Robert L. Thistlethwaite, “20 Years of a Successful Labor Paper: The 







meeting in New York City to form a national pro-labor political party.139 In other words, 
the longest-lived of the early labor newspapers140 was the product of careful forethought 
and political base-building.  Ultimately, the paper folded due to editorial burn-out and 
financial difficulties.141  
 Frank Kabela’s study of U.S. labor newspapers from 1828 through the early 
1870s covered much of the same ground as Streitmatter, McFarland, and Thistlethwaite. 
However, Kabela focused on the impact of economic change on the labor press.142 The 
early workers’ movement, and most of its newspapers, “evaporated” between 1837 and 
1842 during a nationwide economic panic. Only in the 1850s, with the opening of the 
west and resumed economic growth, were U.S. workers able to reorganize and launch 
new publications, including foreign-language periodicals. However, Kabela wrote, “the 
greatest development of the labor press in United States history” occurred between 1863 
and 1873 with the founding of  “no less than 120 journals of labor” during the Civil War 
and the waves of industrialization that followed the conflict.143 
 In his book, The Making of the Labor Bureaucrat, historian Warren Van Tine 
examined how labor leaders in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era exploited 
“institutionalized tools of communication” to boost their images and careers. “The most 
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important medium…was the union journal,” Van Tine wrote.144 As unions grew into 
national organizations, the top officers made increasing use of union publications to 
legitimize their decisions, marginalize critics, and keep their names before the union 
membership. Some officers, including AFL founder Samuel Gompers and Teamsters 
president Daniel Tobin, insisted on editing their union publications, while other labor 
leaders hired editors and oversaw their work. Quotations or letters criticizing the unions 
rarely appeared in the labor press except “as targets for the editor to knock down,” while 
material praising the union and its leaders received “front page exposure.”145  
Within the unions, communication was a “one-way path from the top down,” 
according to Van Tine. He attributed this to what he termed “the insoluble dilemma” of 
managing dissent inside voluntary associations, but his reasoning seems too pat.146 First, 
he failed to question the degree and nature of control over dissent that was actually 
needed to protect the unions. More to the point, he sidestepped the question of the kind of 
organizations U.S. labor leaders were trying to create. Were they hoping to construct 
mass organizations responsive to rank-and-file members, or hierarchical structures under 
centralized control? Nevertheless, Van Tine put his finger on a genuine dilemma with 
continued relevance to unions and the labor press: the inherent tensions between labor’s 
organizational needs for stability and control, and the needs of the workers’ movement 
for mass debate and rank-and-file initiative.  
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The Labor Press Becomes a Union Press 
 No scholar has written more extensively about the U.S. labor press than 
journalism historian Jon E. Bekken, whose dissertation examined working-class 
newspapers in Chicago from 1880 to 1930. Bekken has authored a series of articles 
examining independent, left wing, foreign language, and union publications primarily 
from the late 1800s through World War II.147 According to Bekken, the U.S. labor press 
shaped working-class political culture by fusing ethnic and class consciousness within 
communities while building unity between communities. He emphasized that working-
class publications “survived only where they were embedded in a larger network of 
community institutions.” The labor press relied on radical parties, mutual aid societies, 
unions, and other working-class organizations for readers, news, and support. These 
groups, in turn, relied on the labor press to “communicate with their constituents, develop 
and clarify movement ideology, and reach out to broader publics.”148   
 Bekken employed political opportunity theory to explain why working-class 
communities found it harder and harder to sustain their own media in the early 1900s. 
Government repression during World War I (including the revocation of mailing 
privileges for dissident publications, and the mass arrests and deportations of radical 
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activists) destroyed oppositional parties and periodicals. “Only a handful of radical 
papers survived the war,” Bekken wrote.149 At the same time, millions of second-
generation immigrants grew up fluent in English, and commercial daily newspapers 
began tailoring their content to attract working-class readers. Foreign-language and 
community-based workers’ papers shrank in size and influence. As department stores and 
other large commercial outlets squeezed out neighborhood shops that advertised in the 
labor press, working-class publications found it harder and harder to replace the lost 
revenue by asking their hard-pressed subscribers and readers to pay more.150 With the 
disappearance of radical, foreign-language, and independent workers’ papers, the U.S. 
labor press became a trade union press, according to Bekken. To be sure, lively, creative 
union newspapers existed during the heyday of the CIO. But much of that bold, 
innovative spirit disappeared, as well, with the crushing of the political left in the 
1940s.151 
  In separate studies, Bekken and Stephen Haessler wrote about the anti-communist 
efforts of union leaders and editors in the late 1940s to destroy an important member of 
the U.S. labor press: the Federated Press news service (FP).152 The FP—whose history I 
explore in Chapter 5—was founded in 1919 by some three dozen union newspapers and 
the official publications of the Farm-Labor Party and U.S. Socialist Party. The FP’s board 
of directors grew to include editors of major craft and industrial union publications, as 
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well as syndicalist and communist periodicals. By 1946, nearly one-third of all U.S. labor 
publications subscribed to the FP, which also supplied news to the New York Post and 
other commercial outlets.153 For decades the FP walked a delicate line between 
advocating for labor and reporting important controversies within organized labor.154 
That was never an easy balance to maintain. 
In 1949, during the height of the Red Scare, AFL leaders accused the FP’s 
managing editor of having communist sympathies, and AFL and CIO editors joined to 
create an alternative news service, Labor Press Associates (LPA). Leaders of the two 
federations directed their affiliates to quit the FP and subscribe to the LPA. When the 
AFL and CIO merged in 1955, only a handful of unions still subscribed to the FP, which 
went out of business the following year.  
Labor historian James Tracy showed how political repression and labor 
movement conservatism affected an influential labor newspaper paper in Iowa.155  
Founded as a cooperative in the early 1930s, the Dubuque Leader—which circulated 
throughout the community—investigated government and employer corruption, 
challenged the National Association of Manufacturers’ attacks on the New Deal, and 
mobilized public support for strikes and union organizing drives. In 1936, the Leader 
helped elect labor-endorsed candidates in fourteen of Dubuque’s fifteen precincts and put 
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three union members on the city council.156  Local elites pushed back, convicting the 
newspaper’s editor on what many observers insisted were trumped-up morals charges. 
The Leader continues to publish today, but according to Tracy the “deterioration and 
depoliticization” of the union movement long ago transformed the newspaper into a 
small, inward-looking journal focused on “the vicissitudes of organized labor.”157  
The “labor press was in retreat” at the close of World War II, Bekken wrote. An 
“increasingly institutionalized labor movement” had lowered its aims and narrowed its 
vision. More and more unions replaced their “worker-editors” with professional reporters 
and public relations experts, leaving less and less room for native labor journalists.158 
The post-World War II labor press is so understudied that one scholar termed it 
“uncharted territory.”159 One of the first studies appeared in May 1957, in the business 
publication Management News.160 George Haas examined forty-five international union 
periodicals published earlier that year and commented, favorably, that the union 
publications were “much more than propaganda organs.” More than 40 percent of the 
content concerned matters not directly connected to the unions, he wrote. However, a 
close examination of the data shows that the broad content which favorably impressed 
Hass consisted mainly of commercial advertisements, “fraternal intelligence” (social 
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news about union members), and trade news (e.g. announced changes in union 
jurisdiction, and information about work-related products).161 Overwhelmingly, the 
content focused on matters directly related to the union organizations. 
Haas did find substantial differences between the publications of unions formerly 
affiliated with the AFL and the CIO. Former AFL publications, which tended to be 
magazines, carried more “fraternal intelligence” and more advertising, too—often for 
tools and equipment used by members of particular crafts and trades. Former CIO 
publications, on the other hand, tended to be newspapers and carried more stories about 
collective bargaining, political action, and internal union affairs. If they carried ads, they 
were typically for consumer goods. But the former AFL and CIO publications shared two 
notable characteristics: None of the forty-five periodicals Haas studied contained news 
about unfavorable labor agreements, and, in both sets of publications, stories about 
collective bargaining and political action received the greatest amount of space.162 
 The most sophisticated analysis of postwar labor media appeared in 1958.163 
Journalism scholar Richard Garver examined a random sample of thirty-four international 
union periodicals (a total of 152 issues) published in 1956. He examined only large union 
publications (the “solid, definable core” of the labor press), explaining that their 
resources provided a measure of stability, continuity, and professionalism “not found in 
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many other segments of labor journalism.”164 Based on a content analysis of 6,152 news 
stories, columns, and editorials, Garver concluded that the postwar labor press was 
“defensive in nature”: a “house organ…published primarily to sell the union leaders and 
the organization to the worker.”165  If the labor press ever functioned “primarily as a 
mechanism for educating unionists,” Garver wrote, “this is no longer the case today.” 
Nor, he said was the post-war labor press used to primarily to counter anti-union bias in 
the commercial media, or “as a handy weapon for attacking management.”166 
To support his conclusions, Garver pointed to the absence of content containing 
dissenting views or negative information about unions. Only 0.2 percent of the articles 
contained material that questioned union policy. Only 1 percent of the articles criticized 
the union leadership or organized labor generally, and only 2 percent reported union 
failures to achieve particular goals. “The labor press presents a rose-colored picture of 
union success” in order to enhance “union administration prestige,” Garver wrote.167 
Furthermore, he argued, “reader opinion is not an important” element in labor press 
content. Only nine of the thirty-four publications printed letters from union members, and 
every letter praised the union and its policies. Dissenting or critical information anywhere 
in the publication was always “balanced’ by information supporting the union.168  
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But Garver also wrote that union propaganda was subtle and counterintuitive.  
Overwhelmingly, the “methods suggested by the labor press for achievement of union 
objectives place responsibility squarely on the individual union member and not on the 
organization.”169 He found that fully 40 percent of the social actors mentioned in the 
articles were rank-and-file union members, and only 20 percent were union officers.170 
Rank-and-file members were mentioned in 63 percent of the stories about union 
successes and 73 percent of the stories about union failures, while union leaders were 
mentioned in only 37 percent of the ‘success’ stories and 27 percent of the stories that 
reported failures.171 Garver then argued that the focus on the union membership was 
intended to deflect blame for failures away from the leaders and onto the rank and file.172  
 It seems odd that no one has attempted to replicate Garver’s study or to challenge 
his conclusions, given the near-universal complaint that the words, deeds, and images of 
union leaders dominate most modern labor publications. Garver’s claim that union 
periodicals mentioned members twice as often as leaders (in stories good and bad) cries 
out for confirmation.  More to the point, faulting labor publications for foregrounding the 
union rank and file seems like a case of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.”    
Garver’s definition of “defensive” journalism is open to challenge, as well. He 
classified as “defensive” stories that built up and justified the union, rather than attacking 
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the union’s opponents.173 Here is how Garver described defensive content: “The chant 
which greets the reader on nearly every page of his labor publication is this: the union 
protects the worker’s interests. … [The] union fights sex and race discrimination; the 
union seeks protective legislation for the working class, or the union fights for improved 
conditions.”174 As I write in Chapter 5, the post-war labor press and the AFL-CIO did, 
indeed, react defensively to the anti-communist crusades and the McClellan Committee’s 
investigations of union corruption. But it is curious to apply the word “defensive”—a 
term that connotes reactivity—to stories about unions leading the fight for equal 
treatment and improved conditions for the working class. The failure of scholars to 
challenge Garver’s methods and conclusions is indicative of the lack of academic interest 
in the post-World War II labor press.       
Writing in the Labor Law Journal, Frank Kabela also characterized the post-war 
union press as a leadership “tool to control the working mass.”175 In organized labor, 
communication “moves in only one direction—from union headquarters down,” Kabela 
wrote. Union publications ought to have “the interests of all of labor at heart, and not 
only those of a few officers… [but] only very few labor editors can claim” this is true.176  
However, Kabela observed, surveys showed that more 80 percent of union readers 
felt their labor publication was doing a good job, and was more credible than the 
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commercial press.177 He explained this result, in part, by arguing that workers expect and 
want a combative, partisan labor press. He also echoed Garver by suggesting that U.S. 
unions practice a sophisticated brand of propaganda: “If the [labor] press is a tool of 
leadership, it is certainly a good one, for the readers are not aware of any inaccuracies or 
slanting.” Ultimately, Kabela seemed perplexed by the labor press. It is “an institution of 
many faces,” he wrote: “The readers feel it is an honest and fair source of information; 
[union] editors feel it is an open forum for free expression and honest reporting; but 
outside investigators…see it as a biased tool of labor leaders.”178   
In 1964, reporter Morton Reicheck slammed the U.S. labor press in the Columbia 
Journalism Review.179 Some “of the crudest characteristics of house-organ journalism 
show up in even the best trade-union publications,” he wrote, describing periodicals 
overflowing with the words and photographs of top union officials.180  Paradoxically, 
Reicheck praised the ILPA and the AFL-CIO for “toning down the emotional and 
raucous style” of union publications, but then criticized postwar labor papers for lacking 
a “crusading spirit” and “missionary zeal.” He made two additional, important points. 
Reicheck noted that mailing 20 million union publications to members’ homes does not 
mean the labor press has 20 million readers. He also cited a study showing that most 
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international union periodicals were written for people with at least 18 years of 
schooling—well above the abilities of the average union member.181  
A comparison of AFL and CIO publications—quite similar to Haas’1957 study— 
appeared in a 1969 issue of Labor History.182 Martin Perline compared samples of 
periodicals published by AFL and CIO unions between 1938 and 1939, and between 
1960 and 1961, after the AFL-CIO merger. While the definitions Perline used to 
categorize content were somewhat confusing, his findings were consistent with Hass’s of 
a decade before. Pre- and post-merger AFL publications focused more on contractual, 
workplace concerns, while the CIO publications reported more on politics and 
organizing. AFL publications also were far likely to carry ads for craft- and trade-related 
tools and equipment. Perline also observed that publications by the AFL-CIO carried 
three times more news about politics than the average international union journal, 
regardless of its AFL or CIO roots.183 He also noted a “considerable decrease” 
throughout the 1960s in the number of stories about the broader labor movement. He 
suggested the trend reflected a decrease in the number of competitive organizing drives 
involving AFL and CIO unions.184  
                                            
181 Ibid., 38 
 
182 Martin M. Perline, “The Trade Union Press: An Historical Analysis,” Labor History 10, no. 1 
(Winter 1969): 107-114. 
 
183 Ibid., 111. 
 







Ralph Nader wrote a scathing, though thoughtful, critique of the labor press in a 
1977 article in The Progressive.185 The unions of the 1920s and 1930s “had shrunken 
treasuries and swollen imaginations. Now they have swollen treasuries and shrunken 
imaginations,” he wrote. Nader said U.S. unions need—but do not have—“a free, 
inquiring labor press to remind them of their broad mission” for social justice.186  Despite 
mailing an impressive 800 publications a month to 30 million homes, the “impact and 
professionalism” of the labor press remains “largely imaginary,” Nader wrote.187  
Nader praised several prominent publications as well-written and engaging (he 
specifically mentioned the IAM’s Machinist newspaper, the United Mine Workers’ 
Journal, and the UAW’s Solidarity), but wrote that most union leaders harm the labor 
press through stingy budgets and excessive editorial control. Only two of the fifteen 
largest international publications published letters to the editor, Nader observed, and he 
pointed to an ILPA survey showing that 45 percent of national and international unions 
had reduced the size and/or frequency of their publications since 1964.188  
 A 1983 article in the Columbia Journalism Review rendered a similarly harsh 
verdict.189 Political meddling by top union leaders had stripped the modern labor press of 
any sense of vitality or controversy, according to Michael Hoyt.190 He pointed to several 
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exceptions—all of them cooperatively-owned, independent publications that operated 
with few or no formal ties to organized labor. They included the Midwest Center for 
Labor Research (owned and run by labor educators, rank-and-file steel workers, and low-
level union officers), Labor Notes (founded by radical leftists and activists from dozens 
of different unions), and the publications of insurgent rank-and-file groups inside the 
Teamsters, UAW, and other unions.191  
 However by the late 1990s, “the independent labor press had all but disappeared,” 
according to media scholar Mick Mulcrone. Only a “handful of publications such as 
Labor Notes and Union Democracy Review still struggled on the margins…Most union 
periodicals in the late twentieth century were little more than vehicles of self-
promotion.”192  From 1980 on, few scholars seemed interested in the U.S. labor press. 
Serious discussion from that point forward took the form of debates involving union 
educators and union journalists, as I show in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.193 Ironically, the 
academe lost interest in the labor press at the very moment that the debates over the 
proper role of union media began to sharpen inside organized labor. They exploded into 
public view shortly after John Sweeney’s insurgent slate won control of the AFL-CIO in 
1995—a subject I explore in Chapter 6.  
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Defining “Institutional” and “Social Movement” Union Journalism 
Based on the literature on social movements, business unionism, and the labor 
press, I have identified chief characteristics of two conflicting tendencies within union 
journalism. (See Table 1, page 73.) What I term “institutional union journalism” 
describes practices involving content, the audience, and production and distribution 
which express and reinforce business unionism—a mode of operations that prioritizes the 
needs and interests of labor organizations and leaders.  What I call “social movement 
journalism” describes labor press practices that promote “social movement unionism”—a 
mode of operations that prioritizes the needs of the grassroots labor movement. Broadly 
speaking, institutional union journalism is focused on union leaders and internal 
organizational affairs, while social movement union journalism is focused on workers, in 
and out of the unions, and ways they can mobilize for collective action.  
It is worth repeating: “Institutional” and “social movement” union journalism are 
ideal types that describe tendencies within the labor press. Unions and their publications 
are not monolithic. They will respond differently at different times to different 
constellations of issues and circumstances. Nonetheless, the characteristics identified in 
Table 1 describe journalistic practices historically employed by publications to promote 
union organizations and leaders or to empower rank-and-file workers. Identifying the 
different practices helped me understand the debates over union media (detailed in the 
following chapters) as conflicts between labor’s institutional needs and interests, and 











Historical Research Methods 
I relied on qualitative research methods to construct a history of the ILCA. Had I 
intended to test various theories of social movements or to rigorously analyze the content 
of various publications, I would have identified variables and employed statistical 
methods. But my purposes were descriptive and interpretive. Accordingly, I relied mainly 
upon participant interviews and archival research to understand the evolution of the ILCA 
and important debates involving that organization, the AFL-CIO, and other actors. When 
I employed numerical data, it was simply to describe important trends (e.g. the size and 
composition of the ILCA’s membership, and its leadership body).  
The framework of social movement and organization theory, described in Chapter 
1, guided my research and analysis. It helped me understand the importance of organized 
labor’s dual character as a set of institutions and as a sprawling social movement. It also 
helped me understand the interactions of primary and external actors (e.g. the ILCA 
Executive Council, leaders and top staff of the AFL-CIO, and the U.S. Postal Service) as 
the interactions of entities possessing different types and amounts of resources, and 
propelled by different institutional logics.  
 I located three major sources of primary documents related to the ILCA:  
1) Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries. The Hornbake Library, 
in College Park, Maryland, is the official repository of the ILCA.  
2) The George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland: the official 
repository for the AFL-CIO.  






I spent several months simply trying to determine what was in those collections, 
and where. The entirety of the ILCA collection at Hornbake Library is unprocessed: a 
rough outline describes the contents of thirty-nine cartons of records occupying fifty-
seven linear feet of shelf space. I am the only researcher who has systematically 
examined their contents. Detailed finding aids exist for most collections at the George 
Meany Memorial Archives. Nonetheless, the collection is enormous, and I was also 
granted access to unprocessed materials for which there are no finding aids. I had 
unrestricted access to all records at the ILCA’s offices, except for personnel files. The 
ILCA’s office files are clearly labeled and well-organized. They were extremely useful 
but more limited in scope than the larger collections in College Park and Silver Spring. 
The family of Gordon H. Cole, founding president of the ILPA and a longtime 
editor of the IAM’s Machinist newspaper, was kind enough to give me four boxes of 
papers related to his work with the labor press. I found drafts of speeches, memos, notes, 
and other primary documents that helped illuminate the early years of the ILPA.  
 As I reviewed the material in the various collections, I identified three episodes in 
ILCA history that seemed sufficiently important and well-documented to form the core of 
my dissertation:  
1.    the shaping of the labor press (i.e. the major institutions and forces that  
 created the organization and influenced first three decades of its work)  
2. the ILCA’s campaign during the 1960s and early 1970s to convince the AFL- 
 CIO to create community-based labor newspapers, and  






tribunes, and whether unions should use internal media primarily for public 
relations or grassroots organizing. Both debates erupted publicly and almost 
destroyed the ILCA in the late 1990s. 
Interviews 
 Having identified key episodes and actors in the ILCA’s history, I began to make 
lists of potential interviewees and to look for additional sources of documentary 
evidence. I conducted twenty interviews of varying length. The University of Maryland’s 
Institutional Review Board approved my interview protocols, including a set of interview 
questions, in June, 2009. The questions, which are listed on the interview consent forms, 
were designed to elicit essential information about the individual’s involvement with the 
ILCA and to provide a basis for open-ended discussion. However, I quickly found the 
questions too general to be of much value. They may have helped interviewees to think 
broadly about their experiences with the ILCA prior to the interview. But the actual 
interviews quickly jumped past the “boilerplate” questions and into the particulars of 
their experience, and their perspectives on various issues and events.  
With the written consent of the interviewees, I made audio recordings of all 
interviews, and (per the consent agreement) I stored my recordings and interview notes in 
a locked file cabinet and on a password-protected hard drive. The consent forms 
guaranteed each interviewee the right to provide information on a confidential basis (i.e. 
to have their remarks published without disclosing her identity, or to use any information 
provided purely as background). No interviewee asked me not to publish her comments. 






portions of their remarks. I also offered to destroy or return all interview records five 
years after the publication of my research, but no one requested that I do so.  
Archival Research and Constructing a Narrative 
For every archival document, I noted the name and number of the collection, as 
well as the box and folder in which the document was stored. I noted the title and nature 
of the document (e.g. a personal letter; the minutes of a meeting), the author(s), and the 
date the document was created. This allowed me to assess the authenticity of the 
document (to perform an “external criticism”) by determining who wrote it, when, and 
under what circumstances. It also allowed me to assess its credibility (to perform an 
“internal criticism”) by weighing the expertise, competency, and motivation of the 
authors.194 To understand how the document fit into the life of the ILCA, I tried to 
determine how it was used, whether other records supported or contradicted its contents, 
and whether it had been revised or presented in different forms to different audiences. 
The mass of material available to me was, at times, both overwhelming and a 
patchwork. I had to decide what information to select from cartons full of notes, 
periodicals, and audio and video recordings. Then I had to decide how to connect the 
dots—how to take hundreds of pieces of evidence and construct a story of the ILCA that 
was coherent, compelling, and well-grounded in fact. Inevitably, constructing a narrative 
requires making conjectures about why people and organizations did what they did at 
particular times. My years of experience in the labor press were extremely helpful in that 
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regard. But I tried as best I could to let the material I uncovered—not my suppositions—








“Communities of Interest”:  
The Campaign for Community Labor Newspapers 
 
By the fall of 1967, U.S. trade union editors were sounding the alarm. Barely ten 
years after the founding of the AFL-CIO, the labor movement was coming undone. 
Workers were drifting apart and turning against one another: union members against 
union leaders, young against old, black against white. More and more, rank-and-file 
members were voting down labor contracts bargained by their leaders, and younger 
workers seemed far more concerned about Vietnam and pollution than about their own 
unions.195 As one union editor worried aloud, the building service man no longer 
understands the culinary worker, and the culinary worker does not understand the 
machinist.196  
The editors belonged to the International Labor Press Association (ILPA), a 
national organization comprised, at that time, of some 400 publications produced by 
unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. The publications ran the gamut, from slick four-
color magazines mailed to hundreds of thousands of workers nationwide, to crude 
mimeographed handbills distributed to a few dozen members in a single small shop. On a 
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weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis, ILPA editors communicated with a combined 
estimated audience of 18 million workers in cities, towns, and villages in every corner of 
the country.197  
ILPA leaders believed they had identified a gap in union communications that 
was exacerbating the divisions within organized labor. The large international union 
publications did a decent job covering national news and the activities of their own 
unions. But as a practical matter the national publications could not report on day-to-day 
issues affecting workers where they worked and lived. On the other hand, the small, local 
union publications that did address specific on-the-job concerns almost always lacked the 
resources needed to report on events beyond the workplace doors. Furthermore, the ILPA 
editors pointed out, international and local union publications shared a major 
shortcoming: They addressed members of individual unions, but gave them little sense of 
belonging to a bigger, broader movement.  
The ILPA editors felt the AFL-CIO could resolve these problems by creating 
“community labor newspapers”—union publications that would reach all workers in a 
given city or region, regardless of union affiliation. These newspapers would, on a 
weekly or semi-monthly basis, report from a workers’ point of view on events at City 
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Hall and the State House, on matters affecting local schools and neighborhoods, and on 
the actions of employers, business groups, and, of course, organized labor.198  
Behind closed doors, AFL-CIO leaders were agonizing over the same internal 
divisions that were worrying the ILPA. The 1966 Congressional elections had been a 
disaster. Labor-endorsed candidates had lost forty-seven seats in the House of 
Representatives, three in the Senate, and half-dozen governorships. At the same time, the 
GOP had gained control of state legislatures in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.199  
AFL-CIO leaders blamed the losses on a massive “breakdown in 
communications.”200 By failing to reach out and educate the rank and file, labor had 
allowed anti-union forces “to steal the loyalty of our members,” a top political operative 
told the AFL-CIO Executive Council. Because union leaders had such a poor “political 
understanding” of their members, they were surprised by potency of “white backlash,” 
black militancy, youth alienation, and the mounting concerns over inflation, Vietnam, 
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and government credibility.201  “We were up against a tide that we did not see” coming, 
the national director of the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
explained.202 
ILPA’s proposal to create community labor newspapers “was hitting the deck at a 
very good time,” ILPA President Ray Davidson declared.203 AFL-CIO President George 
Meany responded to the 1966 election debacle by appointing a special committee “to 
study all of our publicity” efforts and he directed the committee to return in a few weeks’ 
time with recommendations for change.204 Just as federation leaders began searching for 
ways to improve communications with the union membership, the ILPA had presented a 
detailed plan to do precisely that. The timing could hardly have been more auspicious. 
Yet the AFL-CIO Executive Council refused to even place the ILPA’s proposal on its 
agenda. The federation’s refusal to seriously consider creating community labor 
newspapers reveals much about the role of union journalism and the tensions between 
institutional and social movement labor after World War II.   
The Revolution of ’65 
 Davidson’s election as ILPA president reflected the grassroots upheavals that 
were sparking such concern among top labor leaders. He had captured the presidency in 
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“a bitter election” fought out on the ILPA convention floor—“the Revolution of ’65,” 
Davidson would later call it.205 The contest unleashed long-festering resentments among 
union editors who believed a clique, hand-picked by the internationals and the AFL-CIO, 
had controlled the ILPA since its founding in 1956. Disgruntled editors formed a caucus 
at the 1965 ILPA convention and circulated a handbill headlined, “The old originals – 
1955. Rigged by merger agreement.”  The handbill noted, correctly, that AFL and CIO 
leaders had appointed the original fifteen-member executive council during the 
negotiations that created the organization. The text of the handbill complained that four 
elections later, the fifteen council seats had rotated among only twenty-nine individuals, 
and it listed their names year by year.206 It called on delegates to reject the incumbent 
leadership’s candidate for president, Richard Estep, editor for the United Papermakers 
and Paperworkers international union, and to rally around Davidson, instead. 
 Outgoing president Leon Stein denounced the insurgents in a keynote address the 
day before the election: “It is painful for me to note that in advance of this convention 
there has been broadcast a call for a caucus…It charges that an alleged establishment has 
suppressed free choice” in the ILPA. “This is a serious charge,” he said.207 
Far harsher words than that were exchanged earlier in the day during an executive 
council meeting marked by charges of intrigue and betrayal.208 ILPA leaders were 
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sharply divided: six of the fifteen vice presidents had signed the caucus call. While the 
records are somewhat murky, the six dissidents were Davidson, of the Oil Chemical and 
Atomic Workers; Marie Downey, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Fred 
Sweet, Hotel and Restaurant Employees; Richard Dickow, Meat Cutters; Richard 
Strunsky, Building Service Employees Local 32B, New York, and David Selvin, editor 
for the San Francisco CLC. 
President Stein believed Estep was running unopposed, but only days before the 
convention Davidson reversed his previously-announced decision to quit the council and 
declared himself “available” as a candidate for the top position. Davidson said he 
received numerous calls from ILPA members urging him to run, and expressing 
frustration over the council’s practice of filling vacancies by appointment rather than by a 
vote of the general membership. At the meeting, Davidson accused the AFL-CIO of 
“heavy-handed king-making” and claimed he had received telephone calls from AFL-
CIO headquarters staff pressuring him not to run, including one call warning that George 
Meany would personally intervene if Davidson stayed in the race.209 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Views; Richard Dickow, Meat Cutters’ The Butcher Workman; Marie Downey, IBEW’s Electrical Workers 
Journal; Richard Estep, United Papermakers and Paperworker’s United Paper; James Gedling,  Loraine 
Labor Leader (a CLC publication); Robert Gerhart, The New Era (published by five Pennsylvania CLCs); 
James Goodsell, The Oregon Labor Press (published by a dozen local unions and several CLCs); Harold 
Newton, Kenosha Labor (published by several Wisconsin locals);  Dean Ruth, IAM’s Machinist 
newspaper; Henry Santiestevan, UAW, Solidarity; Richard Strunsky, Building Service Employees Local, 
32B; Fred Sweet,  H.E.R.E.’s Catering Industry Employee, and Ray Taylor, Milwaukee Labor Press (a 
CLC publication). The two non-voting council members were Saul Miller, director of AFL-CIO 
Publications Department, and past ILPA President Bernard Mullady, editor of the IBEW’s Newsletter and 
former editor of the AFL-CIO News.  







ILPA Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth Fiester, editor of the AFL-CIO News, admitted 
placing one of the calls but denied putting pressure on Davidson. In a rather tortured 
explanation, Fiester said he placed the call believing “Ray had removed himself” as a 
candidate, but that he had also “asked Ray about waiting till next time.”210 Stein refused 
to apologize to the council for inviting Estep to succeed him, insisting he “was no man’s 
agent in this.” Estep, for his part, was far more defensive. “I am “not part of the 
establishment,” he protested. [Emphasis in the original.] He admitted Stein had drafted 
him but said, somewhat implausibly (he had, after all, served on the council since 1956) 
that he agreed to run before learning of “the doubts of Davidson” and others about 
“democracy in the ILPA.”211 
Using the ILPA to Limit Labor Discourse 
Estep may not have seen himself as “part of the establishment” but thousands of 
dissident members inside his own union likely would have disagreed. The contest 
between Estep and Davidson was, in fact, part of much a bigger battle over the right of 
international unions to control their local members and the labor press.  
In July 1964, Estep had filed internal charges against fellow council member 
James Goodsell, editor of the weekly Oregon Labor Press, for publicizing a revolt by 
22,000 union members against Estep’s union and a second international. Never before 










had “charges …been made against a member publication whose editor is a constitutional 
officer” of the ILPA.212   
Week after week, Goodsell’s paper reported on the efforts of workers in fifty 
mills across Oregon, Washington, and California to quit the United Papermakers and 
Paperworkers (UPPW) and the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper 
Mill Workers and create their own union. The workers accused the internationals of 
negotiating sweetheart contracts with employers and suppressing rank-and-file 
democracy. Their accusations, and the actions of their rebel union, were front-page news 
in the Oregon Labor Press, which was supported by Oregon largest CLCs and numerous 
AFL-CIO-affiliated locals. 
According to Edsel’s thirteen-page complaint, the Oregon Labor Press had aided 
“a rump organization” hostile to the AFL-CIO. In so doing, Edsel argued, the Oregon 
Labor Press had violated the ILPA’s Code of Ethics, which requires member 
publications to “serve the best interests” of the federation.213 Estep also accused the 
Oregon Labor Press of biased reporting, and an examination of eighteen feature stories 
published by the paper supports his charge.214 The stories focused almost exclusively on 
the complaints and actions of the rank-and-file rebels, and rarely carried quotes or other 
information supporting the two internationals. However, it was clear from the thousands 
of signed authorization cards submitted to the National Labor Relations Board by 
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disgruntled workers and by the overwhelming “no” votes against the sweetheart contracts 
that the grassroots insurgency reported by the Oregon Labor Press was real and massive. 
It should be noted, too, that union journalism is unabashedly partisan. As Chapters 2 and 
3 showed, the labor press has never pretended to provide “balanced” coverage to its 
foes.215 The Oregon Labor Press had merely done what union newspapers traditionally 
have done—but this time it criticized organized labor. 
UPPW President Paul Phillips complained directly to AFL-CIO President George 
Meany about the Oregon Labor Press’ reportage, but there is no evidence that Meany 
directly intervened. “I can assure you that the officers of the ILPA are deeply disturbed 
by this case,” he wrote to Phillips.216  
And right he was. ILPA leaders convened a special council meeting on November 
12 at AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington D.C. to hear the charges against Goodsell. It 
appears to have been a closed session: no minutes or transcripts of the meeting appear in 
the ILCA’s records. But the outcome is known. A majority of the members present voted 
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to expel Goodsell from the council, with Davidson (and, perhaps a few others) voting to 
acquit.217 
The blowback was severe. Goodsell was a popular, respected editor. His 
newspaper had repeatedly won top awards in contests judged by Harvard University’s 
Neiman Foundation for Journalism.218 He had served on the ILCA executive council 
since 1957, and worked closely with labor editors throughout the western states. In a 
letter to the ILPA council, Secretary-Treasurer Fiester kicked himself for not foreseeing 
that “Ray’s candidacy…would inevitably involve the whole matter of the west coast 
paper workers.”219 But the damage was done: An international union had openly used the 
ILPA to punish a labor newspaper. Expelling Goodsell only fueled the growing 
perception among union journalists that a big labor establishment controlled the ILPA.  
That perception was inarguably correct. The five-member Nominating Committee 
that recommended Estep to the 1965 convention included three former ILPA presidents, 
all of whom worked for large international unions.220 The Nominating Committee was, 
itself, appointed by the ILPA executive council, and ten of the seventeen voting council 
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members that year were employed by international unions or the national AFL-CIO.221  
Furthermore, two of the seven council members who did not work for an international or 
the federation were set to take jobs with the AFL-CIO after the convention.222  The ILPA 
Executive Council was a “closed circle… [a] crony kind of thing,” recalled David Selvin, 
who served four terms on the council. To join, there were “important people that one had 
to know,” and once you were “accepted as one of the elite, then the way was open…You 
didn’t run for office or anything of that sort. The nominating committee puts you up and 
that was that.”223 
True to form, the Nominating Committee opted for continuity in 1965. They 
endorsed Estep’s move from vice president to president, retained AFL-CIO News Editor 
Fiester as secretary-treasurer, and returned almost every eligible vice president (eight, in 
all) to their positions on the council.224 But anti-establishment feelings were running so 
strong among the convention delegates that the Nominating Committee felt compelled to 
make some concessions. They declined to recommend reelection of the two council 
members who were about to take jobs with the AFL-CIO: Walter Davis, of the Retail 
Clerks, and the UAW’s Henry Santiestevan. “It is no secret that there is a strong feeling 
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within the ILPA that no one type of member publication should be over represented on 
the Executive Council,” the Nominating Committee told the delegates. “This feeling is 
strongest with respect to official AFL-CIO publications.”225  
Even Estep tried to capitalize on the anti-establishment fervor. A campaign 
handbill lauded Estep as “the Local Editors’ Candidate.” It began: “For the first time in 
10 long years labor press editors from the ‘smaller’ local union and central body papers 
have a chance to elect ‘one of our own’ as President of ILPA.…Dick Estep is your kind 
of guy.”226 Not until the sixth paragraph did the handbill mention that Estep—who had, 
indeed, edited several CLC papers—was currently working for an international union.  
Davidson was no local union editor, either, but he didn’t pretend to be. Like 
Estep, Davidson was one of “The Old Originals.” In fact, he was president of the CIO 
Press and Public Relations Conference during the negotiations with the AFL that created 
the ILPA.227 But Davidson was something of a rebel, too. Born “dirt poor” in a rural 
Texas town, he recalled his father describing “an eternal war between capital and 
labor…There were bosses and there were workers, and you had to know which side you 
were on.”228 In his mid-20s, Davidson was traveling throughout the southern states as a 
fulltime organizer for the CIO’s American Newspaper Guild. At age 29, he became a 
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full-time representative of the militant Oil Workers’ International Union, CIO229—a 
group so devoted to rank-and-file control that members of the international executive 
board were forbidden to draw a dime in pay from the union treasury. “The greatest thing 
that ever happened to organized labor was the CIO,” Davidson would brag. “The AFL 
was lazy as hell …They sat on their butt and kept their neckties tight—and we have a few 
of them left.”230  
It was Davidson who embodied the determination of CLC and local union editors 
to play a bigger role inside the ILPA. They nominated Davidson from the convention 
floor, and he edged-out Estep 57-51.231  Davidson won the first contested presidential 
election in the ten-year history of the ILPA.232 
Davidson’s First Step 
 Immediately after being sworn in as ILPA president in January 1966, Davidson 
presented the council with a three-page proposal for creating community labor 
newspapers. The labor movement’s approach to communications was a wasteful “hodge-
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podge” marked by fragmentation, mediocrity, and duplication of effort, he wrote.233 
Large national publications “can report only on general trends” affecting labor, Davidson 
argued, and the majority of local union papers cannot “provide real reporting outside the 
local shops.”  Well-run community labor newspapers, on the other hand, would have the 
resources, including the advertising base, to “report on city hall, the state house, and local 
events,” as well as on the labor movement. They could educate the union membership, 
building common understandings and bonds of solidarity, week after week “with a water-
on-stone effect.”234  
“A snappy weekly can cover key local stories,” Davidson wrote. “It can scoop the 
dailies now and then. It can be interesting and provocative.” However, he pointed out, 
“many large cities with significant labor movements have no papers at all,” and the few 
community labor papers that do exist often “struggle for survival.” Underfunded and 
understaffed, they often “do a poor job of covering the news… [and] circulate to only a 
minority of the labor people in the territory covered.” 235 Davidson called community 
newspapers “the most starved segment of the labor press.”236 
Within days, Davidson issued documents detailing five areas of research that 
needed to be done to determine the feasibility of creating a community labor press. He set 
specific guidelines for the research and assigned council members to each area with 
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instructions to have their findings ready for presentation at the next scheduled meeting on 
May 19, barely eight weeks away. Davidson asked the council to investigate: 
1.  the market: cities and small states with high concentrations of union 
members that could support community papers 
2. the product: the range of news and information that newspapers with 
modest but adequate financing realistically could provide 
3. services: specific benefits that community papers could provide to 
organized labor beyond reporting the news; 
4. costs: budget estimates for publishing newspapers of various lengths and 
circulation levels, and 
5. advertising: suggested advertising rates and projections of potential 
revenue for newspapers reaching a majority of union members in various-
sized communities 237 
Davidson was not the first person to urge the AFL-CIO to create community-
based labor newspapers.  In 1958, barely three years after the founding of the AFL-CIO, 
Machinists Union President Al Hayes called on the federation to “develop, in as many 
communities as possible, a labor-owned weekly or daily with the kind of features, news 
and readability that …will interest people both in and out of the labor movement.” A 
“healthy democracy” is impossible when workers must depend on monopoly-controlled 
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commercial media for news and entertainment, Hayes warned.238  Five years later, 
Bernard Mullady—an editor of the AFL-CIO News— proposed that the ILPA organize 
union journalists in towns and cities that lacked labor newspapers, and invest resources to 
help create community-based publications.239 
There is no evidence that the general suggestions by Hayes and Mullady were 
ever followed up in a serious way. But the campaign launched under ILPA President Ray 
Davidson would be comprehensive, methodical, and persistent. It would burn brightly as 
ILPA’s central project for the next six years, and it would take a full decade to 
completely fade away. Despite lingering bitterness over Goodsell’s expulsion and the 
“Revolution of ’65,” the ILPA executive council seemed genuinely united in their 
support for community labor newspapers, and its members tackled their assignments with 
a will.240 At the May 19 council meeting, Fiester produced a report listing every CLC in 
the country with 20,000 members or more, and he presented a large color-coded map that 
vividly depicted the “terrible shortage of community labor papers,” state by state.241 (A 
recreation of the map appears on page 96.) Aware of George Meany’s desire for more 
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local unions to join the CLCs, Fiester astutely included in his report the number of 
unaffiliated members in each community who might be drawn to the federation by a 
stimulating labor newspaper. 
 Machinists Union editor Dean Ruth projected the costs of publishing weekly 
tabloid newspapers of between eight and sixteen pages, and circulations of 25,000, 
50,000, and 100,000 readers. His report encompassed every aspect of operations, 
including photography, composition, proofreading, printing, sorting, postal fees, staff 
salaries and benefits, office rent, equipment, stationary, telephones, gasoline, and 
subscriptions to wire services and essential periodicals. Harold Newton, editor of 
Kenosha Labor, surveyed forty-two community labor newspapers about their 
experiences, positive and negative, with advertising. He collected advertising rate cards, 
and compiled data on circulation, subscription sales, revenues, the size of sales staffs, and 
the commissions paid to advertising representatives. 
A Strategic Choice: Go Broad, or Go High? 
   Three days later, on May 22, ILPA leaders unveiled the community newspaper 
proposal during a meeting attended by some 200 union editors in Washington D.C. 242   
The council worked late the previous night and all that morning preparing the 
presentation, but the unveiling seems to have been poorly planned. Discussion of the 
“deadly serious” gap in labor communications was shoehorned between a Sunday  
 
                                            






























































































































































































afternoon panel on politics and a lengthy awards ceremony. Due to a “lack of time,” the 
“proposals were explained and discussed all too briefly.”243  Monday, May 23 (the final 
day of the meeting) was taken up by a visit to the White House, where union journalists 
heard talks by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, and rubbed shoulders 
with Labor Secretary Wirtz and various members of Congress.244 
The clumsy unveiling reflected uncertainty within the council about how best to 
advance the plan. Should they mount a “massive drive” across the country to build 
support for community papers among the CLCs and local unions?245 Or should they 
concentrate on persuading the top labor leaders who had the political and economic clout 
to enact the plan?246  The first approach would require the ILPA to mobilize its network 
of union journalists to “hammer on labor leaders” on behalf of the plan and “not be shy 
about it.”247  It would require the ILPA to take the lead by reaching out broadly and 
winning the support of state and local union editors, who would then join the ILPA in 
pressing the AFL-CIO and international unions for the resources needed to create a 
community labor press.  
The second approach would require the ILPA to win over a much smaller group: 
the leaders of the AFL-CIO its affiliated unions. Davidson and other ILPA officers would 
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need to convince top labor leaders that community labor newspapers could help resolve 
the communications crisis within the AFL-CIO. They would have to demonstrate that 
labor could strengthen itself by speaking in a unified voice on a regular basis to large 
numbers of workers in key communities. They would have to demonstrate, as well, that 
the movement could save large amounts of time and money by eliminating overlapping 
and ineffectual publications. Once the top labor leaders supported the plan, they—not the 
ILPA—would take the lead, and press the CLCs to create community newspapers.   
Both approaches would require “considerable salesmanship and much delicate 
political diplomacy,” Davidson cautioned. Resistance could be expected whether the aim 
was to consolidate several publications into a single new entity, or simply to overhaul an 
existing newspaper. “In some cases, this may mean ditching some old sheets— or 
ditching present incompetent editors,” Davidson wrote. Each “state and city has a 
complex of political breezes, personalities, old feuds, etc., which in human fashion tend 
to drown out the voice of reason.”248   
In November 1966, the ILPA Executive Council settled on a course of action. 
There would be no “massive drive”; no broad mobilization of union journalists; no 
hammering on top union officers for a new approach to communications. Instead, the 
ILPA would seek the support of labor’s top leaders through quiet, low-key persuasion. As 
Davidson put it, they would “push the project discreetly and carefully through established 
channels” by meeting with the “many people around AFL-CIO headquarters – the 
department heads and others, whose thoughtful support and understanding is vital to the 
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promotion of any program within the body.”249 ILPA leaders also decided to offer the 
AFL-CIO limited, alternative versions of the community newspapers plan. Instead of 
arguing for the creation of publications in many communities, they would seek AFL-CIO 
support for a few, select pilot projects. They would identify target cities with forward-
thinking union leaders and large, active labor movements. This would allow them to craft 
precise budgets and plans that could be launched quickly, with maximum chances for 
success. “The best opportunity of all might come … in localities where at present there is 
little or nothing in the way of a labor press,” Davidson suggested. “There, a fresh start 
could be made from scratch, with a minimum of old wounds to scar over.”250  
A Proposal to Meany 
In November, the executive council transformed the document drafted over the 
summer by Davidson, Fiester and Miller into a final, twenty-page proposal and, on Dec. 
15, 1966, they submitted it to AFL-CIO President George Meany.251 The proposal 
opened with a quote from Meany’s address on the tenth anniversary of the founding of 
the AFL-CIO: “After all the hurrahs and speeches attending the big merger faded away, 
there remained the hard, slow process” of bringing all of organized labor into the 
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federation, Meany said. The job of building the AFL-CIO is incomplete because “too 
many local unions stand apart from their brothers at the state and local level.”252  
The ILPA report immediately continued that theme, arguing that “Strengthening 
central bodies requires strengthening labor communications at the community level.” The 
AFL-CIO should make “a major effort to build up labor papers published by state and 
local central bodies”—papers that would carry “labor’s message, both internally to 
present members and externally to the public and to people we would like to 
organize.”253  
Creating broad solidarities requires time and repetition, the union editors wrote.  
“Political attitudes are formed gradually, the result of accumulated information and 
impressions.”254 Because “most people’s lives are focused on local events,” community 
labor newspapers are uniquely suited to “unite members of various unions” by reporting 
week after week on common problems, and then mobilizing workers to tackle those 
problems and support one another in times of need.255 
 Existing union publications kept labor leaders well-informed, but they failed to 
reach millions of rank-and-file members, the report pointed out. The members were often 
left to learn about the movement through “hearsay, shoptalk and fragmentary press” 
reports from commercial news outlets. “As a result, many relatively active union 
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members are only vaguely aware that the workers across the street are members of a 
sister union; many members who are reasonably well informed about activities in their 
own union half a continent away are unaware of the successes and tribulations of another 
union in their home town; many union members who have some understanding of the 
national issues are hazy in their knowledge of their own Congressman and certainly of 
their state legislatures.”256 
The ILPA pointed to huge gaps in labor’s communications net: 
• Seventeen states with a total 567,000 members of AFL-CIO affiliated 
unions had no known community labor papers—state or city. 
• In fifteen states with a total 4.03 million union members, fewer than 10 
percent had a community paper. (The fifteen states accounted for fully 51 
percent of the total AFL-CIO membership.) 
• In five states (home to 3.9 percent of all affiliated members) community 
papers reached only 20 to 30 percent of the membership. 
• Three states containing 18.5 percent of the total AFL-CIO membership 
had publications reaching between 30 and 50 percent of the members. 
• Only five states (accounting for 17.6 percent of the federation’s 
membership) had community papers that reached between 50 and 75 
percent of all union members.257 
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The report provided some striking examples: 
•  In the heavily-unionized state of New York, only 5 percent of the union 
membership received a state or metropolitan labor paper.  
• In Los Angeles, a weekly community paper reached 22 percent of all 
affiliated members, and that was “the best showing of any million-plus 
city in the country.”258 
According to the report, economics was the primary reason for the lack of 
community labor newspapers, and for their often poor quality. In most cases, 
“community papers cost far too much to produce because circulation is too low,” ILPA 
leaders wrote. “Low circulation breeds a vicious downward spiral of higher unit costs, 
higher subscription rates, lower circulation and so on…[leaving] a publication of little if 
any legitimate value as an advertising medium.” Rivalries and political differences 
between unions created serious difficulties, too. But if the AFL-CIO threw its political 
and financial support behind community newspapers, both sets of problems could be 
solved, the ILPA argued.259  
None of this would come cheap, as the ILPA frankly acknowledged. Larger 
central bodies with 100,000 members and more would have to spend $13,000 a month (or 
$156,000 a year) to adequately finance a weekly labor newspaper.  CLCs with 25,000 
members or less would face higher unit costs and need to spend proportionately more—
                                            
258 Ibid., 4-5. 
 







an estimated $85,000 a year. “We recognize that this is an appropriation many central 
bodies are not likely to make,” ILPA conceded.260 
However, costs could be reduced in a number of ways, the proposal explained.  
State federations could adopt the model of the Michigan AFL-CIO News, which carried 
national, regional, and local news to 200,000 union members a week. The Michigan AFL-
CIO News published no fewer than 46 local editions. Individual unions could subscribe to 
the paper on a weekly, semi-weekly, or monthly basis—whatever best fit their budget—
and they also had the option of producing their own pages with stories focused on their 
own organizations, which would appear as inserts in the larger publication.261 Of course, 
the community labor newspapers, themselves, could cut costs by publishing monthly or 
semi-monthly, instead of every week. However, the ILPA warned, doing so would 
produce “far less comprehensive” news reporting, and a less attractive medium for 
advertisers, too.262  
A “bright and attractive” weekly newspaper reaching the majority of union 
members in a given community could sell enough advertising to recover between 20 and 
25 percent of its operating costs, the ILPA concluded. The balance of revenues would 
have to be recovered through subscription sales to area unions.263   
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The report concluded with a recommendation that the AFL-CIO launch “one or 
more pilot projects” in partnership with the ILPA and a state or local central body. This 
could take the form of creating a community newspaper from scratch or upgrading an 
existing one. It could be a local paper or a statewide publication, with or without special 
editions for municipalities or individual unions. For example, the AFL-CIO would have 
to allocate only $15,000, on a one-time basis, to upgrade and expand the community 
labor newspaper in Cincinnati, Ohio, the ILPA projected. Together, the two pilot projects 
(revitalizing an existing newspaper and starting a new one) would require the AFL-CIO 
to invest between $150,000 and $200,000.264  
The AFL-CIO Responds 
The AFL-CIO responded promptly to the ILPA’s proposal by inviting Davidson 
and Fiester to address a meeting of labor’s top political operatives— the Operating 
Committee of the Committee on Political Education (COPE)—on January 24, 1967 in 
Atlantic City. Davidson felt they were “very well received” and he returned from the 
meeting believing the project was “about to get substantial support from the labor 
leadership.”265 However, instead of committing to the ILPA plan, Meany appointed a 
Standing Committee on Public Relations during a February meeting of the AFL-CIO 
Executive Council. He directed the committee to evaluate the AFL-CIO’s 
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communications programs and report back to federation leaders at their next scheduled 
meeting in May.266  
According to AFL-CIO Publications Department Director Saul Miller (an ex-
officio member of the ILPA executive council), both Meany and the Standing Committee 
on Public Relations showed “interest” in the community labor newspaper proposal.267 
But the Standing Committee proved to be a farce. It met exactly once—two days before 
the May executive council meeting.268 And instead of conducting its own review, the 
committee asked the AFL-CIO Public Relations Department to critique the federations’ 
communications programs. In other words, it had asked the department responsible for 
AFL-CIO communications to evaluate its own work. Albert J. Zack, director of the AFL-
CIO Public Relations Department, was a longtime Meany confidante. A review of Zack’s 
reports on the progress of his department, written during the 1960s, shows they were 
unfailingly positive and eerily similar in wording and format, year after year.269 
It took the Public Relations Department less than eight weeks to write its report, 
which it described (perhaps accurately) as “by far the most comprehensive review of the 
AFL-CIO’s public relations operation ever compiled.” The report recommended that the 
federation:  
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1) continue sponsoring the Edward P. Morgan radio show (the department’s 
single largest expenditure) 
2) mail the AFL-CIO News and Federationist to all local union leaders 
3) create six new public relations field staff positions 
4)    “pursue” the ILPA’s community labor papers plan and explore the regular 
   commissioning of surveys on public attitudes towards labor 
5)     increase AFL-CIO involvement in educational television 
6) commission a series of special projects, including Labor Day films and 
newspaper supplements 
7) produce and/or sponsor more pro-labor programs for television and radio  
8)     improve the department’s Speakers Bureau and promote the publication of   
    more pro-labor books 270 
  
Notably, the AFL-CIO Public Relations Department would have controlled all of 
the proposed new activities, except for the community newspapers (which would have 
been operated by the CLCs) and the expanded mailings of the AFL-CIO News and 
Federationist (which were produced by the Publications Department). The proposals 
would have added a half-dozen staff positions to Zack’s department, and increased its 
activities in books, television, radio, and film. Notably, too, none of the proposed 
activities—with the sole exception of the community labor newspapers plan—were 
primarily designed to reach the union membership as a distinct audience.  
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That the report listed the ILPA’s proposal as a middling priority was not a 
promising sign. Less promising still, the report bundled the already-costly community 
labor newspapers plan with a second, expensive proposal to finance a continuing series of 
national opinion polls.  
Inexplicably, the minutes of the AFL-CIO’s May 9, 1967 Executive Council 
meeting contain no mention of the Standing Committees’ “comprehensive review” of 
federation communications, and no mention of the ILPA’s proposal. Indeed, the AFL-
CIO Executive Council minutes for the balance of the year and for 1968, 1969, and 1970 
contain no reports at all from the Public Relations Committee, and no mention—by any 
party—of community labor newspapers.  
By the fall of 1967, Davidson was deeply discouraged. His term as president was 
drawing to a close and, despite the energy he and others had poured into the project, there 
had been “no official communication whatsoever” from AFL-CIO leaders responding to 
the plan.271 I am “almost to the point of writing it off as a lost cause,” he told the council 
in September.272 
Davidson was still waiting for the AFL-CIO to respond on the morning of 
December 5, when he stood to address a session of 1967 ILPA Convention—his final 
convention as president. The consequences of the council’s decision not to organize mass 
support for the community papers plan were vividly on display. The convention program 
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didn’t even mention community labor newspapers. The session was titled “The Role and 
Function of the Labor Press,” and the panelists discussed everything from political 
reporting to the overabundance of stories and photographs of union leaders. Only 
Davidson spoke about community labor newspapers, and he spoke at the very end. 
The timing of Davidson’s remarks was odd, and he seemed unsure of how to 
proceed. “I got my signals crossed,” he told the session chair. “I wasn’t sure whether you 
wanted to hear my comments now or later…I suppose this is a reasonably good point to 
comment briefly.” He then spoke for eleven minutes. He spent only five minutes 
explaining the need for community labor newspapers, which he described as “the major 
new project of ILPA during my term.” The bulk of Davidson’s speech was a blow-by-
blow account of the council’s attempts to convince AFL-CIO leaders to support the plan.  
The twenty-page proposal delivered to Meany more than one year before the 
convention was never been mailed to the ILPA membership, and was only placed on the 
delegates’ tables the night before Davidson rose to speak. “I hope some of you have read 
it,” he said lamely.273 The delegates did not come to the convention prepared to discuss 
the plan, and the panelists all addressed other topics. It is not surprising, then, that during 
the thirty-minute question-and-answer session not a single comment from the floor or 
dais mentioned community labor newspapers.  
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The ILPA Looks to COPE 
Davidson admitted to the delegates that he felt badly discouraged, but he closed 
his remarks by asking the ILPA to persist and to “find new channels” to press for 
federation support. And the ILPA did exactly that. Three days into the New Year, 
incoming ILPA president Fred Sweet urged the council to “push” the community papers 
plan at its upcoming March meeting, “and give heart to those among us eager to see some 
action at this level of the labor press.”274  
But in a confidential letter, Fiester—who worked at AFL-CIO headquarters— 
explained to Sweet the reasons for the federation’s silence and inaction. “There will be no 
PR committee report at the February AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting, by order of 
GM [George Meany],” Fiester wrote. Walter Reuther was preparing to pull the 1.3 
million-member UAW out of the AFL-CIO, and federation finances would be severely 
damaged. No one knows “if the money is there to spend” on new public relations 
programs, including the hundreds of thousands of dollars sought by the ILPA for 
community newspaper pilot projects. “This is for you alone ... [and] I mean exactly that,” 
he cautioned.275 
The effects of the UAW pull-out were indeed devastating. The national AFL-CIO 
lost approximately $400,000 in 1968 alone and, just as Fiester predicted, the AFL-CIO 
ordered a complete “suspension of all PR proposals.” The freeze continued through 1968 
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and into 1969, during which time the AFL-CIO’s financial and political woes only 
“deteriorated.”276 Sounding desperate, or in denial, Davidson (now an ex-officio member 
of the council) insisted in the fall of 1968 that “a lot that could be done, on the basis of 
the ILPA report without money.”277 It is difficult to imagine what Davidson had in mind. 
The ILPA’s work on community labor newspapers ground to a halt. 
At an April 1969 council meeting, Davidson railed at “the lack of follow up of 
this important and painstakingly-prepared undertaking.”  After much bitter argument, the 
council agreed to switch to an aggressive grassroots strategy. The ILPA would “seek 
every opportunity” to present the community labor newspapers plan to “trade union 
audiences, especially state and city central bodies” before their year-end convention.278 
But precisely at this point, Davidson withdrew from ILPA activities, and the 
ambitious outreach to state and local CLCs never materialized. In a personal letter to 
Fiester, Davidson expressed embarrassment over his outbursts, and apologized for his 
temper. “I am unable to convey my thoughts to the ILPA executive council,” he wrote, 
insisting that the organization would benefit from “a deep and abiding silence on my 
part.”279 Davidson was known as an affable raconteur, but also as an intensely-focused 
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man with a sometimes sharp tongue.280 He was quick to paint disagreements as battles 
between himself and a conservative labor establishment—“to find dragons where there 
ain’t no dragons,” as Fred Sweet put it.281 “By his lights, only he had the right to say (or 
to threaten) that he would get his way or to hell with you all,” Fiester once wrote.282 
Davidson told Fiester he was disappearing into the back country of Mexico “where there 
ain’t even no roads,” and would not return until the end of the year.283 
When the council revisited the community newspapers plan in September, “all the 
old hopes were updated, along with a necrology which dashed them.”284 But the council 
was ready with a whole new strategy: a “synthesis of several splendid ideas” developed 
by David Selvin, editor for the San Francisco CLC.285 His strategy centered on COPE.  
COPE was extraordinarily busy, spending vast sums of money on politics and 
communications during this period. During the 1968 election cycle, COPE dispatched 
more than 10,000 union staff members throughout the country in a difficult struggle to 
dissuade members from voting for George Wallace and Richard Nixon. COPE distributed 
some 175 million pieces of campaign literature that year targeted to young voters, people 
of color, women, retirees, and other key constituencies. COPE was also pioneering a 
revolutionary new technology: computerized direct mail that could generate lists of 
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registered and unregistered union members, complete with telephone numbers, addresses, 
and organizational affiliations, with unprecedented speed and precision.286  
ILPA saw COPE and the labor press as a “natural alliance.” COPE and the 
international unions maintained detailed mailing lists (which the community labor papers 
would need), and they were seeking to solidify the political support of their members. 
The ILPA could offer COPE the services of union journalists experienced in crafting 
messages for workers, as well as direct connections to hundreds of labor publications, 
large and small. Selvin suggested that COPE and the ILPA could begin by generating 
monthly mailings to union members in targeted communities. As they gained experience 
working together, they could expand the program to other regions, with the ultimate aim 
of creating high-quality, weekly labor papers in communities across the country.287  
According to Selvin, the challenge would be to convince COPE leaders that well-
edited, weekly community labor papers would be a “cheaper and infinitely more 
effective” way to educate workers than COPE’s usual practice of dumping “a billion 
leaflets” on targeted communities at election time. However, when Selvin, Pasnick and 
Fiester sat down with COPE officials, the projected costs sent them “into a swoon.”288   
Undeterred, ILPA leaders refined their proposal and traveled to Miami in 
February, 1970 to meet with the COPE Operating Committee. According to Selvin’s 
notes, the “natural allies” were worlds apart in their thinking. The COPE leaders reacted 
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with “confusion and uncertainty,” he wrote. “The price tag obviously troubled some,” 
and “at least” two committee members “voiced substantial objections” to the very idea of 
community labor newspapers. One COPE leader insisted that the international union 
publications were fine vehicles for political education. Another argued that “community 
publications weren’t a suitable instrument and talked vaguely of radio or TV or what 
not.”289 
COPE Director Alexander Barkan said “there was little likelihood of doing 
anything this year,” but he called ILPA’s plan “worthy of further discussion” and pledged 
to appoint a committee to do just that. Selvin suspected this was an “easy and gentle way 
of letting me down.”290  
Attempts to win the support of CLC officers active in COPE were, if anything, 
more disappointing. In July, Selvin, Fiester, and new council member Charles Bosari, 
editor of the Ohio AFL-CIO’s innovative Focus newspaper, traveled to Piney Point, 
Maryland. They hoped to meet with four CLC leaders who, they believed, would be 
particularly receptive to the community papers plan. However, only one of the four—
California AFL-CIO President Jack Henning—attended the COPE meeting, and he “was 
dubious about costs.”291 When yet another hoped-for meeting with CLC leaders from 
across the country fell through, ILPA leaders declared that they would “arrange to visit 
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them.” The meeting minutes do not explain how those visits would be paid for beyond 
the cryptic entry, “Details were left to the officers.”292 
Retreat Under Darkening Skies 
 The 1970s were a period of deepening crisis for the U.S. labor press. As postage 
and newsprint prices soared, many international unions and CLCs reduced the length and 
frequency of their publications, eliminated staff, or ceased publishing altogether.293  
(I explore this period in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.)  
In January 1972, the ILPA executive council created a Permanent Committee on 
Community Papers and directed it to devote time and money to finding new strategies to 
push the project forward.294 Committee chair Charles Bosari established two priorities. 
First, the ILPA would identify sources of money and support to develop new community 
papers. Second, the ILPA would strive “to preserve existing community papers, many of 
which are in a precarious position.”295  But one year later, with no progress to report, the 
committee’s priorities decisively flipped. Bosari resigned from the council and Sal 
Perrotta, editor of the Los Angeles Citizen, took over as committee chair.  Perrotta argued 
“that while in the past the thrust was to try to start new papers, the question today is one 
of survival for those community labor papers that have to take advertising to exist, 
especially in light of the projected postal rate increases.” He then recommended that 
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ILPA: (1) contact state and metropolitan CLCs and offer to assist their publications, (2) 
pressure the international unions to subscribe to CLC publications, and (3) develop a list 
of advertising agencies for labor publications to use. 296    
 But realistically, what assistance could the ILPA—with its volunteer membership 
and limited budget—offer to the CLCs that would make a major difference? What 
pressure could ILPA apply to the international unions whose own publications were 
facing cutbacks? Finally, the ILPA had distributed lists of labor-friendly advertising 
agencies since 1957. Continuing to circulate the lists wouldn’t hurt, but it was unlikely to 
help much, either.297 
 By September 1972, the goal of launching new community papers had simply 
disappeared. The ILPA pledged to “continue with the program set forth by Perrotta … 
[to] strengthen those community papers that are now in existence.”298  
The community labor newspaper project is not mentioned in the minutes of the 
any ILPA executive council meetings for the rest of 1974, or for 1975, or 1976.299 
Indeed, by January 1976, ILPA had set itself a new, far less ambitious goal: to make 
AFL-CIO leaders “aware of the special problems of local member publications.”300  
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ILPA had abandoned its decade-long campaign to fill the “deadly serious” 
communications gap that was undermining organized labor.301 The ILPA and the AFL-
CIO had a chance to create a network of community newspapers at the very moment 
when scores alternative newspapers, rooted in the social movements of the day, were 
flowering in communities from coast to coast; when Wallace and Nixon were preparing 
strategic campaigns to split union voters away from Democratic Party; when General 
Electric and other corporate giants were organizing the Business Roundtable to launch 
legislative and public relations campaigns against the Great Society and New Deal 
reforms.302  
Instead, the ILPA wound up pleading on behalf of the local publications it had 
previously insisted were incapable of showing workers from different unions that they 
faced common problems requiring a collective response—that they were part of a broad 
movement in which the building serviceman understood the culinary worker, and the 
culinary worker understood the machinist. 
Conclusion 
In the early 1950s, Ray Davidson had traveled across the country, visiting cities 
that were home to as many as a half-dozen, fiercely independent oil worker locals. He 
wrote glowing articles describing the wonderful things union members could 
accomplish—the money they could save; the staff they could hire; the new meeting hall 
                                            
301 “The ‘Map’ is still on the Map,” ILPA Reporter, Aug. 1966, ILCA, 1. 
 
302 Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 228-230; Ostertag, 117-160; Streitmatter, Voices of 
Revolution, 181-278; Jefferson Crowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle: Romancing the New Right Worker, 1969-
1973,” Labor History 43 no. 3 (Aug. 2002): 257-283; Raymond Mungo, Famous Long Ago: My Life and 







they could build— if only their locals would unite into a single citywide organization. 
“Well, well, well, we’ve always spoken for the people here,” the local leaders would tell 
him.  We “don’t know if we’ve got anything in common with [those people] over 
there.”303 
““I tried to sell it” but never could, Davidson recalled. “People are set in their 
ways.”304 
Why, some fifteen years later, was Davidson unable to “sell” the AFL-CIO on 
community labor newspapers? The reasons lie in the origins of the ILPA and in the role 
of union journalism after World War II, which I examine in the following chapter. But I 
will close here with two observations.   
Davidson’s attempts to unite the oil workers’ locals paralleled his later campaign 
to create community labor newspapers. Both were efforts to rationalize the larger labor 
movement by reducing fragmentation and waste. However logical his proposals may 
have been—whatever good they might have done for the movement as a whole—they 
could not overcome the parochial interests of leaders in the local unions, CLCs, 
internationals, and the AFL-CIO.  
At a deeper level, Davidson’s efforts demonstrated that communities of interest 
are never “given” or logically self-evident. Perceptions of common interest and feelings 
of solidarity do not arise spontaneously, or without resistance. They must be constructed, 
fought for, and defended.    
                                            








CHAPTER 5:  
Shaping the Post-War Labor Press: the ILPA’s First Thirty Years 
 
 Introduction 
As Chapter 4 explained, in 1966 the International Labor Press Association (ILPA) 
began urging the AFL-CIO to create community-based labor newspapers in regions with 
high concentrations of union members. The ILPA made its proposal at the precise 
moment that AFL-CIO leaders were anguishing over a “massive breakdown in 
communications” with the union membership.305 Federation officials blamed poor 
communication for major losses suffered by pro-labor candidates in recent state and 
congressional races across the country. They also believed poor communication was 
contributing to an erosion of solidarity among rank-and-file workers, and between union 
members and leaders.  
The ILPA’s proposal was explicitly designed to strengthen communications with 
members and boost labor’s political. The proposal had been carefully crafted and vetted 
by high-ranking AFL-CIO staff and by the most respected editors working for the 
federation and its largest affiliates. Nonetheless, despite six years of lobbying, cajoling, 
and pleading, ILPA leaders could not persuade the AFL-CIO Executive Council to place 
the proposal for community labor newspapers on their agenda for discussion and debate. 
 The AFL-CIO’s failure to even consider community newspapers frames a series 
of key questions about the post-World War II labor press. What role did leaders of the 
                                            






newly-formed federation want the labor press to play? What was the status of union 
journalists inside U.S. unions? What political and economic resources did the ILCA 
command, and how effectively did it wield them? What kinds of internal and external 
pressures confronted union journalists, leaders, and other actors, and affected their 
decisions?   
 I begin this chapter by tracing the origins of the ILPA to the initial collaboration 
between the AFL and CIO editors who founded the organization. In the late 1940s, 
editors from the two federations joined forces to destroy the Federated Press—a popular, 
left-leaning labor news service which sometimes reported critically on the unions. In its 
stead, the editors created an explicitly anti-communist news service, financed by AFL 
and CIO leaders and under their firm control. When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955 
and created the ILPA, the outlines of the “bona fide” labor press were already clear: it 
would be staunchly anti-communist and it would faithfully propagate the policies of the 
federation and its affiliates. 
Next, I examine how—only two years after the founding of the ILPA— AFL-CIO 
President George Meany effectively deprived the labor press of access to advertising 
revenue. Meany restricted the sale of advertising by labor publications in response to 
highly-publicized charges of union corruption leveled by the Senate’s McClelland 
Committee. As a result, the labor press became almost wholly dependent on—and, thus, 
beholden to— the international unions and the federation. As I show, the international 
unions and the federation never gave the ILCA (or its member publications) the financial 






union members or the general public. As more and more local union publications joined 
the ILPA seeking training and support (but paying little in dues) the ILPA found itself 
chronically short of funds and frustrated in carrying out its programs. I close the chapter 
by examining political-economic pressures at work during the 1960s and early 1975s 
when the campaign for community labor newspapers was in full swing, and how those 
forces affected the actions of the ILPA, the AFL-CIO, and the international unions.  
Origins of the ILPA; The Killing of the Federated Press 
When the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) merged in 1955, leaders of the two federations merged their labor 
press associations, as well. After months of often-testy negotiations, editors representing 
AFL and CIO publications finally met in Chicago in 1956 to found the International 
Labor Press Association.  
I will return to the founding of the ILPA shortly. But it is important to recognize 
that this was not the first time editors from the AFL and CIO joined forces to re-shape the 
U.S. labor press. The roots of ILPA lie in the anti-communist campaigns of the late 
1940s, when editors from the rival federations collaborated to destroy an influential labor 
news service named the Federated Press (FP).   
Union journalists created the FP in 1919, following a disastrous national strike 
against the U.S. Steel Corporation. The strike involved some 365,000 industrial workers, 






to Pennsylvania.306 The unions and the labor press found themselves hopelessly 
outmatched: too small, divided, and decentralized to contend with the concentrated power 
of a modern corporation. Steel executives used the mainstream press and their own public 
relations departments to plant rumors, suppress stories, and redbait the strike. Prohibited 
by police and hired thugs from meeting together, and “without a single dependable public 
or labor newspaper,” strikers in many locales were often badly misinformed, believing, 
for example, that the strike was collapsing in other parts of the country and the mills were 
back in business producing steel.307 Within months, the strike had collapsed—a 
calamitous defeat that set the U.S. labor movement back a decade or more.308  
The strike exposed the weaknesses of the AFL’s fragmented structure and the 
cautious conservatism of its leaders at time when bolder currents favoring industrial 
organization—and even revolutionary change—still ran strong among U.S. workers.309 It 
also demonstrated an urgent need for labor publications throughout the country to 
coordinate coverage and share news more rapidly.310  
The thirty-two labor editors who met in 1919 to found the FP acted independently 
of any particular union or political party. They were attending the first national 
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convention of the Farmer-Labor Party, a group that was determined to avoid 
entanglements in the sectarian spats of the political left and the internecine power plays 
of institutional labor. The Farmer-Labor Party hoped to stay focused on uniting workers 
and farmers, and the editors who founded the FP reflected that spirit.311 They represented 
a broad cross-section of the U.S. labor movement, including important AFL central 
bodies (e.g. Chicago, Minneapolis, Reading, and Detroit), international unions (including 
the United Mine Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers), and the IWW, Communist Party, and Socialist Party.312 They ran 
the Federated Press as a cooperative, and vowed that it would “go beyond divisions 
among unions and left-wing political parties and disseminate news that represented the 
movement as a whole.”313   
In one sense, the Federated Press simply reflected the diversity of the labor press 
as it existed in 1919. At that time, “daily newspapers and hundreds of substantial weekly 
publications” specifically targeted working-class readers, and the official union journals 
“co-existed with a vibrant radical press deeply rooted in working-class communities.”314 
But the FP was also the product of conscious struggle: It was an “independent space” 
carved out by union journalists hoping to escape the interference and second-guessing of 
the trade union leadership.315 The founders of the Federated Press were “fighters” who 
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saw “the union movement as a social cause and acted on its behalf through labor 
journalism.”316 Many were viewed as “heretics” by the top union leaders, but even their 
critics understood they were significant voices who reached large, influential 
constituencies of the AFL.317 
The FP provided thorough coverage of every issue affecting organized labor. It 
established bureaus in cities including Chicago, New York, Washington D.C., Berlin, 
Sydney, Moscow, and Mexico City. It received reports from pro-labor publications all 
around the world.318 “The better labor papers rely on Federated Press,” TIME magazine 
wrote in 1938.319 But the FP also insisted on covering the struggles of unorganized 
workers and the union rank and file. It reported on internal union disputes that seemed to 
have major implications for all of labor, including the “amalgamation movement”: The 
growing push for industry-wide unions that so threatened the craft-based AFL.320  
The scope of the FP’s reportage rankled many conservative labor leaders.  On 
October 1, 1923, AFL Vice President Matthew Woll stood before the American 
Federation of Labor convention in Portland, Oregon and denounced the Federated Press 
as “pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, pro-revolutionary, [and] anti-American Federation of 
                                            
316 Haessler, 95; 100. 
 
317 Ibid., 100. 
 
318 Matthew Woll, G.W. Perkins, and Chester M Wright. “Report on Federated Press,” in Report 
of the Proceedings of the Forty-Third Convention of the American Federation of Labor , Portland, Oregon, 
Oct. 1-12, 1923,  (Washington, D.C.: Law Reporting Company, 1923), 131; Bekken, “Federated Press.”  
FP staff writers often accepted part-time pay or worked for free to help the organization survive. 
 
319 “Proletarian Press,” Time, Feb. 21, 1938, 49. 
 







Labor.”321 His close friend, AFL President Sam Gompers, had appointed Woll to head a 
committee to investigate the FP’s leadership and journalistic practices. After spending 
months spent interviewing FP members and staff and reviewing their records, Woll’s 
committee issued a blistering report that focused on the FP’s broad conception of the 
labor movement. All manner of “protesting minorities” —syndicalists, and every other 
group that could “lay claim to a labor designation”—received coverage equal in “weight 
and importance” to that given to “the bona fide trade union movement,” the committee 
complained.322 By reporting on such dissident groups as the I.W.W. and the Communist 
Party, the FP had assisted forces “hostile to the American Federation of labor” and to 
democracy itself. “The Federated Press upon its own record cannot hope to have and 
should not have the support of trade union publications or of trade union organizations,” 
the report concluded.323   
Woll—“the ideological spokesman for the old guard” AFL324— wanted 
convention delegates to immediately expel FP correspondent Art Shields from the hall 
and to have all AFL unions (and their publications) cut ties with the Federated Press. But 
AFL leaders, including Gompers, were not prepared to do that.325  The FP was simply too 
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popular, and socialist sympathies were too strong within too many unions.326 Woll would 
have to wait, and work, for conditions to change.  
During the next three decades, scores of AFL newspapers continued to ignore 
Woll and support the Federated Press. And the rise of the CIO during the 1930s only 
deepened the FP’s base in organized labor. The Federated Press had seventy-five dues-
paying members when Woll launched his attack in 1923. By 1946, the FP had 250 dues-
paying members, and supplied news to nearly one third of the U.S. labor press.327  
Four conditions allowed the Federated Press to take root in 1919, and to grow 
through the 1940s. First, left-wing organizations exercised substantial influence inside 
many unions and working-class communities across the country.328 Second, as Bekken 
has shown, a lively labor press existed that included the publications of trade unions, 
radical political groups, and ethnic associations. Significantly, during this period union 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
communist and editor of the Butte Bulletin labor newspaper. In a speech to the convention, Woll attacked 
Dunne for publishing articles critical of the United Mine Workers’ handling of a Pennsylvania coal strike. 
 
326 Greene, 221-223. 
 
327 Ibid., 113-114. 
 
328 DeCaux;  Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: the Laboring of American Culture in the 
Twentieth Century,( New York: Verso, 1998); Dubofsky and Van Tine; Gerstle and Fraser; Sidney Fine, Sit 
Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-37, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967); Philip S. 
Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 9: The T.U.E. L to the End of the Gompers 
Era, (New York, International Publishers, 1991); Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United 
States, Vol. 10: the T.U.E.L  1925-1929, (New York: International Publishers, 1991);Glenda Elizabeth 
Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); 
Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Government repression effectively destroyed the 
I.W.W. after 1919, but left-wing organizations— including the Socialist Party, the Communist Labor Party, 
the Communist Party of America and, most notably, the  Communist Party U.S.A.—continued organizing 
inside and outside the unions. Communist influence was particularly strong in the steel, mining and 
automotive industries. As Denning shows, left-wing ideals infused the popular culture of the 1930s and 
1940s. As Korstad and Gilmore show, communists were also deeply involved in union and community 







publications were frequently produced by rank-and-file activists operating outside the 
direct control of the top labor leaders.329 Third, the top union leadership was deeply 
divided along craft and industrial lines. They were too busy competing with one another 
to unite against the left. Finally, until 1935, most unions lacked legal recognition and 
protection. Unions were weak and vulnerable, and labor leaders had to rely on a 
mobilized, militant membership to ensure their survival.  
All of these conditions had changed by 1947, when Matthew Woll made his 
second, ultimately successful, move to kill the Federated Press.  
AFL and CIO Editors First Join Hands 
On November 7, 1947 the AFL Weekly News announced that the International 
Labor Press of America (the organization of AFL publications, headed by Matthew Woll 
for forty-two of its forty-four years of existence)330 had “voted not to use the Federated 
Press” because of its alleged adherence to “Communist Party policy.” The AFL, meeting 
in convention, promptly directed all members of the “loyal affiliated labor press” to stop 
subscribing to or using the FP’s services.331  
Four AFL editors immediately launched an alternative news service, Labor Press 
Associated (LPA): a part-time, “shoestring” operation whose “primary objective was to 
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knock out the Communist-dominated Federated Press.”332 The CIO soon joined the AFL 
in throwing their financial and political weight behind the LPA. In 1949, the two 
federations established the LPA as a cooperative news service, with a board of directors 
comprised of six editors each from the AFL and CIO, and two editors representing 
various railroad unions.333 Within months, the LPA was serving more than 200 labor 
publications, including such large, influential periodicals as the CIO News, The 
Machinist, and Justice, the official organ of the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union.334   
The LPA boasted an annual budget of some $64,000—three times more money 
than the FP ever had335—which allowed it to undercut the FP’s subscription rates while 
offering “a far more extensive photo and cartoon service.”336  The LPA set up shop in 
Washington D.C. and hired three “Guild martyrs”—professional journalists fired during 
recent newspaper strikes.337 
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The FP quickly fell into a death spiral. Its subscriber base dropped from a high of 
250 in 1946 to 126 in 1950, and plunged to only seventy-four in 1952.338 The Federated 
Press finally folded operations in 1956, the same year Matthew Woll died. In a second 
ironic twist, the Federated Press managed to outlive the Labor Press Associated, which 
dissolved in February 1954 after an embarrassing battle with the Newspaper Guild over 
management’s right to eliminate unionized staff positions.339   
The trade unions would launch other news services, including the Cooperative 
News Service, the AFL-CIO News Service, and Press Associates International, which is 
still in operation. But none could fill the void left by the Federated Press. The FP had 
been more than a news service. It consistently sought to be the voice for all who labored, 
and it refused to paper over internal disputes and scandals “that could have sweeping 
consequences for either a particular union or for the labor movement as a whole.”340 The 
growth of the Federated Press fueled “the growth of the American labor press, itself” by 
forging a “community of interest” between thousands of pro-worker journalists, 
irrespective of union or political affiliation.341  No subsequent labor press organization, 
including the soon-to-be-created ILPA, would duplicate that role.  
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The world in which Matthew Woll died was far more to his liking than the world 
of 1923. The political left was in full retreat, and the independent radical press had all but 
disappeared. More and more unions were replacing their worker-editors with professional 
reporters and public relations experts.342 Labor’s top leaders had found a common cause 
in the crusade against communism and, thanks to the New Deal reforms, they now 
occupied a “seat at the table” (albeit a junior one) alongside leaders of industry and 
government. Their new-found legitimacy came with a price, however. The new federal 
system of industrial relations protected unions as long as they fulfilled their contractual 
commitments to the employers, and their legal obligations to the state. In the years after 
World War II, the militant rank and file that created the unions became more of a liability 
than an asset to labor’s top leaders. These were the times into which the ILPA was born. 
The Birth of the International Labor Press Association 
During the fall of 1955—only months before the December merger of the AFL 
and CIO—editors from the two federations met in Chicago to hammer out a merger of 
their own. The AFL’s chief representative was Gordon Cole, editor of The Machinist and 
president of the International Labor Press of America. Cole was accompanied by Phil 
Pearl, director of AFL press relations, and Fred Sweet, editor of the Catering Industry 
Employee. The CIO delegation was led by Henry Fleisher, editor of the CIO News and 
secretary-treasurer of the CIO’s Press and Public Relations Conference (PPRC).  
Fleisher’s team included Ray Davidson, editor of the Oil Worker and president of the 
PPRC, Al Herrington, editor of the Communication Worker, Ken Fiester editor of Textile 
Labor, and Art Riordan, editor of the IUE-CIO News. Five of the eight men (Cole, 
                                            






Fleisher, Fiester, Herrington and Riordan) had served together as directors of the LPA.343 
Six (Cole, Fleisher, Fiester, Davidson, Herrington, and Sweet) would lead the 
organization they were about to create for the next ten to fifteen years.  
The CIO rankled the AFL by opening the talks with two major demands. Fleisher 
wanted to reserve one of the two top officers’ posts in the new press association reserved 
for the CIO, and he demanded that CIO editors receive more seats on the executive 
council than would have been provided under the 2:1 ratio being used to fill positions 
throughout the federation. After many heated arguments—“Disagreement is a kind word 
for the disputes,” one editor recalled344— the CIO caved in, and dropped both demands. 
PPRC members soon voted to join their AFL counterparts in a new organization with a 
name nearly identical to the old AFL group’s (the International Labor Press of America 
became the International Labor Press Association), and a constitution and code of ethics 
lifted from the old AFL group with a few minor changes.345 
 The CIO editors had very little leverage. With forty-nine members, compared to 
the AFL’s 115, they could never prevail in a “party line” vote.346 And, like so much of 
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the CIO,347 the PPRC was a loose-knit association. The AFL’s press association, on the 
other hand, was tightly run, with a formal board of directors and regular business 
meetings.348 The CIO editors struck the best deal they could and, despite receiving only 
six of fifteen council seats, they did not do badly. In lieu of a guaranteed officer’s spot, 
the Newspaper Guild’s Bernard Mullady (who was hired to edit the AFL-CIO’s 
American Federationist magazine) was appointed secretary-treasurer, placing a CIO 
editor in the influential No. 2 position. PPRC officer Henry Fleisher became editor of the 
AFL-CIO News, ensuring him an ex-officio seat on the council for as long as he held that 
job. The AFL, of course, did even better. Gordon Cole, president of the “old ILPA,” 
continued as president of the “new ILPA,” and AFL editors held a commanding majority 
on the newly-formed executive council. 
The founding convention of the International Labor Press Association opened on 
November 30, 1956 in Washington D.C.  To the 200 editors gathered at the Mayflower 
Hotel, the future seemed bright with possibility. Together, they represented 145 
publications which reached an estimated 20 million workers in the U.S. and Canada.349 
They spoke for a freshly unified labor movement with vast resources and considerable 
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political clout. The union journalists who formed the ILPA were eager to show what they 
could do, and to earn “a seat higher up” in the labor hierarchy.350  
Cole reminded the delegates of the vital role that they played. The “labor press 
represents the only direct means of communication between the members and their 
leaders” in this giant, sprawling movement, Cole said in his opening remarks. Because 
the “majority of members no longer turn out regularly to union meetings,” labor leaders 
will need lively, popular publications to keep the workers informed.351 
The ILPA set two broad goals for itself. First, it would work to raise the quality 
and prestige of the labor press. The ILPA would build ties between labor editors, 
encourage communication, and disseminate “professional information” to assist editors. 
Better labor journalism and a strict “code of ethics” would, ILPA leaders hoped, boost 
respect for editors and their publications, inside and outside the unions.352 The code of 
ethics was integral to the ILPA’s second main objective: combatting “racket 
publications.” 353 Racket publications pose as union newspapers and sell pages of 
advertising (with little or no news) by inflating their circulation figures and by suggesting 
that advertisers would be protected from union boycotts, organizing, and strikes. Though 
occasionally run by corrupt union officials, racket papers are typically produced by 
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professional con artists skilled at “putting the arm on businessmen for ads, then moving 
on to fresher pastures.”354 
“There is no question of the steadily growing importance of the labor press to the 
trade union movement,” Cole told the delegates. “The question in my mind is how many 
of our union officers have recognized the importance of their publications.”355   
Cole already knew the answer. The organization he had helped to found was 
starting out in debt. It received not a penny in start-up funds from the federation or its 
affiliates. Secretary-Treasurer Mullady “did a heroic job holding off creditors,” during 
the ILPA’s first year, one labor editor recalled.356 And the ILPA’s budgetary woes were 
only just beginning. 
Meany Creates a Dependent Labor Press 
 By 1955, the anti-communist campaigns targeting organized labor were largely 
over. However, as the AFL and CIO were merging, labor confronted a fresh round of 
allegations from the U.S. Senate’s McClellan Committee.357 Commercial news outlets 
gave extensive play to committee revelations of racketeering, extortion, and gangsterism, 
while conservative groups including the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
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U.S. Chamber of Commerce made “union corruption” the focal point of their work.358 
The waves of propaganda caused public opinion to tilt sharply against labor. A poll 
conducted by LOOK magazine during the investigations showed the public feared the 
power of “big labor” more than the power of “big business” by a factor of three-to-one.359   
Some of the McClellan Committee’s allegations pointed directly at the labor 
press. Unions were walking a “fine line” in their methods of soliciting advertising, 
warned McClellan Committee investigator Robert Dunne in a meeting with ILPA leaders. 
Many CLC and local union newspapers raised funds by printing special Labor Day 
editions stuffed with ads and very little news. How were these special editions different 
from the racket papers, Dunne asked? He also observed that many state federations raised 
money by selling ads in so-called labor “yearbooks.” A “large amount of money changes 
hands” in those transactions without finding its way into the union treasuries, he claimed. 
Furthermore, Dunne complained, some ads in union publications were signed “a Friend 
of Labor,” making it impossible to trace the source of the funds. ILPA leaders reminded 
Dunne that their code of ethics barred “friend of labor ads” and similar questionable 
practices, but they and Dunne were well aware that those practices continued.360 
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 To his credit, George Meany seemed genuinely offended by even the appearance 
of corruption in the labor press. Records show that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the 
federation president corresponded extensively about the labor press with his staff and 
with leaders of the ILPA—and virtually every letter involved concerns about racket 
publications, or the advertising and business practices of union publications. In 1959, 
Meany repeatedly told the ILPA convention that labor was “on the defensive,” and this 
defensive mindset was reflected in his approach to the labor press.361 Rather than 
focusing on proactive ways to use union media, Meany concentrated almost exclusively 
on what labor publications should not do. The labor press “does not exist to make a profit 
for anyone,” Meany wrote to ILPA President Peter Terzick. Nor, he continued, should the 
labor press serve as a “propaganda weapon”— although Meany clearly expected union 
periodicals to champion the AFL-CIO.362  
On May 27, 1958, Meany issued a directive so strict and sweeping as to eliminate 
virtually all advertising from the labor press. Citing “adverse publicity” over advertising, 
Meany adopted the ILPA’s ban on “friend of labor” advertisements as official federation 
policy. He then went further, banning ads from all “employers who are not 100% 
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Technically, Meany’s order was binding only on publications of the AFL-CIO 
and its state and local central bodies. In practice, it had far broader implications. The 
ILPA was created by the AFL-CIO, and was obliged by its code of ethics to “serve the 
best interests” of the federation.  Whatever policies ILPA leaders applied towards their 
member publications could hardly ignore, let alone openly contravene, such a specific 
directive from the federation president. 
The pushback from ILPA members was immediate. “There are no 100% 
unionized firms here,” a representative of the Austin Texas Trades Council wrote Meany 
only days after receiving his letter. [Emphasis in the original.] He requested a written 
“exception to this directive.” The president of the Indiana State AFL-CIO wrote Meany 
on June 4 to express his confusion. Was Meany saying his paper could accept ads only 
from companies with “union shop” or “closed shop” contracts?363 Or did the “100 
percent rule” require that everyone working for an advertiser, including white-collar 
employees, belong to a union? “If the 100% unionized policy is to be strictly enforced, 
the Labor movement in Baltimore will be without an official organ,” a doleful labor 
leader reported to Meany.364 
After receiving dozens of such complaints and consulting with ILPA leaders, 
Meany softened his stance. “Friend of labor” ads were still forbidden, and labor papers 
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were ordered not to accept ads from companies actively resisting unionization. But union 
leaders in each community were free to apply “the rule of reason” in interpreting the 
directive. Meany insisted that he never intended to prohibit ads from “Mom and Pop” 
stores, or from unionized companies with a few unorganized departments.365 
Nonetheless, Meany declared, “In my opinion it would be a good thing if no trade union 
paper accepted advertising…because experience has proved, time after time, that 
advertising in the labor press is particularly vulnerable to abuses.” The labor movement 
“should be willing and able to support our organs of internal communications without 
seeking assistance from the business community.”366 
Sadly, experience also proved that organized labor was not willing to provide the 
support needed to make the labor press a potent force inside the unions or in the broader 
community. Unfortunately, too, the damage was done. Meany’s directive and his 
continued animus towards advertising caused the ILPA to pursue what can only be 
described as a schizophrenic set of policies for another twenty years.367 Starting in 1958, 
the ILPA published directories every few years listing member publications, their 
circulations, and contact information to connect advertisers with “bona fide” (i.e. non-
racket) union papers. At the same time, secretary-treasurers Bernard Mullady and 
Kenneth Fiester spent a tremendous amount of time policing the advertising policies of 
labor publications, disciplining ILPA members, and rejecting applications for 
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membership for various infractions, big and small. Why had a paper accepted advertising 
from a business located outside its circulation area? Did the name of a municipal labor 
publication imply that it reached a statewide audience? “You seem to be proud that your 
paper lives on advertising and subscriptions alone, rather than being financed by unions,” 
Fiester scolded an Ohio editor. “Neither we nor the AFL-CIO consider this anything to be 
proud of. Our strong preference is for labor papers entirely financed by unions with no 
advertising at all.”368  
Despite the fact that AFL-CIO and ILPA policies actually did allow labor 
publications to accept advertising, an ILPA survey conducted in 2000—forty-two years 
after Meany softened his ban—showed that fewer than one-in-five labor publications 
accepted advertising. The “single biggest reason” for refusing ads was “simply, that it’s 
against policy. … [In] many cases, it was the only reason given,” the survey showed. 
Many unions continued to ban advertising, either because they thought that was the right 
thing to do, or because they wrongly believed that was the policy of the AFL-CIO.369 
It is likely that Meany helped to lessen corruption in the labor press by 
discouraging the sale of advertising. But he could have accomplished that goal through a 
well-financed crackdown on shady practices coupled with an aggressive push to build a 
legitimate advertising base. Meany’s efforts to eliminate corruption by banning 
advertising were similar to his efforts to eliminate communists by crushing the Federated 
Press. He used a sledgehammer against both targets, and built nothing new to replace 
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what he destroyed. Intentionally or not, Meany created a labor press that would be 
chronically starved for cash, and wholly dependent on institutional labor for its survival.  
A Growing Mismatch Between Resources and Mission  
The ILPA’s very general mandate—to strengthen the labor press and combat 
racket papers—said nothing about how to accomplish those goals. In early 1959, ILPA 
leaders appointed a six-member committee to consider two questions: “What is the ILPA 
going to do in the way of a program?” And “Where are we going to get the money?”370 In 
May, the committee reviewed a survey showing that “the majority of members desired 
technical assistance,” in such areas as writing and design. A consensus emerged that the 
ILPA should concentrate on training and supporting local unions and small CLCs.371  
Gordon Cole was extremely skeptical about that approach. In very blunt language 
he offered a wholly different vision of what the ILPA should do. “Local unions have no 
place in ILPA” because the organization lacks the resources to assist hundreds of small 
publications scattered across the country, he insisted. Cole agreed that the ILPA should 
aid the grassroots labor press. However, he said, “We can’t do it by recruiting them and 
then suggesting they look to us for help.”372 
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Instead, Cole argued, ILPA membership should be restricted to AFL-CIO and 
international union publications. The organization should use its resources to upgrade the 
quality and prestige of the big publications by providing professional training and 
educational seminars for editors and writers. As the international union press grew in 
quality and stature, the ILPA would use its influence to encourage resource-rich 
internationals to create their own internal press associations, and it would assist the 
internationals in training and supporting their local editors. At the same time, Cole said, 
the ILPA would organize regional press associations comprised of local union and CLC 
publications in various parts of the country.373   
No one on the committee sided with Cole. Indeed, Kenneth Fiester derided the 
Cole’s plan as catering to the labor press “elite.”374 Instead, the committee charted a 
course that set the ILPA in a completely opposite direction. They proposed that that ILPA 
produce a range of new materials geared to small CLC and local union publications, 
including regular news bulletins, pamphlets, reading lists, and a film depicting “a model 
newspaper” to “sell” union officers on the value of quality publications. They also 
proposed hiring a full-time staff member to work mainly on building state and regional 
labor press associations. 
The committee briefly considered asking the AFL-CIO for funds to launch the 
new programs,375 but quickly decided that an increase in ILPA dues was a “more 
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feasible” solution.376 They agreed to impose higher dues on international unions and 
large, well-funded CLCs. But they also agreed to keep dues low (and to temporarily 
waive initiation fees) for local union and small central body papers “to bring them into 
the ILPA as new members…Prime consideration was given to the needs of these same 
small publications which are seriously in need of help.”377  
Just as the committee hoped, local editors poured into the ILPA. (See Figure 4, 
page 143.) In 1957, the local union press represented only 21.9 percent of all ILCA 
members. Five years later, they made up nearly 40 percent of the organization. By the 
late 1970s, the local labor press comprised a solid majority—57.5 percent of the ILPA 
membership— and their numbers continued to rise, reaching 74.4 percent of the total 
membership in 1993.378  
Clearly, the smaller publications found much to like in the programs and services 
offered by the ILPA (which haven’t changed much in the intervening fifty years). 
Members received an Editor’s Guide—a thick notebook packed with advice on 
everything from news writing to the complexities of libel law. They received a regular 
newsletter, the ILPA Reporter, which carried reports on events within the labor press and 
ILPA, as well as practical tips and suggestions. They received camera-ready graphics, 
campaign materials prepared by COPE and, occasionally, pre-written news stories. They 
received clear explanations of arcane postal regulations, and ILPA members could call an 
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AFL-CIO expert for help resolving problems with postal authorities. Members could mail 
their publications to the ILPA and receive critiques and suggestions. And they could enter 
a national contest and compete for awards in various categories which, if they won, 
reflected well on the union officers, and (hopefully) helped the editor to gain their trust 
and support.  
 
 
In 1964, as planned, the ILPA used a portion of its increased revenue to hire a 
full-time field representative to organize regional press associations. The associations 
provided the ILPA with “a considerable source of additional membership,” but they were 
also inherently unstable—mainly because of high turnover rates among local union 
editors. Many local editors were inexperienced volunteers, trying to hold down jobs, meet 
family commitments, perform other duties for their unions, and produce a newsletter.  
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and effort.379 With the exception of Fiester, ILPA council members served without pay. 
On top of their own demanding jobs and normal council duties, ILPA officers were 
spending large amounts of time in the 1960s investigating the racket press and filing 
complaints with state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission.380   
Just as Cole feared, the ILPA continually found itself spread too thin, lacking the 
time and money to accomplish much of what it set out to do. The ILPA started out in 
debt, but by scrimping and more than doubling its membership to 305 publications, the 
organization managed to gross $11,154 in dues revenue in 1958.381 By 1964, the ILPA’s 
membership had grown by 25 percent and, thanks to the new dues structure, its income 
more than doubled to $22,915, allowing the organization to hire a full-time field 
representative. But four years later, the ILPA was running out of cash again and had to let 
him go. The “ILPA has no staff worth mentioning,” Fiester grumbled.382   
By 1971, the organization—with 400 member publications— was running a 
$16,000 annual deficit, and ILPA leaders again raised dues, this time by 25 percent. They 
soon reported that the dues hike “is not solving our problem” and that their programs 
were “too ambitious” for the money they had.383 They cancelled meetings, cut the 
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frequency of membership mailings, and embarked on a membership drive. Almost 
immediately, the ILPA became locked in an expensive, time-consuming battle with the 
U.S. Postal Service over hikes in second-class mailing rates that threatened to devastate 
the labor press and other non-profit mailers.384 Between 1974 and 1984, the ILPA spent 
an average $16,000 a year fighting the rate hikes, and ILPA leaders spent a great deal of 
time raising funds for that campaign.385   
By 1978, the ILPA was confronting a $20,000 deficit, and the postal battles were 
only part of the story. The core problem, as Cole had foreseen, was the mismatch 
between the organization’s resources and membership base. The ILPA had added 200 
members since 1974, but the growth was “concentrated in smaller local union 
publications” that paid the least in dues but required the greatest amount of support. Most 
internationals already belonged to the ILPA, so there was little to be gained by recruiting 
the larger publications. To make matters worse, many CLC publications were going 
broke and folding operations during this period, as I discuss in the next chapter.386 Seeing 
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55 percent dues increase. By 1988, ILPA Secretary-Treasurer Pat Ziska was able to 
announce that the organization (now named the International Labor Communications 
Association, or ILCA) would take in dues totaling $93,000 that year. “We are on firm 
financial ground,” he proclaimed, before adding, paradoxically, that the ILCA was 
“spending more than we are collecting”—to the tune of $10,000 a month!387  
 It is instructive to compare the ILPA’s dues income for 1957 and 1988 in 
proportion to the number of publications the organization had to serve. After adjusting for 
inflation, the ILPA (with 305 members) had dues receipts of $88,709.32 in current (2011) 
dollars in 1957, or $290.85 per-member. In 1988, the ILPA (with 756 members) had dues 
receipts totaling $175,675.66 in current dollars, or $232.38 per-member— 20 percent 
less, in real terms, than the ILPA had thirty-two years before.   
The AFL-CIO did provide one important form of financial support to the ILPA 
during the first three decades of its existence. From 1956 through 1983, the federation 
assigned a top communications staff member to serve as the ILPA’s secretary-treasurer—
a time-consuming job that entailed maintaining financial records and corresponding with 
members, union leaders, and outside organizations.388 This arrangement with the AFL-
CIO allowed the ILPA to operate smoothly and professionally without having to “bear 
the salary and other expenses of a full-time Secretary-Treasurer,” which the organization, 
as constituted, could not have afforded to do.389 But having an AFL-CIO employee serve 
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as secretary-treasurer also allowed the federation to oversee and control the day-to-day 
business of the ILPA for the first three decades of its existence. As ILPA Secretary-
Treasurer Kenneth Fiester explained, “There is much that only the secretary-treasurer can 
do, since he is more or less in residence. To a degree, ILPA reflects the interests, abilities 
and energy of the secretary-treasurer.”390  
There is no record of the ILPA ever asking the AFL-CIO for substantial financial 
support. High-ranking AFL-CIO staff members said that ILPA leaders believed that 
accepting federation money might jeopardize the ILPA’s independence.391 If so, that says 
a great deal about how the AFL-CIO was perceived by groups close to the federation. On 
the other hand, there is no record that the AFL-CIO ever approached the ILPA with offers 
of sharply increased assistance, with or without strings attached.  
As Cole also predicted, the ILPA developed a leadership core and financial base 
badly out of synch with its locally-oriented mission and predominantly grassroots 
membership. Despite being a distinct minority, the wealthy internationals and the AFL-
CIO held both of the ILPA’s top officer’s posts for twenty-eight of the first thirty years of 
the organization’s existence.392 Indeed, as the next chapter discusses, no local union 
editor would serve as president or secretary-treasurer until 1996. The international unions 
also controlled, on average, 47 percent of the voting seats on the executive council during 
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the first three decades of the ILPA’s life, compared to only 10 percent for local union 
publications, which have comprised the largest single bloc of ILPA members since the 
early 1960s.393 The international unions were also the financial mainstay of the ILPA 
during its first thirty years, supplying between 60 percent and 70 percent of the annual 
dues for an organization whose programs were designed almost exclusively for the 
benefit of local unions and small CLCs.394  
The ILPA did offer valuable programs and services: The steady rise in local union 
membership is evidence of that. The ILPA, allied with other non-profit mailers, also 
succeeded in blunting some of the proposed postal rate hikes. As damaging as they were, 
the rate hikes would have been larger and more harmful if not for the efforts of the ILPA. 
And ILPA leaders spent a great deal of time tracking phony labor papers and hauling 
them into court. Had they not done so, the racket press would almost certainly be an even 
bigger problem than it is today.395 
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However, chronic under-financing has continually frustrated many of the ILPA’s 
plans, large and small. For example, the regional press associations—the ILPA’s most 
direct link with grassroots union editors— have stagnated since the late 1960s. The ILPA 
established ten state and regional associations during the 1950s and 1960s. There are only 
eight today. Despite repeated attempts to build new associations in New England, the 
south and other regions, the ILPA finds itself more or less where it was fifty years ago.396  
We will never know whether Gordon Cole’s strategy of concentrating first on the 
international union press would have produced a better result. But there is little evidence 
that the strategy adopted by the ILPA in 1959—to build the ILPA by concentrating on 
local unions and small CLCs— has improved the overall quality of the labor press or 
increased its prestige inside or outside the unions. Indeed, the massive cuts in the size and 
frequency of union publications throughout the 1970s and 1980s (a trend I explore in the 
next chapter) provide powerful evidence to the contrary.  
Why the Campaign for Community Labor Newspapers Failed 
 ILPA leaders may have thought they were merely critiquing the labor press when 
they pointed to gaps in labor’s communications network and urged a technical “fix”—a 
reallocation of resources to create community newspapers. What the ILPA actually 
offered the AFL-CIO was, in fact, an incisive critique of the structure of organized labor 
and the methods union leaders used to regulate movement discourse.   
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David Selvin believed the AFL-CIO rejected the community papers plan because 
it asked the federation to spend “a lot of money for a relatively untried venture.”397 But 
community labor papers were hardly untried. Labor history is full of examples of 
community papers leading major struggles, and plenty of successful community papers 
existed in the 1960s, including Michigan’s AFL-CIO News and the Ohio AFL-CIO’s 
Focus. The leaders of COPE, the federation, and the international unions were well aware 
of them.398  
So, was money a factor? It was the factor according to Allen Y. Zack, Jr., son of 
Meany’s public relations chief and ILPA secretary-treasurer from 1975 to 1981. “Who 
was going to pay for it?” he asked. “If somebody could have solved the money issue, I 
think the other problems would have gone away.”399 Davidson and other ILPA leaders 
argued that organized labor would save money by publishing large newspapers that 
reached every union member in a given region rather than dozens of smaller papers that 
reached bits and pieces of the union audience. That was undoubtedly true, but their 
argument neglected a crucial question: Whose money would be saved? Community 
papers would have required hundreds of thousands of dollars in start-up funds. And the 
CLCs and area unions would have had to purchase bulk subscriptions. Where was the 
money to come from? Unless community labor papers turned a profit and began paying 
for themselves (which no one expected to happen) organized labor could save money 
only by reducing spending on other programs.  
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Labor, like all institutions, is made up of groups and individuals with their own 
priorities to protect. The AFL-CIO Public Relations Department had a raft of programs it 
sought to preserve and expand. COPE was pouring vast sums into political campaigns 
and direct mail technologies. And as I discuss in the next chapter, the international unions 
had their own financial woes and weren’t terribly supportive of their own publications.  
Without question, community labor papers represented an expensive undertaking. 
However, it is worth noting that the AFL-CIO apparently had no difficulties in 1966 
collecting $3.26 million from its affiliates for the John F. Kennedy Library and the 
Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Fund.400 As Gordon Cole wryly observed, labor leaders 
always seemed to find “money for the important activities” like “modern office 
equipment… [and] extremely expensive legal talent.” The question, as Cole pointed out, 
was not money per se: It was what the labor leaders consider to be “important.”401  
Union journalists were in no position to challenge the priorities of labor’s top 
leaders. Cole, Davidson, Fiester and other editors directed union departments with 
sizeable budgets and great visibility. But they were high-ranking union staff members, not 
officers. They did not make policy. They articulated policies made by the officers. And 
the CLC and local union editors were even less able to influence the allocation of 
resources within the movement, and the same is true today.  
                                            
400 Minutes of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, May 8-9, 1967, RG4-006, Executive Council, 
Executive Council Minutes, 1955-1969, Vol. 12, GMMA, 20.  
 
401 Cole, Gordon H. “Union Communications in the Twentieth Century,” typewritten speech dated 







Sadly for the labor press, a 1975 ILPA survey showed the officers often viewed 
“editorial departments… [as] a lower priority than other union departments” when 
formulating their budgets.402  Murray Seeger, Director of AFL-CIO Publications under 
during the 1980s, explained that most union officers considered membership 
communications to be “a tertiary function” compared to negotiating contracts and 
running the union.403 Organized labor had become so preoccupied with collective 
bargaining that its leaders often viewed demands for member education and 
communication as the special pleadings of “missionaries or idealists.”404   
In 1959, an influential group of ILPA leaders called their organization “an 
integral part of the AFL-CIO, as are the various departments—Building Trades, Metal 
Trades, etc.,” and deserving of the same support from federation affiliates.405 This was 
wishful thinking, bordering on the delusional. The AFL-CIO Constitution mandates the 
existence of six “trade and industrial departments,” including the Building and 
Construction Trades Department, and the Metal Trades Department. (See Figure 1, 
“Organizational Chart of the AFL-CIO.”) 406 These mandated bodies (often referred to as 
“constitutional departments”) are typically directed by boards comprised of the secretary-
treasurers or presidents of the affiliated international unions. As an “allied organization” 
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of the AFL-CIO, the ILPA was not part of the federation’s constitutional structure. It has 
never enjoyed so high a status.  
Tellingly, Allen Y. Zack said he knew “virtually nothing about the ILPA” when 
he succeeded AFL-CIO Public Relations Director Saul Miller as ILPA secretary-treasurer 
in 1975—and Zack had been working under Miller at AFL-CIO Headquarters for three 
years. “Like every other federation staffer, I had gone to ILPA cocktail parties and 
luncheons but that was about it,” Zack recalled.407  Miller provided “no real agenda” 
telling Zack what to do, beyond some general advice to keep the ILPA stable and out of 
“inter-union fights.”408 
Miller’s concern about the labor press becoming embroiled in union politics 
suggests another reason why Meany failed to consider the community papers plan: 
control. Miller expressed this very concern to Ray Davidson in 1966, when the 
community papers plan was first taking shape. The editorial policies of any paper using 
the AFL-CIO’s political mailing lists “would have to be attuned very closely with those 
of COPE in the area,” Miller said, adding that this was “a situation which presently does 
not exist.”409  ILPA Secretary-Treasurer Fiester, then editor of the AFL-CIO News, made 
much the same point in two letters written the following year. Any newspaper endorsed 
by the AFL-CIO must agree to “surrender… [its] editorial independence” and adhere 
“without exception” to federation policy, he advised one union editor.  He explained to 
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another editor that the ILPA recognizes only community papers which are endorsed by 
state or local CLCs because the national AFL-CIO has ways to exert “control over its 
central bodies…and keep them from getting out of line.”410 
Controlling communications was part of Meany’s strategy for keeping the AFL-
CIO out of the internal affairs of its affiliates, according to his director of public relations. 
The AFL-CIO communicates exclusively “with national and international unions,” Albert 
J.  Zack wrote: “[We] have no direct contact with the local union member. The 
communication between a member and his union is the sole province of that union.”411 
Why, then, would Meany support creating AFL-CIO-sponsored newspapers to keep rank-
and-file workers informed about other affiliated unions? Simply by existing, community 
labor newspapers would have proclaimed that workers had a stake in issues affecting 
workers who belonged to other unions, worked for different employers, or labored under 
different contracts. Local unions also disagree all the time on all sorts of political and 
economic matters. And scandals and disputes involving unions can erupt in very public 
ways. Could a local labor paper ignore such stories and retain its credibility? Could it 
write about them without risking the support of union leaders who might be embarrassed 
by the coverage, or upset that the paper failed to take their side? Who would determine 
editorial policy? Who would police the paper’s performance, or mediate disputes that 
could easily reverberate all the way to AFL-CIO headquarters? 
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Furthermore, it is precisely at the community level where the ties between 
individual workers are strongest, and where the impulse to respond collectively to 
problems affecting neighbors and friends is most keenly felt.412 By the time ILPA’s 
proposal landed on Meany’s desk, The Oregon Labor Press and other community papers 
had already dragged the federation president into local disputes over union jurisdiction, 
sympathy strikes, and the Vietnam War.413 Throughout the 1960s, Meany was busy 
battling waves of protests from CLCs over the AFL-CIO’s support for a federal EEOC 
and its staunch opposition to George Wallace’s presidential campaign.414  
Labor newspapers that reported, week after week, on problems affecting workers 
across the lines of union, craft, and contract would have articulated a broad concept of 
“community” that subverted the principles of autonomy and contract-specific bargaining 
on which the AFL-CIO was built. Woll, Meany, and other federation leaders had killed 
the Federated Press for precisely that reason. Barely ten years after destroying the FP, 
why would Meany create community labor newspapers that would generate political 
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headaches, be difficult to control, and foster conceptions of labor as a broad, grassroots 
movement?  
The Wider Environment  
 So far in this chapter, I have looked at the social actors most immediately 
involved in creating and shaping the ILPA. These included Matthew Woll, AFL-CIO 
President George Meany, the editors affiliated with the CIO and AFL before and after the 
1955 merger, federation staff, and the leaders of COPE. These actors were propelled by 
different institutional logics—norms, values, and beliefs that caused them to prefer a 
labor press with more (or fewer) resources that discussed a broader (or narrower) range of 
subjects with a larger (or smaller) audience.  
The institutions within which Meany, the editors, and other individuals operated 
were social actors, too. Institutions have distinct internal cultures (norms, values, and 
beliefs) and organizational imperatives that constrain and facilitate the actions of their 
leaders, staff, and members. For example, Richard Estep and other ILPA leaders worked 
hard for years to improve the quality and prestige of the labor press. Yet Estep’s 
obligations to his own international led him to bring charges against fellow ILPA leader 
James Goodsell, whose reportage reflected poorly on Estep’s union. Other ILPA leaders 
employed by other labor organizations sided with Estep. In this case, their obligations to 
the federation and the internationals (i.e. the dominant institutional logics of organized 
labor) led them to weaken the labor press in important ways by dividing the ILPA and 






The primary institutional actors (e.g. the ILPA; the AFL-CIO and its affiliates) 
also operated within a broader social environment dominated by other, more-powerful 
institutions that shaped the post-war labor press in less direct but even more profound 
ways. As I explained in Chapter 2, the U.S. Congress, the National Labor Relations 
Board, and the federal courts produced laws and regulations that created a bifurcated, 
fragmented union structure, with large centralized institutions overseeing thousands of 
smaller, separate subunits. They also produced a labor movement characterized by an 
“overwhelming reliance” on firm-specific collective bargaining over economic concerns. 
In Europe, wages and working conditions are typically established through industry-wide 
bargaining between national labor confederations and employer groups. European states 
also typically provide their citizens with health insurance and other costly benefits.  
In the U.S., however, wages, benefits, and working conditions  must be negotiated 
between individual employers and unions— often worksite by worksite—every three to 
five years.415 To get sense of the burden this places on U.S. unions, consider that 332,642 
collective bargaining agreements—an average of 83,161 a year—expired and had to be 
renegotiated in the United States between 1966 and 1969 alone.416  As Nelson 
Lichtenstein wrote, the need to negotiate and oversee “a private welfare state” created 
centralized labor organizations “administratively top-heavy with technicians,” and caused 
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“even the most liberal” unions to become “narrowly focused” on economic concerns and 
“defensive” in their approach to bargaining and politics.417  
Conservative political and business groups also helped to narrow the range of 
discourse within the union publications and cripple the community labor press. The anti-
communist crusades ostensibly targeted the U.S. Communist Party, but the main blows 
were actually aimed at the broad, pro-labor coalitions of the Popular Front.418 These 
coalitions were based in industrial communities, where unionists, civil rights activists, 
artists, and radicals collaborated in “legislative battles, strikes, organizing campaigns, and 
labor negotiations [that] were seamlessly interwoven.”419 State and local central bodies 
are natural incubators for dissidents and insurgent labor leaders. As such, national union 
officers have historically been wary of the CLCs, and have sought to curb their power.420 
Many labor leaders exploited the anti-communist crusades to eliminate their most 
outspoken rivals. The purging of 13 million members of eleven left-led unions crippled 
scores of the most vibrant CLCs, as well as their community-based publications. The 
AFL-CIO’s reaction to the McClellan Committee’s anti-corruption investigations (which 
were heavily publicized by conservative business groups) further weakened the 
community labor press by limiting its access to advertising.  
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These factors made the ILPA’s critique of the structure of the labor press a 
critique of the structure of the unions, themselves. The organization and financing of the 
U.S. labor press mirrors the organization and the distribution of resources within 
organized labor.  The labor press is dominated at the top by a relatively small number of 
well-financed publications produced by the federation and big internationals. At the 
grassroots level are hundreds of small, often poorly-financed publications produced by 
union locals. And in between, as Davidson and other ILPA leaders pointed out, are a 
relative handful of community labor newspapers, few of which are very good. 
A State-Imposed Concept of Community 
Federal labor policy also created a legal definition of a “community of interest” 
that defines workers in purely economic terms and divides them into “employer-specific” 
units. To constitute a “community of interest” (and to be considered eligible for union 
representation), workers must satisfy most or all of the following conditions: They must 
labor under a common management or supervisory system, perform similar jobs requiring 
similar skills and training, work in the same location or in close geographic proximity, 
interact regularly while performing their duties, and share common facilities, as well as 
rules and schedules related to wages, benefits and working hours.421 Furthermore, federal 
law recognizes unions for one purpose only: to bargain with employers over wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of work.422  
The state imposes harsh penalties on unions that engage in collective action based 
on broader notions of community. A union under contract with one employer cannot 
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legally strike to support workers engaged in a dispute with another employer—or even, in 
some cases, to support workers laboring for the same employer, but covered by a separate 
labor agreement. Unions that violate no-strike agreements or engage in sympathy strikes 
or secondary boycotts can be decertified by the Board and lose their legal standing and 
protection. They can be fined, found in contempt, and their leaders can be jailed.423  
In sum, U.S. law creates powerful disincentives to use the labor press to promote 
concepts of community that encompass all wage-earners and—still less—that encourage 
workers to act on those broader sympathies. Nonetheless, within the very real constraints 
imposed by the state, the business sector, and their own institutions, Meany, Davidson, 
and other individuals made choices based on their personal priorities and idiosyncrasies. 
After World War II, there were real possibilities for the labor press to attract 
advertisers, hire staff, expand circulation, and become an influential voice in the public 
discourse. Davidson and other union journalists strove to bring such a labor press into 
being. However, the leaders and members of the ILPA could not displace the narrower 
vision (the “institutional logics”) of the top labor leadership. The federation and 
international unions controlled the editors’ jobs and budgets, and dictated policies 
governing advertising, circulation, and editorial content. The result was a post-war labor 
press that spoke (and continues to speak) to myriad groups of workers separated by union 
affiliation, craft, contract, and workplace—a labor press trapped in a communicative 
enclosure; segregated from the mainstream discourse.    
  
                                            






Chapter 6: In Whose Voice? 
The Debates over House Organs and Public Relations 
 
 During the 1990s and 2000s, two longstanding debates within the International 
Labor Communications Association escalated into a very public, bitter critique of the 
AFL-CIO. Relations between the two organizations became so strained that the 
federation moved in 2003 to dismantle the ILCA. For decades, union journalists had 
debated whether (or to what extent) union publications should be “house organs,” that 
focused on the union organizations and leaders, or “grassroots tribunes” that concentrated 
on the needs and activities of workers. As I discuss in this chapter, the debate over house 
organs escalated into an open call by some ILCA leaders for complete editorial freedom 
for union editors. A second major debate broke out during this period over labor’s use of 
electronic communications technologies and public relations. Leading voices within the 
ILCA argued that unions should utilize video and other electronic technologies mainly 
for local organizing rather than national campaigns to influence public opinion. This 
debate, too, became explicit, public rejection of AFL-CIO communication policies. 
 To understand why these debates became so bitter, and why the federation and the 
ILCA became so estranged, it is necessary to examine a series of crises starting in the 
1970s that sharply raised the costs of membership communications and caused many 







Labor Turns Away From the Labor Press 
In the 1970s, U.S. corporations began a massive shift of investment out of basic 
industry and into mergers, acquisitions, and foreign ventures. They shuttered plants in 
unionized states and moved production to unorganized regions in the U.S. south and 
overseas.424 Unions lost millions of dues-paying members, while inflation eroded the 
value of the dues the unions did receive. Simultaneously, business conservatives 
launched well-financed propaganda campaigns to discredit union and government 
intervention in the so-called free markets.425 Increasing numbers of employers began to 
brazenly violate labor laws, hoping to cripple unions where they existed and stifle 
organizing where they did not. And labor quickly learned it could no longer count on the 
federal government for protection.426  
Under President Nixon, the U.S. Postal Service became a self-supporting federal 
agency and proceeded to raise the mailing rates for unions and other non-profit 
organizations by 1,200 percent between 1971 and 1979. (During that same period, the 
cost of newsprint soared 150 percent.)427 In 1978, a Democratically-controlled Congress 
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and White House refused to pass reforms specifically designed to curb the epidemic of 
labor law-breaking.428 And three years later, in his first year in office, President Reagan 
sent an unmistakable signal to anti-union employers by firing 12,000 striking air traffic 
controllers.429 The ineffectuality of the National Labor Relations Board during the Ford 
and Carter years became an open embrace of the business community under Reagan’s 
board Chairman Donald Dotson.430 
The economic and political assaults on U.S. unions had two direct, adverse effects 
on the labor press. The combination of higher postal fees and newsprint costs hit hard at 
lengthier periodicals that were mailed to large numbers of readers: namely international 
union and CLC publications. Second, labor leaders began looking to public relations as a 
way to counter the propaganda offensives of business and political conservatives.  
 According to a 1975 ILPA survey, 31 percent of international union publications 
and 44 percent of “regional and community” labor papers (i.e. publications of, or 
endorsed by, union districts and state and local CLCs) reported reductions in the number 
of pages published per issue. Forty-five percent of international union publications, 44 
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percent of “regional and community” newspapers, and 30 percent of local union 
periodicals had reduced the number of issues published per year. In addition, the survey 
showed 21 percent of all international papers and 14 percent of the “regional and 
community” papers reported losing at least one staff member. The primary reasons cited 
for the cuts: increased newsprint prices, postal rates, and general inflation.431 
Matters only worsened for the labor press between 1975 through 1985, a second 
ILPA survey showed. Thirty-three percent of the international union publications and 26 
percent of the state and regional labor periodicals (a category that included CLC 
publications) reported reductions in budget and/or staff during that ten-year period. 
Twenty-two percent of all labor papers reported cuts in the number of issues they printed 
per year, with the majority reducing their frequency of publication by half or more. The 
second survey showed local union publications “endured the fewest cutbacks,” which 
was the pattern in the first survey, too. Once again, labor editors cited higher postal rates 
and general inflation as leading reasons for the cuts, but a new explanation now topped 
the list: the loss of union members due to plant closings and lay-offs.432  
“The trend was going away from the weekly and monthly labor papers,” recalled 
Murray Seeger, former AFL-CIO Director of Information. “Membership was not growing 
and…the unions were looking at them as a cost item.”433 What the surveys failed to 
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capture were papers that could not respond because they were no longer in business. 
ILPA records, however, reveal a dramatic drop in the number of CLC publications. 
Between 1970 and 1981, the number of CLC publications belonging to the ILPA plunged 
from ninety-eight to seventy-nine.  In 1985, sixty-two CLC publications appeared on the 
membership rolls, and by 1991 only fifty-five remained. During this period, the number 
of local union members in the ILPA soared (locals were so numerous and the 
organization set their dues rates so low that it was relatively easy to recruit them) while 
the number of international union publications barely changed.434 The crisis mainly 
affected community and international union papers, but there was a big difference: The 
internationals had far greater resources to cushion the blows. Community papers (that 
“most starved segment of the labor press”) had operated on a shoestring for years and had 
little room to maneuver.435  
Perhaps the most portentous finding in the surveys of 1970s was the widespread 
perception among union editors that labor leaders assigned a “lower priority” to member 
communications when allocating money and staff. “There is a general administrative 
trend in many unions to solve any budgetary problems by first singling out publications 
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for retrenchment or drastic curtailment—the only link a union has to its membership as a 
whole,” ILPA leaders complained.436 
Labor Turns to Electronic Public Relations 
In 1985, the AFL-CIO released a 34-page report, The Changing Situation of 
Workers and Their Unions, which acknowledged, in very frank terms, the dire problems 
facing organized labor.  U.S. unions “find themselves behind the pace of change,” the 
AFL-CIO conceded. While the U.S. labor force added three million workers between 
1960 and 1980, the number of union members didn’t budge, the report pointed out. More 
troubling still, the report continued, union membership began falling in the 1980s both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of the total labor force.437 
Washington Post columnist David Broder hailed the report as “a remarkable 
document…a blunt declaration” that union leaders were “ready to tackle” the crises in 
organized labor.438 But union journalists spotted a glaring omission. The “landmark 
study”—the product of “more than two years of deliberations by a blue-ribbon panel of 
AFL-CIO leaders”— contained “not one word about the labor press.”439  
In a chapter titled, “Improving the Labor Movement’s Communications” (one of 
five major subjects addressed in the report),  the panel called on unions to employ “every 
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technology and medium available,” and then proceeded to list broadcast and cable 
television, radio, teleconferencing, spot advertising, and video, omitting any mention of 
print.440 They reminded labor leaders to be cognizant of “the limits of our resources” and 
to “improve the efficacy of our traditional programs,” but said nothing about improving 
the efficacy of labor’s existing network of publications and editors.441  
In sum, the federation’s 1985 report contained two messages of tremendous 
importance to the ILPA. First, the report concentrated on the need to reach out more to 
students, reporters, unorganized workers, and others outside the trade unions: in other 
words, it called for intensified public relations. Second, the report urged unions to shift to 
electronic media.  
In fact, by 1985 both trends—the shift towards public relations and electronic 
technologies—were well established within the federation and many of its most 
important affiliates.442 Half the international unions responding to a survey said they 
increased spending on public relations between 1976 and 1981, the same period when 
ILPA members reported widespread cut-backs in the labor press. More than one-third of 
the international unions said they made “significant” increases in their public relations 
expenditures during that period, and half said they expected to spend “more” or 
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“considerably more” on public relations during the next five years.443 Two years before 
the Changing Situation report was released, the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was completing work on a color television studio 
equipped with microwave satellite relays in its Washington D.C. headquarters building. 
AFSCME began producing television ads for national distribution in 1972, and by the 
early 1980s the union’s public relations department had thirty full-time staff members 
and a $5 million annual budget.444 In 1977—two years after transforming the weekly 
Machinist newspaper into a monthly publication to save the union $700,000 a-year— the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) sharply reversed 
course, expanding its communications department and throwing itself into television, 
video, and film.445 The IAM’s colorful new president, William W. Winpisinger, an 
avowed socialist and former automobile mechanic, appointed Robert J. Kalaski to 
succeed Gordon Cole as communications director. Kalaski built an in-house video studio, 
conducted labor’s first, live interactive satellite broadcast, and began to produce full-
length television programs. (An IAM program on plant closings titled We Didn’t Want it 
to Happen This Way, won the top award for documentaries at the 1979 New York Film 
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Festival.) That same year, the IAM trained 1,500 rank-and-file members in forty-three 
states to monitor television news and entertainment programs. The results of IAM’s 
Media Monitoring Project showed that workers and unions were almost never depicted 
on T.V., and, when they were, they were typically portrayed as ignorant, corrupt, 
incompetent, and violent.446 
Recognizing the enormous costs of electronic media, Winpisinger proposed 
creating a coalition of unions to pool money for advertising campaigns, program 
development, equipment, and training. It was Winpisinger’s proposal—and an IAM 
media consultant who told the AFL-CIO Executive Council in 1981, “If you’re not on 
T.V., you don’t exist”—that inspired a new federation president to create the Labor 
Institute for Public Affairs.447   
LIPA and a New Name for the ILPA 
Lane Kirkland, who succeeded George Meany as AFL-CIO President in 1979, felt 
labor communications was “stuck in ancient history.” He was determined to make labor 
part of the mainstream social discourse.448 In November 1981, Kirkland convinced 
delegates to the national AFL-CIO convention to support a special dues assessment to 
create the Labor Institute for Public Affairs (LIPA). The new organization had two main 
objectives. It would provide labor with a consistent presence in the electronic media 
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(television, in particular), and it would improve the ability of the federation and its 
affiliates to utilize electronic communication technologies.449  
LIPA “appeared to have carte blanche” when it came to spending money, a union 
media activist recalled.450 When LIPA “went public” in 1983, its annual budget of $1.79 
million represented nearly two-thirds of the total monies allotted to the AFL-CIO 
Information Department, which was responsible for all federation publications, publicity, 
and press relations. In 1984, Kirkland separated LIPA from the Information Department 
and poured $4.22 million into the new organization—twice what it spent on all 
Information Department activities combined.451 LIPA opened offices in New York City 
and Hollywood, California and produced pro-labor advertisements (for print, radio, and 
television) featuring rock stars and movie actors, as well as documentary films, and pilots 
for T.V. variety shows. The AFL-CIO even gutted the ground floor of its Washington 
D.C. headquarters building to build LIPA a television studio, complete with satellite 
uplinks and a video editing bay.452 During the mid-1980s, the AFL-CIO spent an average 
$3 million a year on LIPA. Spending jumped to $7 million in 1989 and to $5.4 million 
the following year with the launch of the “Union Yes” advertising campaign.453     
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In November, 1981, when ILPA leaders learned of Kirkland’s plans to create 
LIPA, they immediately drafted a statement expressing enthusiastic support for the 
initiative, and their eagerness to be involved. LIPA represents “a unique opportunity” to 
strengthen labor communications, ILPA leaders wrote Kirkland. The corporate interests 
are constantly developing technologies to mold “the minds of our members, our 
prospective members and the general public,” they wrote. It is time for the unions to 
make a “total commitment” to exploit “all forms of communications.” They also urged 
LIPA to take advantage of the experience of the ILPA and its members: “Working labor 
journalists are knowledgeable in many of the new forms of communication technology 
and can offer added insights.”454 
When ILPA leaders drafted their statement on LIPA, they also proposed renaming 
their organization the International Labor Communications Association (ILCA). “The 
survival of the labor press” is at stake, they declared. “The trend is towards electronic 
media” and anyone who continues to think of “print only” will be left behind. The 
proposed name change also signaled a new emphasis on “external as well as internal 
communications”—in other words, a heightened focus on public relations.455 The ILPA 
officially became the ILCA at its convention in fall 1983. 
Throughout the 1980s, the ILCA repeatedly sought ways to collaborate with 
LIPA, but their efforts “never seemed to gain traction.”456 Kalaski invited LIPA to co-
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sponsor the ILCA’s first-ever film and broadcast awards ceremony. The awards would be 
called “The Sammies,” a mixed reference to AFL founder Sam Gompers and the 
Grammy awards. But LIPA’s leaders backed out a few weeks before the event, informing 
Kalaski that they were “not ready.”457 LIPA staffers conducted workshops at various 
ILCA gatherings and, when asked, shared lists of media groups that might wish to join or 
to work with the ILCA. But over time, ILCA leaders grew exasperated by their inability 
to forge a regular working relationship with the LIPA. Can we “encourage LIPA to 
assign someone to act as a liaison with the ILCA,” they wondered? 458 When the ILCA 
discovered it could cost up to $25,000 to produce a planned video—far more than they 
could afford—LIPA offered its assistance.459 But that assistance never materialized, 
prompting ILCA leaders to look for strategies “to put pressure on LIPA to be more 
enthusiastic and supportive of the project.”460 After months of haggling, LIPA’s leaders 
announced they would have to subcontract the video work and present the ILCA with a 
bill. The ILCA completed the project using its own funds, volunteer labor, and resources 
donated by the IAM and other international unions.461 
LIPA acted as if the “working labor journalists” of the ILCA had little to offer in 
the way of useful “insights.” In truth, the two organizations reflected different worlds. 
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LIPA President Larry Kirkman was a high-power communications professional, and so 
were the people he hired. He held degrees in journalism and education from Columbia 
College and Harvard University. Kirkman had been an editor for the National 
Endowment of the Arts, a producer for PBS, an assistant professor at American 
University, and a director of the American Film Institute.462 “Larry knew television but 
he knew nothing about labor,” explained Murray Seeger. He was “not a labor guy.”463 
The “Benign Neglect” of the AFL-CIO 
But Seeger was not exactly “a labor guy,” either, and from the moment he was 
hired as Lane Kirkland’s Director of Information in 1981, the ILCA and the AFL-CIO 
began drifting apart. Seeger was a professional journalist who came to know Kirkland 
while covering labor and economics for Newsweek and the Los Angeles Times. He had 
worked in a unionized steel mill one summer as a teenager, and even served as a picket 
captain during a Guild newspaper strike. But by Seeger’s own admission, he was an 
“outsider” when he arrived at the AFL-CIO. Kirkland was looking for “someone from 
outside” the unions who knew labor well and had strong connections to the mainstream 
press: “someone who could look at labor from the outside.”464 
“No question, Murray was a qualified, professional journalist, but I don’t think he 
was committed to what we were doing,” said Carolyn Jacobson, an editor for the Bakery, 
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Confectionary and Tobacco Workers Union who succeeded Kalaski as ILCA president. 
“There was an arrogance…that, particularly those of us doing local publications, weren’t 
doing anything interesting or important.”465 Susan Phillips, a former ILCA secretary-
treasurer, described Seeger’s tenure from 1981 to 1987 as a period of “benign neglect” 
towards the ILCA.466  
In 1983, when ILCA Secretary-Treasurer Susan Dunlop left the AFL-CIO 
Information Department, Seeger failed to appoint a member of his staff to take her place 
on the ILCA council. It was the first time in twenty-seven years that the AFL-CIO failed 
to provide the ILCA with a full-time secretary-treasurer.  
According to Dunlop, “there was nothing mysterious” about Seeger’s decision. 
“The secretary-treasurer’s job is a lot of work… [and] nobody wanted to do it.”467 
However, Seeger could have followed precedent and simply assigned someone to take 
the job. But Seeger didn’t seem to view the ILCA as a major priority. Records show that 
Seeger, an ex-officio council member, almost never attended ILCA meetings. When he 
did, it was typically to explain the federation’s latest programs.468 His failure to fill the 
post required ILCA’s volunteer leaders to spend time on record-keeping and 
correspondence instead delivering programs and services to the labor press. Without a 
direct “pipeline to the AFL-CIO,” ILCA leaders found it harder to obtain resources from 
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federation staff.469 Intentionally or not, Seeger had sent a message that the federation was 
less interested in the labor press than before. 
The paltry sums the federation spent on the ILCA, compared to the riches it 
lavished on LIPA, provide the starkest proof of the shift in AFL-CIO priorities. For 
example, in 1982, when the AFL-CIO gave LIPA $4.22 million, it loaned $10,000 to the 
ILCA, which was so broke it could not meet its expenses.470  In 1986, when the AFL-
CIO spent $3.89 million on LIPA, the federation gave the ILCA a used Zenith computer 
“in limited operation” and a printer “on loan” from another department.  ILCA leaders 
had to purchase a printer stand, desk, and chair, and find a volunteer to program the 
computer in order to use the equipment.471 
Several factors explain the federation’s generosity towards LIPA and its “nickel-
and-diming” of the ILCA. First, the AFL-CIO recognized that labor’s enemies were using 
television and other electronic media to “symbolically annihilate” workers and unions: to 
eliminate working-class people and perspectives from the public discourse or, at the very 
least, to marginalize them.472 To its great credit, the AFL-CIO responded boldly, pouring 
massive amounts of money into LIPA, hoping to counter those attacks and win the “the 
hearts and minds” of the public. Ultimately the costs became too great to bear and the 
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federation disbanded LIPA in 1995. I will examine debates about the wisdom of the 
AFL-CIO’s strategy later in this chapter, but it cannot be denied that LIPA represented a 
bold, sustained attempt by organized labor to exploit electronic mass media.  
Second, the federation’s growing interest in public relations coincided with a 
general decline in the interest shown by labor leaders’ in print communications directed 
towards the union membership. “The ILPA was a symbol of reducing the investment in 
internal communication,” Seeger said. “You could just see it sort of fading. That was a 
mirror of what was going on in the internal management of the unions.”473 The turn away 
from the labor press was partly due to rising postage and printing costs but, as I showed, 
the unions had not run out of money for communications. They were shifting funds out of 
membership communications and into public relations. Union leaders were also starting 
to question the relevance of printed communications and becoming fascinated with video, 
cable television, and other electronic media that seemed more exciting and potentially 
powerful than traditional newspapers and magazines.474  
     Third, LIPA and the ILCA were very different organizations—“apples and 
oranges,” in the words of Susan Phillips. Federation leaders created the ILCA, but they 
did not run it. The ILCA was a voluntary association of publications, most of which 
belonged to local unions attached to various AFL-CIO affiliates. LIPA, on the other hand, 
belonged to the AFL-CIO. It was an AFL-CIO department, staffed by federation 
employees. Pouring money into LIPA and turning it into a powerful organization posed 
                                            
473 Seeger interview.  
 







few political risks for the AFL-CIO. But empowering an organization that the federation 
did not control and that regularly addressed the rank-and-file members of its affiliates 
was fraught with political peril. The most obvious danger was that the ILCA or a member 
paper might report a story or raise questions that caused trouble for an affiliate. But Susan 
Phillips pointed to a deeper danger. By strengthening “local union communications you 
are strengthening the local union leadership,” she said, and “if you develop leaders, they 
are going to challenge” the incumbents. “Labor leaders are often paranoid about things 
they can’t control.”475 
     The federation’s fear of creating problems for its affiliates goes to the heart of the 
“institutional logics” of the AFL-CIO—the principal of autonomy that leaves each 
international free to conduct its affairs and deal with its members. Simply put, the AFL-
CIO has a mandate to speak to the public. It has no mandate whatsoever to address the 
members of its affiliates. As Meany’s director of public relations explained, “The 
communication between a member and his union is the sole province of that union.”476 
Lane Kirkland himself ran into trouble when he launched a barnstorming bus tour on 
behalf of presidential candidate Walter Mondale in 1984. “The individual union 
presidents didn’t like the idea of the AFL-CIO president reaching right to the members,” 
recalled Seeger, who accompanied Kirkland on the tour. “At these regional conferences, 
people would say, ‘Gee, I never met a president of the AFL-CIO before.’ And the second 
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line would be, ‘I’ve never met the president of my own union.’ And this is what they 
couldn’t stand.”477 
The federation could have looked for ways to place the ILCA on a solid financial 
footing while maintaining an “arms-length” relationship with the organization. The AFL-
CIO’s sponsorship of the American Institute for Free Labor Development and the 
Solidarity Center show the federation’s ability to do this in the arena of international 
affairs.478 Instead, the federation opted to keep an arms-length distance from the ILCA 
and leave it “free” to raise its own funds and run its own programs, as best it could. 
Michael Byrne, a former editor of the AFL-CIO News, said the federation treated the 
ILCA like “a stepchild—it was never given the resources it could have had.” 479 
With paid staff to organize and administer programs, the ILCA “could have done 
a lot more. Things would have been completely different,” Susan Phillips said. But ILCA 
leaders were accustomed to “piggybacking on what others were doing” and obtaining 
“freebies” from unions and volunteers, she said. Looking back, she reflected, “It was like 
growing up poor and not realizing it until much later.”480  
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“New Voices” Take Over the Federation 
 If ILCA leaders did not feel poor in the late 1980s, they clearly felt ignored and 
underappreciated. During a January 1987 executive council meeting, ILCA President 
Carolyn Jacobson complained that AFL-CIO took her group for granted. The ILCA’s 
independence from the federation is largely “a fiction,” she said. It operates as a “support 
group [but] without recognition.” The ILCA should not give up its autonomy, Jacobson 
argued, but it should expect the AFL-CIO to acknowledge the ILCA’s contributions and 
involve it more directly in its programs.481  
 Only weeks after that meeting, Seeger retired as AFL-CIO Information Director 
and was replaced by Rex Hardesty. Hardesty was a former sports writer for the Tulsa 
World and the Washington Star but, unlike Seeger, he was also a veteran union journalist, 
having worked for eighteen years as an editor at the AFL-CIO.482  The federation also 
hired a young journalist, Dennis Beal, to serve as Kirkland’s assistant for 
communications. The two appointments lifted Jacobson’s hopes: “Dennis takes the ILCA 
quite seriously,” she told the council. “We are opening up an avenue of communications 
to the AFL-CIO that I feel has been blocked for some time.”483 
 Her optimism seemed justified. Hardesty became a regular at ILCA council 
meetings, and soon the federation began supplying ILCA with a $10,000 dollar annual 
grant, which was used over the years to purchase computers, software, a photocopier, and 
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other items the organization would been hard pressed to afford.484 The AFL-CIO began 
to provide the ILCA with a semimonthly graphics pack to mail to its members. It paid to 
print an ILCA brochure on racket publications and contributed $5,000 to create a 
database to help track and file complaints against bogus labor papers.485  
However, even as it grew closer to the ILCA, Kirkland’s administration was 
losing support among top labor leaders. The problems confronting labor were deepening, 
and the size and influence of the trade union movement were in free fall. Union 
membership rates plunged by nearly one third under Kirkland, from 23 percent of all U.S. 
workers at the start of the 1980s to only 16.1 percent when the decade ended.486 More 
and more openly, labor leaders complained that Kirkland was fixated on international and 
inside-the-Beltway intrigues, while U.S. unions were being decimated by layoffs, broken 
strikes, and concessionary contracts.   
In 1994, Kirkland found himself facing the first open split in the federation’s 
leadership since 1935—and the first contested federation election since 1894.487  
Recognizing he could not be reelected, Kirkland stepped down as AFL-CIO president 
only months before the 1995 AFL-CIO convention. Federation Secretary-Treasurer 
Thomas Donahue succeeded Kirkland and began campaigning for election at the national 
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AFL-CIO convention that fall. But Donahue was too closely identified with Kirkland to 
straddle the split. He lost badly to John Sweeney, leader of the “New Voices” slate, 
whose grassroots-oriented agenda seemed a perfect fit for the ILCA. 
Sweeney headed the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)—the fastest 
growing union in the country, and the only U.S. union based among janitors, nursing 
home workers, clericals, and others trapped in the low-wage service sector. Sweeney 
advocated confrontational actions, including blocking streets and bridges, and marching 
into executive office suites.488 Running with him was forty-five year-old Richard 
Trumka, the youngest person ever elected president of the militant United Mine Workers 
Union. During a prolonged struggle with the Pittston Coal Company in the late 1980s, 
Trumka had one of the first sit-down strikes and building seizures since the Great 
Depression.489 The third member of the slate, Linda Chavez-Thompson, was the daughter 
of Mexican-American sharecroppers. She worked in the North Texas cotton fields as a 
young girl, dropped out of high school, and in her early twenties traveled the Deep South 
organizing for the Laborers’ International Union.490 
To the surprise and consternation of many, the victory of the “New Voices” slate 
ushered-in the most acrimonious relations ever between the ILCA and the AFL-CIO. 
Initially, ILCA leaders were excited by the wide-open debates over labor’s future 
and the federation’s bold new proposals for mobilizing workers. Perhaps the ILCA 
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should become a part of the AFL-CIO, one council member suggested at the New York 
convention where Sweeney, Trumka and Chavez-Thompson were elected. The council 
was not prepared to go that far, but ILCA Secretary-Treasurer Susan Phillips did 
announce plans to meet with Denise Mitchell, Sweeney’s communications director, to 
discuss the “ILCA’s integration into the AFL-CIO’s new public affairs structure.”491 
Phillips said that during her meetings with Mitchell, she discovered the two 
women shared the belief that the ILCA’s primary purpose was to “reinforce federation 
policy.” But she also sensed that Mitchell’s commitment to the ILCA was more 
calculated and limited than Hardesty’s had been. “I always felt that Rex actively tried to 
help… [while] Denise’s support was political. She knew the people on the ILCA council 
and I think she realized she didn’t want to simply dismiss the UFCW or the Machinists, 
so she was cooperative.”492 
Mitchell, who headed communications for Sweeney at the SEIU, practiced a 
disciplined, centralized brand of communications. She readily conceded that the ILCA 
never fit with that approach. In a lengthy interview, she explained that her 
communication plans flowed, first, from an analysis of the federation’s mission, followed 
by an assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges—all of 
which varied by issue and circumstance. Furthermore, she said, her department strove at 
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all times to accomplish three objectives: (1) to the influence the public by injecting the 
AFL-CIO into key policy debates; (2) to influence the labor movement by promoting 
issues and campaigns through the labor press and other means; (3) to “position the 
federation within the labor movement” by creating a coherent image of its goals and 
activities.493 
Mitchell viewed the labor press as a transmission belt for federation messages. 
During our interview, she described a strategy of “flowing information down” and 
“driving communications through” the unions.494 In a 1999 speech to the ILCA, written 
by Mitchell’s department, John Sweeny used identical language, over and over: The labor 
press is “spreading our message,” “delivering” information, and “telling” labor’s story. 
Labor publications “talk to,” and “speak for” working people.495 Nowhere in Sweeney’s 
speech or in Mitchell’s description of her strategy was the labor press described as a 
means for the workers themselves to have a voice. 
Mitchell was emphatic that messages from local unions carried far more 
credibility with the rank and file than messages from the federation or the internationals: 
“All the survey work we’ve done shows that,” she said. “It has become a kind of cardinal 
rule for us.” Nonetheless, she said, the ILCA lacked the resources, organization, and 
professionalism required to reach the grassroots membership press on a regular, effective 
basis. “It would take a lot of resources to do that,” she said. “I don’t know how good a 
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job most national unions have done figuring out how to flow information down to their 
local unions...and that’s a primary relationship.” Although the AFL-CIO is organized in 
every state and in some 500 communities, its decentralized, autonomous structure makes 
it “extremely difficult” to reach the local labor press, she continued. The state and local 
CLCs are, to a great extent, independent entities controlled by their own leaders and 
constituencies, Mitchell pointed out. Transmitting messages from the national AFL-CIO 
wasn’t necessarily a high priority for them or, still less, for the international unions.  
According to Mitchell, the ILCA’s “elected structure” had politicized an 
organization that needed all its energies focused on the challenges of communications. 
Internal politics have created a sense of independence so strong that the ILCA has 
sometimes sought to compete, rather than cooperate, with the AFL-CIO.  ILCA’s 
overwhelming reliance on volunteer leaders was a weakness, too, she said: “Don’t get me 
wrong, they have really committed people who are very good communicators, but that’s a 
different thing than having time to run an organization.” 
According to Mitchell, some internationals have urged the AFL-CIO to improve 
the ILCA by encouraging more capable people to run for office. However, she said, 
doing that would put the AFL-CIO “in the middle” of ILCA elections—something she 
was loath to do. Furthermore, she argued, even a well-run ILCA—even one “brought 
within the AFL-CIO where people did have control over it”—would have a difficult time 
communicating with the locals” for all the reasons outlined above. 496 








Phillips tried to convince Mitchell that the ILCA did, in fact, offer the federation a 
way to reach levels of the union they “could not have reached in other ways…a way to 
get material directly into the hands of the locals.”497 But Michael Byrne, who edited the 
AFL-CIO News from 1989-1997, said Mitchell “made it clear to me when she came to the 
AFL-CIO that she did not have a lot of faith in the ILCA.” She felt the ILCA was 
“running its own show, and there was no way we could use them in ways that would 
advance the labor movement.” Indeed, Byrne said, Mitchell ordered him to stop spending 
time and money attending ILCA’s executive council meetings:  “She said the ILCA is not 
that important.”498  
Despite her reservations about the usefulness of the organization, Mitchell 
continued to meet regularly with Phillips, ILCA president George Burke, and other 
leaders. And, under Mitchell, federation support for the ILCA rose to unprecedented 
levels. The AFL-CIO replaced its annual $10,000 grant to the ILCA with rent-free office 
space, saving the organization some $6,000 a year. It began paying for the ILCA’s 
mailings, which saved the organization an additional $25,000 in 1996 alone. Mitchell 
added the ILCA to the AFL-CIO’s in-house computer network, giving the group free 
access to many of the federation’s databases, and to its email system, software, and 
training. The AFL-CIO also invited ILCA leaders to provide media training to 
international union political directors, and to participate in high-profile campaigns, 
including the federation’s “Ask a Working Woman” survey. When John Sweeney 
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addressed the ILCA’s 1999 Convention, he became the first federation president in forty 
years to do so.499    
Notwithstanding the increased financial support and collaboration with ILCA 
leaders, records show that Mitchell never attended an ILCA executive council meeting, 
nor did her official designee Deputy Director of Public Affairs Donna Jablonski, who 
held an ex-officio council seat.500 The AFL-CIO and the ILCA were continuing to drift 
apart, though perhaps less visibly than before. Their historic “disconnect” would soon 
become an open feud.  
The Rise of Local Unions in the ILCA 
The crises in organized labor did not ease with the “New Voices” slate, nor did 
the frustration of labor activists inside and outside the ILCA. Union membership rates 
continued to plummet, year after year. Pro-labor reforms—including laws to strengthen 
OSHA and discourage strikebreaking—died in Congress, thanks largely to a Democratic 
Party that continued to pocket millions of dollars from the unions. However, the 
discourse of the “New Voices” leaders—their willingness to question old ways; their 
emphasis on militant grassroots action—energized labor activists, and heightened their 
expectations. Increasingly, activists used the federation’s new rhetoric to challenge the 
federation and to advocate policies to empower rank-and-file workers. 
                                            
499 Minutes of ILCA Executive Council meetings, Jan. 20, 1997, Feb., 28, 1997, Sept. 19, 1997, 
and Apr. 17-18, 1998, ILCA; “ILCA Convention Has a Story to Tell,” ILCA Reporter. 
 
500 As described in the next section, Mitchell and members of her staff did participate in panels at 
ILCA conferences and conventions. Also, James Parks, an editor in the AFL-CIO Publications Department 
held a council seat from October 2000 to Sept. 2002. He resigned in 2002 when George Burke stepped 






By the mid-1990s, local union publications comprised nearly three-quarters of the 
ILCA membership. In 1996, a local union editor— James Earp, editor for Operating 
Engineers Local 3 in California—was elected president of the ILCA. He became the first 
local editor ever elected to a top officer’s spot. Four other local union editors were 
elected that year to serve on the council with him. Since 1956, local unions had typically 
held one or two of the seventeen council seats. For a handful of years they held three. 
Between 1995 and 2000, local unions routinely controlled between four and five seats.501  
“There was a shift in power...towards more local-oriented leadership. They 
wanted more radical change and more radical tactics,” recalled George Burke, editor for 
the International Association of Fire Fighters, who succeeded Earp as ILCA president in 
1998. The local union editors allied with editors from the CLCs, and a few more 
radically-minded international union editors on the council. They “looked at us—the AFL 
and the internationals—as institutional leaders, as the establishment. We had the money 
and the staff. We were the fat cats in the ivory tower, while they were leading the 
struggle in the streets, day after day,” Burke said.502  
Local editor Martin Fishgold joined the ILCA executive council in January 1998, 
and he laid out his aims at the very first meeting. The ILCA should “encourage unions to 
use their publications as a place where the members can exchange ideas, even if critical 
of the union leadership,” Fishgold told his fellow officers. Labor had an “outside 
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enemy—the CEOs,” he said. But labor had an “inside enemy,” too: “Those who want to 
control the union members.”503 
Fishgold was no stranger to many council members. He was president of the New 
York Metro Labor Communications Association (“Metro”), the ILCA’s largest, most 
active regional affiliate. For more than a dozen years, Fishgold had edited the Unionist 
newspaper for Service Employees Union Local 371, an AFSCME affiliate renowned in 
New York City labor circles as a “militant, rebel, dissident” organization.504 Local 371 
officials gave Fishgold the time and freedom to work with “Metro” and the ILCA, and to 
report news that frequently riled the leaders of other city unions. He wrote about 300 
Domino Sugar workers who were abandoned by their international union during a long, 
unsuccessful strike. When the Village Voice ran series on corrupt New York unions, 
Fishgold angered “the city’s labor establishment” by inviting the reporter who broke the 
stories to address a special “Metro” forum.505 “He did amazing connective work,” 
recalled a union journalist who interned for Fishgold. “He connected the labor press to 
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Bob McChesney’s work on media reform.506 He connected us to the immigrant rights 
movement at a critical time. He really thought, ‘Of course we have a role here. This 
conversation is not complete without our voice.’ And I think he was right.”507 
 Fishgold first crossed swords with the ILCA leadership in 1995, when he asked 
to address the council about 2,000 newspaper workers locked-out by the Detroit News 
and the Detroit Free Press. Susan Phillips rejected his request. “Why does he want to do 
this?” she asked herself. “He’s not from the Newspaper Guild. ...Can he give us the latest 
on the strike? Or does he just want to criticize us for not covering it more? I told him 
‘No’…and that forever set him against me.”508 ILCA council member Sherry Halbrook, 
who belonged to the New York “Metro,” recalled that Fishgold was “absolutely furious” 
over Phillip’s decision, and that he complained for months that her actions were 
undemocratic and unjustified. “Frankly, I felt he should have been given a chance to 
speak,” Halbrook said. “Susan ran things with quite a firm hand. …She would make a lot 
of decisions, and then tell us about them later.”509 
Once on the council, Fishgold launched a protracted campaign to wear down the 
ILCA leadership. Meeting after meeting, he would object and force debate over matters 
trivial and not. He demanded that each council member’s vote be recorded, even on non-
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roll call votes.510  He refused to approve the hiring of a clerical worker for the ILCA 
office, insisting the entire council should have vetted her credentials. He argued that the 
council, not the top officers, should decide whether to share mailing lists or to endorse 
events involving outside organizations.511 He demanded changes in the minutes of a 
previous meeting to reflect his opposition to the choice of a keynote speaker.512 Even 
council members who generally supported Fishgold’s positions described the meetings as 
“nasty, combative…no fun at all.”513 
But Fishgold engaged the council in more substantive debates as well. And the 
lines of debate could hardly have been sharper. He proposed a code of ethics that called 
on ILPA members to report “the truth about internal union business… [to] adhere to high 
standards of accuracy and thoroughness,” and to make the labor press “a forum for airing 
diverse opinions of our membership.” Phillips objected, arguing that the “elected officials 
set union policy and the editors work with them… to convey those policies.” That, she 
said, was “the very essence of democracy.” ILCA President Burke insisted the proposed 
code was unenforceable and ill-advised. “One man’s truth is another man’s fiction,” and 
the same is true for accuracy and thoroughness, Burke said. Furthermore, he said, labor 
papers are a vehicle “for advancing the cause of the current leadership.” Fishgold was 
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unmoved. Labor papers exist to “keep the discussion going,” he shot back, “not for 
keeping our officers happy.”514 
  In the fall of 1998, Fishgold joined forces with Andy Zipser, who, like Fishgold, 
had sought unsuccessfully to attend ILCA council meetings. Zipser, editor of the 
Newspaper Guild Reporter, was puzzled by Burke’s insistence that council meetings 
were for council members alone, not for ILCA members. He started circulating copies of 
his correspondence with Burke to the entire executive council. “The board was aligned 
behind Burke on this, with the sole exception—the sterling exception—of Marty 
[Fishgold],” Zipser recalled. “Marty was a bomb-thrower anyway, and I think he viewed 
me as a bomb-thrower. Suddenly, he saw an ally.”  
After Fishgold convinced the council to open its meetings to ILCA members, 
Zipser thought, “Here is a guy who is going to push this organization forward. So let me 
back him.” 515  Fishgold and Zipser soon found they held common views about the role of 
union journalism. They believed most labor papers were boring house organs that lauded 
the union leaders, ignored internal dissent, and failed to engage the members in 
discussion and debate.516 As I showed in Chapter 3, their complaints about house organs 
were not novel, or particularly controversial. But Zipser and Fishgold took the argument 
in a markedly more radical direction. Unions are supposed to belong to the members, 
they argued, and union democracy cannot exist unless the labor press is free to operate 
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“as a check on abuses of authority, as a way of promoting dialogue, as a way of providing 
information that people need to govern themselves intelligently.”517 They believed the 
labor press should enjoy the same level of freedom and protection that is guaranteed to 
publications in the broader society.    
Most controversially, they called for a radical change in the identity of union 
journalists. They argued, explicitly, that labor editors should be free to publish whatever 
they wished, without prior restraint or fear of retaliation from the elected union 
leadership. Zipser agreed that leaders of unions and other democratic organizations need 
platforms to articulate their policies and agendas. However, he argued, unions must 
separate their public relations functions from their publications. A “problem arises 
when…we confuse cheer-leading and truth-telling and combine both functions into one 
office,” he wrote. “One can’t be a propagandist and a journalist, because any person 
asked to wear both hats soon finds that one is far more comfortable than the other.”518 
In a lengthy article in Labor Notes, Zipser argued that independent union 
journalism was not a utopian scheme.519 He pointed out that Swedish workers were 
served by popular, colorful union magazines with a quality of reporting on a par with 
Time or Newsweek. Several factors made this possible. Swedish law prohibited the 
owners of publications (including labor publications) from telling their editors what to 
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print.520 Union editors were further shielded from political pressure by long-term 
employment contracts, with ample severance packages. Finally, union magazines in 
Sweden carried large amounts of advertising, making them less dependent on union funds 
and encouraging higher levels of journalistic quality. After all, he wrote, why would 
advertisers purchase space in dull periodicals that nobody read? 
Fishgold and Zipser began speaking at forums and writing articles that shoved 
their critique directly under the noses of the AFL-CIO leadership and under the noses 
ILCA leaders and members, too. In the fall of 2000, Zipser arrived early for an ILCA 
awards luncheon—its biggest gathering outside the convention—and placed copies of a 
four-page critique of the labor press on more than 120 chairs arranged throughout the 
banquet hall. House organs are “a direct challenge to the Sweeney initiatives,” he wrote. 
The AFL-CIO wants to mobilize workers, but union editors are putting readers to sleep 
with pages full of photographs union leaders and dreary stories about internal union 
business.521 Zipser criticized periodicals by name (including his own), and the hall was 
full of representatives from those very unions “waiting for their meals, and very unhappy 
that I called them out. …Boy, did that piss off a lot of people,” he recalled.522 
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A Widening Rift 
Other ILCA activists soon opened a second debate that directly challenged the 
“new” AFL-CIO. When it comes to using media, organized labor was “dominated by a 
corporate mindset,” Fred Glass—a longtime ILCA activist and communications director 
for the California Federation of Teachers—wrote in the Labor Studies Journal. The AFL-
CIO was squandering millions of dollars on catchy sound bites and carefully-crafted 
images that treated workers as passive consumers, Glass argued. Sweeney’s hope of 
energizing grassroots labor required unions to adopt an “organizing model” of 
communications, he wrote. Unions must concentrate media resources on local organizing 
and education rather than transmitting messages from the top down. They should involve 
workers face-to-face, and train them to use media “in a collective effort at self-
enfranchisement.” The “adherents of business unionism” will vigorously resist anyone 
who challenges the dominant approach to labor communications, Glass warned. The 
“‘Trojan Horse’ of corporate media theory” had entered the house of labor long ago.523 
For union journalists, the victory of the “New Voices” slate was an “ironic 
historical twist,” ILCA council member Howard Kling wrote in the same issue of the 
Labor Studies Journal. Labor editors quickly discovered that the federation’s new slogan 
“‘You Have a Voice’” meant a voice “controlled from the top,” Kling wrote. They 
discovered, too, that the AFL-CIO’s commitment to grassroots organizing “did not come 
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with a parallel commitment to more democratic, alternative, grassroots approaches to 
labor media.”  
Kling praised the AFL-CIO’s skillful use of public relations to influence reporters 
and elected officials, but he faulted the federation for neglecting the labor press. The 
ILCA had an alternative vision to offer the movement, he wrote. Labor media should be 
independent and democratic, not “mere vehicles for officer reelection.” Unions should 
train and provide resources to enable workers to utilize video, television, radio and Web-
based media. As local labor media matured, Kling said, they would link with established 
pro-worker platforms via low-cost digital technologies into a potent, national network.524 
Fishgold, Zipser and other ILCA leaders and activists were now raising their 
criticisms on a regular basis at national media reform conferences, labor education 
conventions, regional labor press meetings, and other public venues—frequently in the 
presence of Denise Mitchell and others from the AFL-CIO. “Marty was quite outspoken 
at these conferences…very emotional, volatile, and loud,” Zipser recalled. “He made 
Denise “quite uncomfortable…and I probably contributed to that. There was a pretty 
abrasive quality to the ILCA at that time from the AFL-CIO’s point of view. ”525 But 
their critique of the AFL-CIO and the incumbent ILCA leadership resonated with many 
union journalists. In a post-convention survey in 1997, ILCA members said they were 
disappointed that AFL-CIO representatives failed to attend events and meet with the 
delegates. The delegates wanted the ILCA to provide more information on ways the labor 
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press could serve the membership, not just “the latest spin on politics.” They wanted 
fewer speeches and more opportunities for dialogue.526 Many ILCA members who 
worked directly with the union rank and file “understood instinctively that wherever we 
were with labor communications, it wasn’t working.” They wanted to expand the range 
of content beyond internal union business, and expand the conversation about social 
justice beyond the ranks of organized labor.527  
The growing battle within the ILCA was, in part, “a culture clash,” one council 
member said. Fishgold hailed from a “gritty, cosmopolitan” city full of “strong 
progressive movements.” The federation and the internationals, who were mainly 
ensconced in Washington D.C., “always had the power to run things. ... [They] were very 
suspicious, very resistant of anyone outside their circle coming in and trying to change 
the way they did things.” Fishgold was “up against the old guard, and he wasn’t going to 
sit back. ...He was the ‘bull in the china shop.’”528 
Fishgold was gradually gaining allies on the council, notably Steve Stallone, from 
the left-leaning International Longshore and Warehouse Union, and Tony Carobine, of 
the American Postal Workers Union. Others on the council “would vacillate back and 
forth” between the so-called “international faction” and the “local-oriented” faction, 
Burke said. “There was a lot of rock-throwing. ...It was very unpleasant.”529 
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Burke felt Fishgold made a strategic decision to take control of the council by 
thwarting everything the incumbent leaders sought to accomplish. If that was his strategy, 
it appeared to pay off.  At a council meeting in September 2002, Burke’s frustration 
finally boiled over. “That’s it. I’ve had it,” he said. He resigned and “walked away.”530 
Several council members walked out with him. Within weeks, fully ten of ILCA’s 
seventeen leaders had quit the board.  
At the next scheduled council meeting, in January 2003, Fishgold was elected 
interim president of the ILCA (there were no other nominations) and the ILCA Reporter 
immediately trumpeted the organization’s new direction. One quarter of the front page 
was given over to a cartoon decrying the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The accompanying article, 
which filled the remainder of the page, began, “The beat of war drums, a corporate push 
to eliminate all media ownership rules, and an ever-more naked attack on unions...”531 
Nearly two years would pass before the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution criticizing the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq.532 
Several international unions, including the Machinists, the IBEW, the Seafarers, 
and the Laborers pulled out of the ILCA to protest Fishgold’s policies. Their withdrawal 
cost the ILCA $25,000 in annual dues.533 The AFL-CIO, too, began to push back hard. In 
March 2003, Sweeney, Trumka and Chavez-Thompson all declined Fishgold’s invitation 
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to address an upcoming ILCA conference.534 AFL-CIO and international union leaders 
started “asking very pointed questions,” Burke recalled. “‘Why should we fund 
something that isn’t giving us any value and that is actually becoming a thorn in our 
side?’”  
In the fall of 2003, Mitchell announced the creation of a “Working Group” to 
consider ways to “take on some of the ILCA’s functions” in servicing the local union 
press. The group even considered sponsoring an annual journalism contest – one of the 
ILCA’s most popular programs, and a major source of revenue.535 The AFL-CIO also 
announced it would no longer provide the ILCA with free telephone service, computers, 
and technical support. A few months later, the AFL-CIO announced it was raising the 
rent for ILCA’s office from $5,000 a year to $50,000 a year. (Other organizations in the 
building continued to receive free or heavily subsidized rent, Fishgold complained.)536  
Fishgold claimed to be “pleased” by the creation of the Working Group, saying he 
looked “forward to working with the international unions and the AFL-CIO” to better 
serve the local union press. He also told the council he planned to meet with Mitchell to 
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improve relations between the ILCA and the federation.537 However, hopes for improved 
relations were immediately torpedoed by a front-page story in the ILCA Reporter that 
began: “The AFL-CIO, which in recent years has adopted a corporate, top-down 
communications style, is exploring grassroots alternatives.” The article skewered AFL-
CIO concerns for the local labor press as “something new.”538 A second article in the 
same issue of the Reporter described many union editors as “mouthpieces for the labor 
bosses.” They were “handcuffed” by the labor leadership and compelled to write stories 
that covered up union defeats, corruption, and internal dissent.539   
Even Fishgold’s staunchest supporters were finding him difficult and unpleasant 
to work with. Many who knew him well described Fishgold as “incredibly generous,” 
“affectionate,” and “kind.” But they also recalled how fiercely he reacted to criticism—
even to mild, unintended slights—and how he nursed his resentments for years. His allies 
began to see that Fishgold’s “nasty, combative” manner was not reserved for the old 
guard conservatives. “It was just the way he did things, and it continued after George 
Burke,” said Stallone, who nominated Fishgold for president after Burke resigned. “It 
became clear to me after not very long that Marty could talk the talk but he couldn’t walk 
the walk,” Zipser said. “He said all the right things about democracy, and unions, and so 
on. But when it came to actually running an organization, he was authoritarian.”540   
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Shortly after becoming ILCA president, Fishgold hired David Swanson (a former 
presidential campaign secretary for Dennis Kucinich and national communications 
coordinator for ACORN) as ILCA’s full-time executive director.541 Soon, Swanson 
recalled, Fishgold was telephoning him “multiple times a day” with orders and demands.  
“I had to run everything by Marty, and if he wanted to me do something that others on 
the council weren’t going to like, I had to keep quiet about it, or tell them I was working 
on something else.”542 Swanson resigned after 10 months and was replaced by Alec 
Dubro, a former rock critic for Rolling Stone magazine and president of the National 
Writers’ Union. “Marty was one for giving orders. …He kept repeating his resentments 
and, at first, all his anger was directed at David Swanson… [but] then he forgot about 
Swanson and got on me.” Dubro lasted eighteen months. He resigned rather than obey 
Fishgold’s order to publish a copy of the ILCA Reporter against the wishes of the council. 
“He accused me of treachery,” Dubro said, and the two never spoke again.   
Fishgold was politically clumsy, too.  He sabotaged his hopes to transform the 
ILCA by alienating his base—the council members who supported his vision. In 2003, he 
attempted to fire ILCA Executive Director Lynn Clark right before Christmas, ignoring 
the due process and progressive discipline requirements of her Newspaper Guild contract. 
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Clark was well liked and well connected at AFL-CIO Headquarters. The bungled attempt 
to fire her drew a great deal of negative attention to the ILCA. Fishgold seemed to delight 
in baiting Denise Mitchell and federation leaders, knowing full well that ILCA’s leaders 
and members worked for unions that valued good relations with the AFL-CIO—and that 
the ILCA depended on those unions and the federation for dues and other vital support. 
Fishgold wanted to use the ILCA to recreate a “vigorous, independent labor press as there 
once had been” in the United States, “but he had neither the money nor the political 
support. …He was willing to make a break from the AFL-CIO before there was an 
alternative plan.”543 
 Realizing he had lost the council’s support and could not be reelected, Fishgold 
announced he was stepping down at the 2005 ILCA Convention in Chicago. Delegates 
elected Steve Stallone as president and Michael Kuchta, editor of the St. Paul Union 
Advocate, as secretary-treasurer. Within hours, Denise Mitchell sat down with the new 
ILCA leaders and “the first thing she did was offer us free office space in the AFL-CIO 
building,” Stallone said. One of Mitchell’s staff, Tula Connell, began working with the 
ILCA and even joined the council for a time.  Within months of the 2005 convention, the 
Machinists, IBEW, and Seafarers union had rejoined the ILCA, as well.544 
_______________________________ 
 The ILCA has not backed off its critique of top-down, corporate-style union 
communications since the 2005 convention, nor has Mitchell altered her opinion that the 
                                            
543 Dubro interview. 
 







ILCA is of marginal value to the AFL-CIO. Rather than polemicizing against corporate-
style communications, the ILCA has concentrated on developing its own programs and 
working with the AFL-CIO and the international unions whenever possible and mutually 
beneficial. Notably, the ILCA has pursued a program proposed by Glass and Kling by 
launching Labor Media Centers, on a pilot basis, during its semi-annual conventions in 
New Orleans (in 2007, one year after Hurricane Katrina), in Pittsburgh, 2009, and in 
Seattle, in 2011. ILCA leaders provided delegates and local editors in the host cities with 
training, video cameras, computers, and other equipment, and then sent them out to 
gather stories and post them online.545 
 In May, 2011, AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka and several international 
unions announced they would cut back sharply on contributions to the Democratic Party 
and focus their resources, instead, on building state and local struggles. Democrats had 
stood by for too long while Republicans attacked U.S. workers, the labor leaders 
complained. Trumka (who has since voiced support for the Occupy Wall Street 
movement) argued that building powerful grassroots campaigns was the best way to 
construct a broad-based, national movement. And he pointed to the upsurge in pro-
worker activities across the country sparked by the mass demonstrations in Wisconsin in 
early 2011, when thousands of people occupied the state capitol for several weeks to 
defend public-sector bargaining.546 
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Once again, top U.S. labor leaders have adopted a strategy that seems tailor-made 
for a nationwide network of pro-worker editors and publications. Yet, once again, there is 
no indication that the federation or its affiliates have factored the ILCA into their plans, 
except as one more vehicle for delivering their message. 
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 Chapter 7: Analysis and Conclusions 
 
Social movements are processes of collective meaning-making. As such, they 
inherently involve processes of communication.547 Movements must recruit members, 
construct and reconstruct identities, build alliances, and generate a sense of common 
purpose sufficient to allow people with relatively few resources to undertake sustained, 
collective actions against more powerful social actors.548 Each movement evolves a 
distinct internal culture, or set of institutional logics: norms, values, and beliefs that 
define its character and guide its behaviors.549 As media scholar Robert Hackett wrote, 
communication is integral to “every stage of a movement’s trajectory.”550 Internal 
debates over the use of movement media are necessarily debates over the nature of the 
movement itself. 
Organized labor is one of the oldest and largest U.S. social movements. Since the 
initial waves of industrialization in the early 1800s, millions of U.S. workers have formed 
organizations and engaged in various forms of collective action, including strikes, 
boycotts, and even armed confrontations, to wrest concessions from employers and the 
government. Industrialization forced some people to depend upon wages to survive, and 
allowed others to amass great wealth and political influence. The labor movement is a 
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movement of wage earners: a sustained effort to compel a downwards redistribution of 
economic and political power.551  
Like many modern social movements, organized labor exists simultaneously as a 
set of formal organizations, and as a diffuse network of individuals.552 The union 
organizations (i.e. the AFL-CIO, international unions, and their various subdivisions, 
which I refer to collectively as “institutional labor”) administer to and represent the 
grassroots workers’ movement. Institutional labor has fiduciary responsibilities to staff 
and members, legal obligations to employers and the government, political alliances to 
protect, and internal structures and processes to maintain.553 Labor’s “institutional needs” 
require stability and predictability. As a social movement, however, labor must mobilize 
workers for contentious actions against employers and other dominant interests. At the 
very least, unions must maintain enough members in a sufficient state of readiness to 
pose a credible threat of disruption at any given time. Labor’s “social movement needs” 
require agitation and risk. The needs of institutional labor and social movement labor are 
not the same, and they frequently conflict. 
When unions use the labor press mainly to promote their institutional interests, 
they practice what I described in Chapter 3 as “institutional union journalism.” In 
institutional union publications, media content tends to focus on organizational policies 
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and internal business; on specific workplace concerns (e.g. contractual disputes), and the 
actions of the incumbent union leaders. Such publications circulate almost exclusively 
among members of one particular union. They rarely carry material critical of the unions, 
and they provide little information to facilitate independent rank-and-file activity. 
“Institutional union publications” are typically produced by professionals, far removed 
from the union rank and file, and mailed to members’ homes.  
When unions use publications primarily to mobilize workers, they practice what I 
call “social-movement union journalism.” Content focuses more on the activities and 
concerns of rank-and-file members and their allies outside the unions. Stories frequently 
involve broad questions of social justice that affect the workplace and the community. 
“Social-movement union publications” are more likely to publish stories and letters that 
criticize the unions, and are designed to facilitate grassroots activism. Often, they 
circulate among members of many unions (and to unorganized workers) and are produced 
by volunteers, low-level union officers, and others close to the rank and file. Frequently, 
they are handed out in face-to-face encounters between activists and workers.  
As explained in Chapter 3, historical tensions between labor’s need for order and 
control on the one hand, and for grassroots mobilization on the other, are reflected in 
debates within the movement over the “appropriate” role of the labor press.554 The AFL-
CIO created the International Labor Communications Association (the ILCA, originally 
named the International Labor Press Association, or ILPA) in 1956 to establish a “bona 
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fide” labor press for the post-World War II era. ILCA leaders crafted a constitution and 
code of ethics to ensure that member publications adhered to AFL-CIO policies and were 
honestly run. Ostensibly an organization of union publications, the ILCA was (and 
remains) the only national organization of U.S. union journalists. Throughout the history 
of the ILCA, tensions between institutional and social movement journalism have played 
out, time and again, in debates among union editors, and leaders of the AFL-CIO and its 
affiliates. What matters should the labor press share with the union rank and file? What 
information should be closely-held by the union leadership?  Should a labor publication 
address members of many different unions and, perhaps, people outside the unions, too? 
How much editorial control should the international unions and AFL-CIO exercise? How 
much editorial independence should local unions, Central Labor Councils (CLCs), and 
union journalists enjoy? These debates represented competing “collective action 
frames”—competing visions of what the post-World War II labor movement should stand 
for, and what it should it do to accomplish its goals.555  
In the following section, I employ the framework of social movement theory and 
organization theory (described in Chapter 1) to examine those debates and answer two 
questions:  
1. Given the historical constraints placed on the ILCA and its member  
publications, can the labor press serve as an instrument to transform organized 
labor into a vigorous, expanding worker’s movement?   
2. If the labor press can play that role, what might a “transformative” labor press 
look like?  How would it be organized, and what would it do? 
                                            






Examining the Key Debates 
 The ILPA’s unsuccessful campaign for AFL-CIO-supported community-based 
labor newspapers (detailed in Chapter 4) started in 1966 and continued for nearly a 
decade. The campaign was triggered by an international union’s decision in 1964 to use 
the ILPA to punish James Goodsell, editor of the Oregon Labor Press. (This was the 
“destabilizing event” that set off a cycle of contention in the organizational field.)556  
Goodsell had published a series of front-page articles reporting favorably on a rebellion 
by 22,000 paper workers against two international unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
ILPA council member Richard Estep, editor for one of the two international unions, 
brought internal charges against Goodsell for failing to “serve the best interests” of the 
AFL-CIO. A majority of ILPA leaders sided with Estep and voted to expel Goodsell from 
the ILPA executive council. The retaliation against the Oregon Labor Press angered local 
union and CLC editors (and some progressive international union editors, too) who 
already believed the AFL-CIO and large internationals exercised undue influence over 
the ILPA. Only weeks before the 1965 ILPA convention, disgruntled editors persuaded 
council member Ray Davidson (whose roots lay in a militant, rank and file-run union) to 
challenge Estep for the ILPA presidency.  Davidson won, and immediately launched a 
campaign to persuade the AFL-CIO to create labor newspapers in communities with large 
union populations. 
By the mid-1960s, ILPA and AFL-CIO leaders recognized that solidarity was 
weakening within the U.S. labor movement. Both groups also agreed that poor 
communications with union members was largely to blame. In 1966, the ILPA presented 
                                            






the federation with a detailed report showing a glaring gap in labor’s communications 
network. Almost every union member received a regular publication from their 
international union that reported on broad trends and events affecting that union and the 
national labor movement. Many union members also received local union publications 
that reported on issues and events affecting their particular work site and local labor 
organization. However, the ILPA showed, fewer than one in seven U.S. union members 
received publications that reported on issues and events affecting all union members in 
their community, or that linked developments in local politics and business to the well-
being of workers generally, or to the goals of organized labor. And the community papers 
that did exist were often poorly edited and under-financed, according to the ILPA.  
Well-run, well-financed community newspapers were the missing link in labor 
communications, ILPA leaders wrote to AFL-CIO President George Meany. National 
publications simply could not address local concerns, and local union publications rarely 
had the resources to report on events beyond the workplace doors. As any union 
organizer can attest, “most people’s lives are focused on local events… [and] political 
attitudes are formed gradually, the result of accumulated information and impressions,” 
the ILPA leaders reminded Meany.557 Only newspapers that reported on community 
concerns, from the workplace to state house, “52 times a year” would have the “water-on-
stone effect” required to make a lasting impact on worker attitudes, Davidson insisted.558 
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The ILPA presented the AFL-CIO with a detailed plan (including cost estimates) 
for establishing community labor newspapers of various circulations and page lengths. 
Citing federation worries about a major communications breakdown with the union 
membership, Davidson said the report was “hitting the deck at a very good time.”559    
However, in critiquing the existing labor press, ILPA leaders had unwittingly 
criticized the structure and operating principles of the AFL-CIO itself. The federation 
was founded on the principle of union autonomy which, among other things, guarantees 
each international union the exclusive authority to address its own members—to maintain 
its own, separate discursive space.560 The ILPA’s call for community-based publications 
that regularly addressed members of every union threatened the principle of union 
autonomy. The fragmented discourse criticized by the ILPA—scores of separate 
publications addressing separate segments of the work force—reflected and reinforced 
the fragmented, decentralized structures of organized labor. To begin with, the dearth of 
strong community labor papers was largely the result of the anti-communist crusades that 
destroyed many progressive, well-organized CLCs in the 1940s and early ‘50s, along 
with their publications and independent labor media, including the Federated Press news 
service. Many labor leaders used anti-communism to purge opponents and consolidate 
their personal positions. The lack of community labor newspapers meant that the vast 
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majority of union members after World War II received news about the labor movement 
solely from their own union leaders.561  
The ILPA’s proposals threatened to push power down from the international 
unions, and inwards from the local unions to the CLCs that would operate the community 
newspapers. Publications that not only reported local news week after week but also 
mobilized readers to resolve local problems would have wielded tremendous influence in 
their respective communities. How could international union publications reporting 
national news, or local union newsletters reporting workplace-specific events hope to 
have a comparable impact?562 The debate over community labor newspapers was a 
struggle over “representational resources”—a struggle within the movement over the 
power to define social reality for the union membership.563 
Community labor newspapers also threatened to propagate a sense of community 
wholly at odds with the narrow, employer-specific definition encoded in federal labor 
law.564 By their very existence, community papers would have asserted that workers in 
one union had an active stake in knowing about the problems of other workers laboring 
for other employers, or belonging to other unions. Over time, readers would have begun 
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to identify their own plight with the plight of wage earners generally. With regular 
exposure to labor-oriented news about politics, economics, and trends across multiple 
industries, workers would have begun to see patterns in contract disputes, plant closings, 
and other matters affecting their lives. Instead of seeing such developments as isolated, 
episodic events, readers would have begun to connect their hardships to the concerted 
actions of employers, financiers, and government officials.565 When people believe they 
share common problems stemming from common sources, they tend to respond through 
common, collective action. Such broad sympathies threaten anyone, including labor 
leaders, who would control a grassroots movement.   
  The debate over community newspapers demonstrated that “business unionism” 
and “social movement unionism” are fluid concepts. They are ideal types that exist along 
a spectrum of practices and beliefs, and bleed into one another. For example, Saul Miller, 
George Meany’s director of publications, and Kenneth Fiester, an editor for the United 
Autoworkers Union and the AFL-CIO, were by no means labor radicals. They were 
union journalists who, based on years of experience, proposed a new institutional logic—
community labor newspapers—to strengthen solidarity within the labor movement. 
Broadening the discourse between workers at the community level would have pushed 
union journalism in a “social movement” direction. But in important ways, the 
community labor newspaper proposal was rather limited. It was silent, for example, on 
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the question of reporting internal disputes or criticisms of organized labor. Miller, Fiester, 
and the majority of the ILPA council advocated the “top-down” social movement 
unionism practiced by Walter Reuther’s UAW (and, later, by John Sweeney’s AFL-CIO): 
a unionism that stressed community concerns and social justice within a centralized, top-
down structure.566 
The push for community labor newspapers failed because the ILPA could not 
muster a constituency strong enough to compel AFL-CIO leaders to reconsider—let 
alone alter—the dominant institutional logics regarding member communications. Two 
influential bodies within the federation—the Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
and the Public Relations Department—did meet with ILPA leaders and listen to their 
proposal. But the top officers, the AFL-CIO Executive Council, failed to even place 
community newspapers on their agenda.  
Labor Public Relations and Journalism for the Rank and File 
The debates over labor’s reliance on corporate-style public relations and over 
labor papers as house organs presented a more radical critique of union communications 
than the call for community newspapers. Unions began to shift spending from 
publications into public relations during the 1970s in response to a 1,200 percent hike in 
second-class postal rates initiated by the Nixon Administration.567 This was the 
“destabilizing” event that caused the ILPA and AFL-CIO to drift apart during the 1980s, 
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and then to collide in a bitter debate in the late 1990s.568 As the costs of print publications 
soared, organized labor cut back on communications with union members and stepped up 
efforts to reach out to elected officials, reporters, and the general public. International 
unions and CLCs reduced the size and frequency of their publications, and many 
publications simply folded. As Murray Seeger, director of the AFL-CIO’s Information 
Department during the 1980s, recalled, “The trend was going away from the weekly and 
monthly labor papers. … [The] unions were looking at them as a cost item.”569 In 1983, 
Seeger signaled the AFL-CIO’s diminished interest in the labor press by breaking a 27-
year tradition and failing to assign a federation staff member to serve as ILPA’s fulltime 
secretary-treasurer. He severed the most direct connection between the AFL-CIO and the 
ILPA, and over the next decade the two organizations steadily drifted apart.  
In 1983, the AFL-CIO also launched the Labor Institute for Public Affairs (LIPA) 
to expand labor’s use of television, advertising, and modern public relations. The AFL-
CIO began pumping millions of dollars into LIPA while the ILPA struggled to stay 
solvent, year after year. That same year, the ILPA renamed itself the International Labor 
Communications Association (ILCA) to demonstrate that union journalists, too, 
recognized the importance of public outreach and electronic media. Time and again, 
ILCA leaders attempted to collaborate with LIPA, but their overtures were ignored.   
As early as 1983, ILCA activist Fred Glass questioned why labor was using 
electronic technologies exclusively for national public relations campaigns. 
Concentrating the power of television and video on “small-scale, community-based” 
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organizing would be less expensive and have a greater immediate impact, he argued. It 
would build upon existing structures within the labor movement and construct new 
activist networks linking people inside and outside the unions.570 During the 1980s and 
1990s, as the number of labor television and video activists expanded, Glass’s critique of 
corporate-style union public relations gained traction inside the ILCA.  
In 1995, the insurgent “New Voices” slate took control of the AFL-CIO. John 
Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson swept into office promising to 
mobilize grassroots labor and give ordinary workers a voice. ILCA activists were excited 
by the speeches and new programs calling for militant grassroots action. However, they 
were soon disappointed to learn that the “new” AFL-CIO was even more committed to 
top-down public relations (and even less interested in the labor press) than its 
predecessors had been. ILCA leaders and activists, including Glass, video producer 
Howard Kling, newspaper Guild editor Andy Zipser, and local union editor Marty 
Fishgold (who became ILCA president in 2003) began to publicly criticize AFL-CIO 
communications for bypassing and disempowering rank-and-file workers. They called on 
unions not simply to “target” communications towards working-class communities 
(which labor leaders could have done without relinquishing control) but to go further by 
providing training and resources so local workers could use electronic media on their own 
behalf.571 Their critique of corporate-style public relations became an explicit call to 
redistribute representational resources within the labor movement. It became a pointed, 
public challenge to the dominant institutional logics of the AFL-CIO.  
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The third debate involving the ILCA and the AFL-CIO—the debate that broke out 
in the mid-1990s over house organs—was, at one level, old and uncontroversial. 
Generations of union journalists of every political stripe have grumbled about labor 
periodicals stuffed with photographs and stories promoting union officers and policies.572 
But the militant grassroots rhetoric of the “New Voices” slate had altered the dominant 
discourse of organized labor. The AFL-CIO had adopted social-movement terms and 
symbols, but it had refused to abandon the top-down communication practices so 
characteristic of business unionism. An old contradiction was thus thrown into new, 
sharper relief: How can a movement founded on mass collective action rely so heavily on 
leadership-centered publications?  
As happened with the debate over labor public relations, the critique of house 
organs evolved into something far more radical. Instead of simply calling for a greater 
focus on the rank and file, the more vocal members of the ILCA began urging union 
editors to publish criticisms of union policies and leaders, and to report on internal 
dissent and corruption. Fishgold and Zipser took the argument even further than that, 
insisting that union editors should be free to make editorial decisions without prior 
restraint or fear of retaliation from union officials. Their call for editorial freedom was an 
explicit challenge to the union leadership’s control of the labor press. It was a direct 
challenge to union journalists, as well: a challenge to rethink their responsibilities to the 
union members and hierarchy. Fishgold and Zipser insisted that union journalists had a 
duty to protect union democracy by keeping the membership fully informed. That 
                                            
572 Van Tine, 33-55; Ameringer, 182-187. Ameringer, a socialist and union editor, derided labor 
papers of the early 1900s as “pieces of sales promotion for the union” jammed with “fulsome accounts of 






responsibility, they insisted, overrode any obligations editors might have to burnish the 
reputations of the union leadership.  
Fishgold’s attempts to use the ILCA to transform the labor press were a disaster.  
The federation responded by cutting off resources to the ILCA, imposing a tenfold 
increase in rent, and charging the organization for telephones and computer support. 
Several international unions pulled out of the organization, depriving the already cash-
strapped ILCA of $25,000 in dues. Fishgold had challenged institutional labor, seemingly 
without considering who could fire his members, or who controlled the resources the 
ILCA needed to survive. Unlike Davidson, Fishgold and his allies had tried to build a 
base of support for their proposals among to the ILCA membership. But what leverage 
could union journalists apply that might compel union leaders to agree to such a drastic 
shift in power?  
The arguments that Fishgold and Zipser advanced for the independence of union 
editors were often loud and impossible to ignore. But they never even became the 
dominant institutional logics within the ILCA executive council, let alone the federation 
or its affiliates. As Steve Stallone, the council member who nominated Fishgold for 
president, said, “I could never understand how editors of union publications could 
possibly operate independently of our own union officers.”573 Fishgold’s blunt, 
confrontational style also alienated many of his closest supporters and provided a handy 
target for opponents seeking to sidestep the substance of his critiques.  
                                            






As I discussed in Chapter 6, changes in the broad social environment (e.g. labor 
laws, economic trends, and political pressures) powerfully influenced the actions of union 
journalists, officers, and others involved with the ILCA. Yet, the personalities of Fishgold 
and other individual actors—and the choices that they made—profoundly shaped the 
ILCA, as well. George Meany’s reaction to the McClellan Committee’s charges of union 
corruption deprived the publications of a freshly-unified labor movement access to 
advertising revenue that might have allowed them to take root and grow. Ray Davidson’s   
determination to communicate with grassroots workers made community labor 
newspapers the focus of the ILCA’s work for nearly a decade. And his decision to 
discreetly lobby top labor leaders instead of rallying union journalists to support the plan   
likely doomed the project he so loved. Murray Seeger’s decision not to assign a staff 
member to serve as ILCA’s secretary-treasurer allowed the AFL-CIO and the ILCA to 
drift apart at the very moment union journalists were striving to adopt electronic 
technologies and link up with LIPA. It is important to understand how political-economic 
forces shape the options open to individuals and organizations. Ultimately, however, 
people confront the circumstances they are given and make their own history.  
Can the Labor Press Transform the Labor Movement? 
The labor press certainly can serve as an instrument to transform organized labor 
into a vigorous workers’ movement. Studies of unions that have successfully transitioned 
from an inward-looking bureaucratic mode of operation to an outward-looking 
“organizing model” stress the importance of educating and winning the support of 






pronged campaigns driven by a determined core of leaders.574 It is inconceivable that the 
U.S. labor movement could alter its internal culture,  develop new programs, tactics and 
strategies, reach out to new members, and do all the other things necessary to transform 
itself without using internal media. Indeed, any serious bid to transform the movement 
will require union leaders to use the labor press in a more consistent, strategic, proactive 
manner than they have at any point since the founding of the AFL-CIO. A transformative 
labor press cannot be an afterthought or tertiary concern. It must be a primary instrument 
in a strategic offensive.  
The most likely scenario for transforming the labor movement would be for a 
union, or small group of unions, to adopt innovative collective action frames and 
organizational methods (including the use of media) that inspire significant numbers of 
workers to engage in concerted action. Other unions, seeking to replicate that success, 
would adopt similar frames and practices, modifying them to suit their particular needs, 
structures, and ideologies. Through this process of diffusion, translation, and bricolage, 
change would work its way across the labor movement.575  
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was the product of one such 
transformation in the late nineteenth century. Skilled workers grew dissatisfied with the 
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Knights of Labor, a multi-class movement supporting an array of social reforms. They 
proceeded to found a new confederation comprised of tightly organized, autonomous 
unions, each representing a specific craft or trade, and heavily focused on economic 
bargaining.576 These well-financed organizations of white, native-born men survived the 
economic depression of the 1890s, which destroyed virtually every other form of labor 
organization. The “business unionism” of the AFL quickly became the dominate form of 
labor organization in the U.S.577  
The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) arose in much the same manner. 
Unions seeking to represent semi-skilled and unskilled workers became frustrated with 
the AFL’s refusal to organize the burgeoning mass production industries. They broke 
from the AFL in 1935 and launched organizing drives in steel, auto, textile, and other 
sectors. They employed innovative tactics, including the sit-down strike. They published 
militant newspapers that repudiated the AFL’s conservative, exclusivist stand by 
redefining “union member” to embrace all wage earners, regardless of skill, nationality, 
gender, and race.578 In 1937, U.S. unions nearly doubled their total membership, adding 
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some three million members, and “the vast majority of the newly organized workers 
belonged to [the] CIO.”579   
The labor press will play a central role—but not an independent role—in any 
future effort by union leaders to transform the movement. Labor leaders would drive the 
process, and they would use the labor press as one element within a larger campaign.  
Towards a Transformative Labor Press 
However, I see no reason why union journalists should work solely within the 
existing union structures and wait for labor leaders to initiate a transformation. Indeed, I 
believe union journalists can—and should—organize and collaborate outside the unions. 
Doing so will increase the chances of igniting a successful new workers’ movement and 
hasten its arrival. Waiting for one union, or a handful of unions, to step forward and lead 
a transformation is inherently risky: Political conditions can change abruptly within 
individual organizations and reverse whatever progress they have made.580 Furthermore, 
strategies that rely on a few organizations will fail to leverage the skills, energies, and 
connections of hundreds of union journalists who work for other unions.  
Igniting a new movement will also require a readiness to abandon old structures 
and methods of operation. If union journalists confine themselves to working within 
existing labor organizations (including the ILCA), they will tend to reproduce the 
existing structures and practices, not challenge them. The federal system of industrial 
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relations (including the unions) was designed for an economic, social, and technological 
world that, in large part, no longer exists. Indeed, the mismatch is so profound today that 
the AFL-CIO may be in a state of irreversible decline.581 The crises facing U.S. workers 
demand more from the labor press. 
Large, diverse groups of labor editors can organize outside (as well as inside) the 
unions, and play a leading role in transforming the movement. There is precedent for this. 
The leaders of the CIO did not invent industrial organizing or new, more inclusive 
concepts of unionism. Millions of industrial workers were staging mass uprisings on the 
railroads, and in garments, textiles, steel, and other industries decades before the CIO was 
created. A lively, diverse labor press—including radical newspapers, foreign language 
publications, union periodicals, and the Federated Press news service—prepared the 
ground for the workers’ struggles, and helped to sustain them. Through mass agitation 
and education, they helped fuse ethnic and class consciousness within working-class 
communities and built bonds of solidarity between communities long divided.582  
Fred Glass used the term “pre-organizing” to describe how articulating grievances 
and fostering debate create the psychological conditions for collective action.583 
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Suffragist newspapers played precisely that role in the nineteenth century women’s 
movement. Steiner wrote that suffragist newspapers offered spaces where “women could 
come together to experiment with alternative definitions of and for women…try on 
various identities and then advocate those conceptions that offered a sense of significance 
and value.” Suffragist publications were instruments for “constructing and maintaining 
shared sensibilities, collective action and allegiances.”584  
A new workers’ movement will require new identities, internal cultures, and 
modes of organization. These will not arise automatically or spontaneously. As Fraser 
pointed out, our “preferences, interests and identities are not given exogenously…They 
are as much outcomes as antecedents of public deliberation.”585 A new workers’ 
movement will require a labor press with the size and independence needed to stimulate 
broad experimentation and debate among a new generation of wage-earners. 
An Independent Space for Union Journalists 
The history of the ILCA shows that journalists working solely inside the unions 
will not have the freedom or resources required to develop new ideas and methods that 
can displace the dominant logics of organized labor. The ILCA does provide an important 
space for union journalists to collaborate and share ideas. But the ILCA is what Ruth 
Needleman calls a “structured opportunity,” not an “independent space.” There is an 
enormous difference. Union leaders create structured opportunities (e.g. committee 
appointments, and assignments to conferences) to give subordinates experience by 
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allowing them to exercise limited authority under controlled conditions. Structured 
opportunities reproduce and reinforce the dominant institutional logics of the union.586 
Union activists create independent spaces to escape “the dominant culture and controlled 
structures of the union.”587 By operating outside the oversight of union officials, activists 
can develop new ideas and practices that can challenge those of the incumbent leaders.588   
 The ILCA operates with limited autonomy. Discourse within the organization has, 
at times, been sharply critical of institutional labor. And the ILCA allows journalists who 
normally work with members of their own unions to connect and collaborate with 
journalists from many other unions. But the ILCA and most of its members rely on the 
resources of the AFL-CIO and the international unions. The ILCA does not 
fundamentally challenge the fractured discourse of U.S. labor, where separate 
publications address bits and pieces of the union membership. Top labor leaders have 
generally left the ILCA alone, but they have never hesitated to rein-in the organization, 
its leaders, or individual publications whenever they felt the need to do so.  
It is striking to look at the crises covered in this paper—the anti-communist and 
anti-corruption campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s; the loss of solidarity during the 1960s; 
the decline of the Democratic Party and the rise of Reaganism and the Business 
Roundtable in the 1970s and ‘80s—and to consider that, in every instance, labor leaders 
responded by retreating from membership communications. Given that record, it is 
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impossible to see how, in the present crisis, union journalists working solely inside the 
ILCA could conduct the sort of bold pre-organizing needed to spark a new movement. 
Fishgold, Zipser and other ILCA activists were not wrong to decry the decrepit 
condition of labor communications or to call for sweeping change. But they were wrong 
to think that the ILCA was a space where union journalists could come together to do 
that. To transform the labor movement, union journalists must construct an independent 
space of their own. They must organize inside and outside the unions. 
Union journalists throughout the country should create media, independent of 
organized labor, and link those platforms (including print publications) into a national, 
pro-worker communications network.589 Historically, two factors have undermined 
attempts to create an independent U.S. labor press, according to Jon Bekken: finances, 
and editorial control (which Bekken refers to as accountability or responsibility).590 He 
notes that independent pro-worker publications are often severely underfinanced and 
consist of a mish-mash of content of wildly varying quality. Bekken has suggested that 
both obstacles could be overcome (at least in part) if union journalists adopted the 
cooperative financing and collective-decision-making practices that sustained some of the 
the most successful independent workers’ publications of the early twentieth century. 
Many foreign-language papers, the Federated Press, and the Dubuque Leader and Racine 
Labor—two of the longest-lived independent U.S. labor papers—were cooperatively 
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owned and operated. This lessened their dependence on the resources and good will of 
the top labor officials, and provided stable mechanisms for internal management.591  
For a century or more, union journalists have dreamed of creating a national labor 
newspaper, but that goal has always proved impossibly expensive. The costs of paper, 
printing, and distribution, as well as the cost of office space, equipment, and salaries for 
writers, editors, designers and other staff were—and are—simply prohibitive. But it is 
possible now for labor to enter the daily national discourse without relying on print. New 
digital platforms (e.g. the internet, videophones, laptop computers, and low-power radio) 
make it relatively inexpensive to compile stories and graphics, and rapidly disseminate 
them to millions of people across the country—indeed, around the world. Furthermore, 
digital technologies allow people with little training to generate content, so rank-and-file 
workers can become producers of news. People can participate on an elementary level 
simply by clicking “like” or “share” and forwarding content to acquaintances and friends.  
Media critic Malcolm Gladwell has questioned the potential of social media to 
effect social change. Pointing to the U.S. civil rights movement, Gladwell argued that 
movement activists must be bound by strong personal ties to withstand the fury of 
powerful foes. Activists must also be deeply committed to their cause and have the 
support of strong, disciplined organizations, according to Gladwell. But social media 
construct weak ties and require low levels of commitment, according to Gladwell, 
because activists are only asked to click a mouse or post messages to friends. 
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Furthermore, he argued, online campaigns build diffuse virtual networks, not strong, 
capable organizations that involve people face to face.592  
Other media scholars strongly disagree, arguing that social media have played a 
pivotal role in many of the most significant movements of the 2000s, including the battle 
to protect public unions in Wisconsin, Occupy Wall Street, and the so-called “Arab 
Spring.”593 Wael Ghonim, a Google marketing director, described using Facebook to 
encourage his fellow Egyptians to speak out against the Mubarak regime. The anonymity 
provided by Facebook allowed “the great mass of people who are normally risk 
averse…to overcome its fears and believe that change was possible.”594 Melissa Wall and 
Sahar El Zahed wrote that YouTube fueled the anti-Mubarak uprisings by providing a 
public platform, or stage, for people to act out their beliefs and inspire others—similar to 
the use of television by televangelists.595 According to sociologist Zeynep Tufekci, social 
media eliminate an important barrier to the growth of social movements: the so-called 
“collective action problem,” caused by individuals’ rational fear of being the first person 
to challenge a powerful opponent. Social media dramatically lower the risk of 
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confronting authority, she wrote. They also allow large numbers of people to discover 
that others share their views, creating a “cascade effect” where more and more people 
join the movement and cause it to rapidly expand. Such “visible momentum” is a 
necessary “condition of success” for any social movement, she wrote.596  
Writing about the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle, Wall concluded that online 
networks helped craft movement identities by allowing activists to frame issues, develop 
feelings of emotional investment in the cause, and delineate boundaries between friends 
and foes.597 In an article with particular relevance to the ILCA, Sandra Gozález-Bailón et 
al. discussed the “amplifying” effects of social media. Online networks can connect so-
called “spreaders” (activists having multiple communications links to other activists) with 
other “spreaders,” who are then connected to other “spreaders,” and on, and on. Very 
quickly, masses of people begin to receive calls to action from myriad sources, and the 
messages are reinforced because they are repeated in many different forms in a 
concentrated period of time.598 Many union journalists in the ILCA are “spreaders”: They 
are deeply integrated into communications networks that connect activists inside and 
outside of organized labor. The potential for union journalists to use social media to 
construct a potent national news service seems clear. 
Gladwell sorely understated the potential of weak ties and small acts of 
participation. As sociologists Jonathon Freeman and Scott Fraser showed in 1966, 
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individuals who simply sign a petition supporting a cause become significantly more 
willing to make far greater commitments to that cause.599 Even small public acts of 
support can cause people to see themselves differently, as people who care about that 
issue and are willing to take a stand. Social media make it simple—and relatively safe— 
for millions of people to take small actions and publicly state their views. It is possible, 
then, that social media can build social movements with stronger initial levels of 
commitment than earlier movements that depended on newspapers and other more 
passive, individualistic modes of communication.  
A Road Forward 
In December, 2000, labor educator Frank Emspak joined with ILCA activist 
Howard Kling to found Workers Independent News (WIN), a national, pro-labor, radio 
news organization. Supported by advertising, grants, and donations, WIN currently 
reaches an estimated one million listeners Mondays through Fridays on 200 radio stations 
throughout the country. WIN staff operate an interactive website, distribute programming 
to hundreds of progressive websites throughout the country, issue email news alerts, and 
employ Facebook, Twitter, and other social media to attract and inform listeners.600 
Now, Emspak’s organization is trying to create a cooperatively-owned, pro-
worker news network in Wisconsin. The Forward! News Network (F!NN) could be 
replicated in other states to form a viable national network.601 They began by launching 
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an hour-long, talk radio program at the end of 2011. “The People’s Mic” (hosted by an 
experienced newscaster and senior producer at WIN) airs during afternoon “drive time” 
on a Clear Channel-owned FM station in Madison, the state’s capitol. There is already 
talk of syndicating the show. The next step involves building F!NN by tapping into 
existing networks of “citizen journalists,” progressive bloggers, radio broadcasters, and 
INDY media activists all across Wisconsin. F!NN would receive content and story ideas 
from grassroots journalists, then provide the additional reporting and editing needed to 
“ensure a high level of journalistic quality.” Emspak’s organization would also offer 
training and mentoring to expand the base of citizen journalists. The plan envisions F!NN 
maturing to the point where it could combine its own content and WIN’s national 
reportage into one- to three-minute daily newscasts for sale to Wisconsin radio stations.  
Altogether, the “People’s Mic” and F!NN would cost an estimated $100,000 a-
year for equipment, staff, stringers, and related expenses. (Current WIN personnel would 
also participate in F!NN.) Emspak’s group is raising start-up funds from grants and 
donations, but their projections show that the “People’s Mic,” and F!NN should attract 
enough advertising revenue to cover half their operating costs after a few months in 
business. According to Emspak, the Forward! News Network could be replicated now in 
at least nine states with well-developed grassroots news outlets: California, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. He said the 
ILCA’s network of editors and publications would be a natural fit with the Forward News 








Conditions are ripe for a new mass movement of workers. Real median wages for 
U.S. workers have stagnated since the early 1970s, while union membership rates have 
continued to fall.602 During the past five years alone, millions of wage earners lost their 
jobs, homes, and savings in a deep recession fueled by financial fraud and speculation.  
Institutional labor appears paralyzed; unable to reverse its own decline or to effectively 
respond to the problems facing U.S. wage earners. And the U.S. is no longer the 
ascendant world power it was in the 1950s and 1960s. As global competition tightens, 
living standards are likely to worsen for U.S. workers. The need to organize and fight will 
only grow. But the need for change is not enough. 
New movements arise from broad, oppositional discourse; from bold 
experimentation with new identities, ideas, and forms of collective action. As Jon Bekken 
observed, working-class communities sustained the working-press in the early 1900s, but 
equally important, the workers’ press helped construct and sustain working-class 
communities by providing spaces for people to share ideas and promote collective 
action.603 Nancy Fraser made the same point when she wrote that human preferences, 
                                            
602 Heidi Shierholz, “Fix it and Forget it: Index the Minimum Wage to Growth in Average 
Wages,” EPI Briefing Paper #251, Dec. 17, 2009, Economic Policy Institute; 
http://epi.3cdn.net/91fd33f4e013307415_rum6iydua.pdf (accessed Aug. 1, 2011); “State of Working 
America Data,” Economic Policy Institute, www.epi.org/research_data/state_of_working_america_data/  
(accessed Dec. 12, 2011);  Gerald Mayer, “Union Membership Trends in the United States,” CRS Report 
for Congress, Aug. 31, 2004. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace&sei-
redir=1#search=%22U.S.%20union%20membership%22 (accessed Aug. 4, 2011).  
 







identities, and interests are not “given exogenously.” They “are as much outcomes as 
antecedents of public deliberation.”604  
Union journalists can create a new movement, not by willing one into existence 
but by providing people in struggle with a voice and an instrument for self-organization. 
New waves of unrest are erupting across the United States. Activists are experimenting 
with new identities and organizational forms, including the Occupy Movement (“We are 
the 99 Percent!”), workers’ centers for immigrant and day laborers, and community 
unions that fuse workplace and neighborhood concerns.605 Union journalists need 
popularize these and other experiments, and stimulate broad debate about what people 
need, and what must be done to satisfy those needs. To ignite a new movement, union 
journalists must to reach beyond the dwindling minority of workers who currently belong 
to unions and build a labor press for all who labor. 
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APPENDIX 1  
Timeline 
1949: AFL and CIO editors collaborate to kill the left-leaning Federated Press 
(FP) news service. They establish an alternative service, Labor Press 
Associated (LPA). AFL and CIO leaders pressure affiliates to quit the FP 
and join the LPA. 
1955: The AFL and CIO merge to form the AFL-CIO. 
1956: AFL and CIO editors merge their organizations to create the International 
Labor Press Association (ILPA). 
1957: Local union publications comprise 20.1 percent of the ILPA membership. 
1958: Reacting to charges of corruption from the U.S. Senate’s McClellan 
Committee, AFL-CIO President George Meany restricts advertising in the 
labor press. The curbs are soon eased, but many union publications 
continue to refuse advertising. 
1963: Local union publications comprise 38% of the ILPA membership. 
1964: James Goodsell, editor of the Oregon Labor Press, is expelled from the 
ILPA executive council for reporting a revolt by 22,000 rank-and-file 
workers against two AFL-CIO international unions. 
1965: Ray Davidson becomes president of the ILPA in a surprise, contested 
election. Union journalists, upset by Goodsell’s expulsion and the 
domination of the ILPA by international unions and the AFL-CIO, urged 
Davidson to run. 
1966: ILPA presents the AFL-CIO with a detailed proposal to create 
community-based labor newspapers. ILPA would continue to campaign 






1971-1979:   Mailing rates for non-profit newspapers rise 1,200 percent, while the cost 
of newsprint jumps 150 percent. Many labor papers reduce the size and 
frequency of their publications, or cease publishing altogether. Many 
unions shift funds out of the labor press and into public relations. 
1979: Local union publications comprise 57.5 percent of the ILPA membership. 
1980:   Lane Kirkland succeeds George Meany as AFL-CIO president. 
1983: AFL-CIO creates the Labor Institute for Public Affairs (LIPA) to 
encourage unions to adopt electronic communication technologies, and to 
provide the federation with advanced, in-house, public relations 
capabilities.  
1983: ILPA changes its name to the International Labor Communications 
Association (ILCA). The change reflects a desire by union editors to 
embrace both electronic technologies and public relations.  
1983: For the first time, the AFL-CIO declines to provide ILCA with a full-time 
secretary-treasurer.  For the next decade, the AFL-CIO concentrates 
heavily on LIPA, and the federation and ILCA steadily drift apart. 
1985:  The AFL-CIO releases The Changing Situation of Workers and Their 
Unions. The report is a frank acknowledgement of labor’s dwindling size 
and influence. However, none of its recommendations to rebuild the 
movement mention the labor press. 
1991: Local union publications comprise 74 percent of the ILCA membership. 
1995:  John Sweeny’s “New Voices” slate assumes control of the AFL-CIO in 
the federation’s first contested election. Denise Mitchell, Sweeney’s 
director of Public Affairs, practices a tightly-disciplined style of public 






1996: James Earp is elected president of the ILCA, becoming the first local 
union editor to hold a top officer’s spot in the organization. Four other 
local union editors are also elected to the council.  
1998: Local union editor Marty Fishgold joins the ILCA executive council. He 
and other ILCA activists begin publicly criticizing the communications 
practices of the AFL-CIO. They argue that union journalists should be free 
to decide what to publish without interference from union officers. 
2002: Fishgold is elected ILCA president when the incumbent leaders resign. 
Four international unions quit the ILCA in protest. The AFL-CIO applies 
threatens to take over many of ILCA’s functions, and to charge the 
organization for services previously provided for free or at reduced rates. 
2005: Isolated within the ILCA executive council, Fishgold declines to seek 
reelection. He is succeeded by Steve Stallone, editor for the International 
Long Shore and Warehouse Union. Public disputes between the ILCA and 
AFL-CIO come to a halt. Relations between the two organizations 
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